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“Above all, this book provides a very basic service to our society’s vexed debates 
about transgender: it gives the empiricals. I have not come across a book that lays 
out the relevant factual background better than this one does. Through careful and 
detailed discussion of the particularities involved, Schiappa develops a pragmatic, 
moderate, and sensible approach to the main issues, culminating in his very helpful 
proposal to apply four different levels of gatekeeping to transgender people in 
different kinds of context. This moderate and context-nuanced approach is a 
sensible corrective to the ideological extremism that all too often comes from both 
sides.”
—Professor Sophie Grace Chappell, Open University
“Definitions matter: American, socialist, patriot, Trumpian . . . and woman. Schi-
appa does not think it is obvious that the state should be involved in all defining, 
though clearly it should in some. His warm, scholarly, humane, and readable book 
brings the discussion of trans rights and responsibilities to a higher level. But per-
haps more significantly, it raises, too, the level of the discussion about definition 
itself. The next time you reach for a definition to make an argument, think Schi-
appa, and pause. A long time.  So you don’t start throwing rocks.”
—Deirdre N. McCloskey, Distinguished Professor of Economics, 
History, English, and Communication
University of Illinois at Chicago

At no other point in human history have the definitions of “woman” and “man,” 
“male” and “female,” “masculine” and “feminine,” been more contentious than now. 
This book advances a pragmatic approach to the act of defining that acknowledges 
the important ethical dimensions of our definitional practices.
Increased transgender rights and visibility has been met with increased opposition, 
controversy, and even violence. Who should have the power to define the meanings 
of sex and gender? What values and interests are advanced by competing definitions? 
Should an all-boys’ college or high school allow transgender boys to apply? Should 
transgender women be allowed to use the women’s bathroom? How has growing 
recognition of intersex conditions challenged our definitions of sex/gender? In this 
timely intervention, Edward Schiappa examines the key sites of debate including 
schools, bathrooms, the military, sports, prisons, and feminism, drawing attention 
to the political, practical, and ethical dimensions of the act of defining itself.
This is an important text for students and scholars in gender studies, philosophy, 
communication, and sociology.
Edward Schiappa is the John E. Burchard Professor of Humanities at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His work in rhetorical theory and media 
studies has been published in journals in Classics, Psychology, Philosophy, 
English, Law, and Communication Studies. He is the author of a number of 
books, including Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning and Beyond 
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PREFACE: STRONGER TOGETHER
This book brings together a long-time scholarly interest in definitions and the 
political work of categories with an on-going commitment to social justice. Espe-
cially in the wake of the calamitous Trump presidency,1 I felt it was high time to 
add the T to three decades of (intermittent) research and advocacy concerned with 
LGB issues.2
It is important to make clear that I do not pretend to speak for the transgender 
community. It was more than three decades ago that Linda Martin Alcoff described 
what she calls “The Problem of Speaking for Others” (1991). Alcoff’s analysis 
remains a powerful scholarly intervention that reminds us of the inescapability and 
salience of our own position—in my case, a privileged white man. I am aware that 
I speak from a position of privilege, even if I cannot claim to be 100% aware of all 
the ways my training and previous research limits my field of vision. Still, as Alcoff 
notes, if I were to remain silent and “retreat” from these issues, I would fail my 
political responsibility to speak out against oppression, a responsibility “incurred by 
the very fact of my privilege” (1991, 8).
I have read and consulted with many trans people throughout the research and 
writing of this book. In my concluding chapter, I discuss the importance of the 
theme “Nothing About Us Without Us” and involving trans people in efforts to 
resolve sex/gender definitional controversies. There is, of course, great variability 
in the viewpoints held by transgender people. Two noteworthy examples must suf-
fice to make the point: Some transgender people describe their decision to transi-
tion as a matter of freedom and choice, and reject the “woman trapped in a man’s 
body” (or vice versa) narrative (McCloskey 2007; Bettcher 2013, 2014), while 
others insist there was no choice at all and embrace some version of the “wrong 
body” narrative.3 Recently, some trans people support J.K. Rowling’s and so-called 
“gender critical” scholars’ right to speak (McCloskey 2020), while others actively 
work to “cancel” or “de-platform” such speakers (see Chapter 9).4 In any case: 
Preface: Stronger together xiii
Though we must avoid essentializing a “transgender perspective,” I acknowledge 
and respect the fact that experiencing life as transgender is profoundly different 
than my own life experience.
Thus, I offer this book as a contribution to a conversation, speaking with my 
cis and trans brothers and sisters. I strongly urge readers to take up related policy-
focused work by such trans authors as Paisley Currah (2021, 2022), Heath Fogg 
Davis (2017), Dean Spade (2015), and Ann Travers (2018), as well as the important 
historical work by Susan Stryker (2017) and the extensive philosophical work by 
Talia Bettcher (see 2022, among others). It is important that we all listen to each 
other, and for us to all recognize the truth of the well-known saying that we are 
stronger together than apart.5  
Notes
 1 Paisley Curah aptly describes the Trump administration’s efforts to reverse Obama-era 
policies on sex reclassification as violence that “is both epistemic and has real material 
effects” (in Fischel 2019, 97).
 2 See Schiappa (2021) for a brief account of the origins of Schiappa (2008, 2012a, 2012b, 
2019) and Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes (2005, 2006).
 3 Some trans activists and scholars argue that the “wrong body” narrative was imposed by 
the medical profession, while others feel that the it is a useful way to express their felt 
experience. As Jack Halberstam put it: “The term ‘wrong body’ was used often in the 
1980s, even becoming the name of a BBC show about transsexuality, and offensive as the 
term might sound now, it at least harbored an explanation for how cross-gendered people 
might experience embodiment: I, at least, felt as if I was in the wrong body, and there 
seemed to be no way out” (2018, 1–2). Ulrica Engdahl provides a succinct summary of 
the critiques of the essentializing aspects of the “wrong body” narrative, while pointing 
the way to a theoretical account that avoids essentializing a gender binary while acknowl-
edging the lived experience of some trans people: “Wrong body as lived body expresses 
the situatedness of trans body experience as wrong, hence relativizing it. Wrong body 
as trans embodiment expresses subjectively felt bodily meaning interacting with cultural 
interpretations of bodies, where the subjective and the cultural are not always congruent. 
This way the gender binary is replaced with gender variance as a frame for understanding 
gender, offering a more fluid understanding of the trans body” (2014, 269).
 4 As Roger Brubaker puts it, “[W]hat does it mean to ‘think with trans’? The sheer variety 
of transgender experience precludes a univocal answer” (2016, 10).
 5 Taylor, Lewis, and Haider-Markel document how important it has been for the transgen-
der rights movement to join itself with the “gay rights cause, creating a broader LGBT 
collective identity” (2018, 35). Van Dyke and Amos (2017) provide a recent summary 
of the considerable scholarly literature documenting how central coalition building with 





The argument of this book is that increased visibility and interest in transgender 
issues and politics have contributed to a definitional rupture with regard to sex 
and gender. By definitional rupture I mean a dispute or series of disputes that can-
not be resolved simply or neutrally by reference to a dictionary or authoritative 
source, but only by considering the process of defining itself—how and why do we 
define words? Who should have the power to define? What values and interests are 
advanced by competing definitions?1
Though cultural understandings of what it means to be a woman or a man have 
gone through times of reconsideration and debate, it is arguably the case that at no 
other point in recent history have the definitions of “woman” and “man,” “male” 
and “female,” “masculine” and “feminine,” been more up for grabs than the pre-
sent. To resolve these definitional controversies, we need to consider carefully the 
political, practical, and ethical dimensions of the act of defining.
Despite the fact that transgender history is far from new (Meyerowitz 2002; 
Stryker 2017), the visibility and salience of transgender issues has increased dra-
matically in the 21st century (Billard 2019, 165). The result is a clash over how one 
defines sex and gender. On one end of the spectrum, those who can be described 
as biological determinists argue that biological sex determines one’s gender and thus 
both are evident at birth or earlier, and that one’s medical designation should deter-
mine a host of legal and societal constraints based on one’s assigned sex. On the 
other end of the spectrum, those who might be called autonomous nominalists or 
advocates of “self-identification” or “first-person authority” contend that gender 
identity is independent of biology and is a purely personal decision and, as such, 
should be respected and never regulated or discriminated against.2
These two opposing ways to define sex/gender have become highly politicized, 
first with the Trump administration and now with conservative state legislatures 
pushing a biological determinist approach wherever possible, while the Biden 
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administration, the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives, and more 
liberal state legislatures have championed self-identification.
Though I have simplified the extreme positions, it is worth noting that advo-
cates on either end of the spectrum might invoke the phrase “a boy is a boy” or 
“a girl is a girl.” The biological determinist means that biology is destiny and 
thus immutable; whereas the nominalist is advocating that we respect a person’s 
self-identification and not qualify it, for example, with the “trans” prefix. That 
people with such disparate starting points would make similar pronouncements 
while meaning very different things suggests a definitional rupture that cannot 
be resolved simply or neutrally but only by considering the process of defining 
itself.
If asked how I  think sex and gender should be defined, my answer is that it 
depends on the context in which the question is posed. My goal in this book is 
not to offer a single, definitive answer, but rather to advocate a definitional process 
that takes seriously the political, practical, and ethical dimensions of the act of 
defining. In the final chapter, I  describe the need for purpose-oriented defini-
tions, and offer “levels of scrutiny” that are adapted from different levels of scrutiny 
found in U.S. constitutional law, in order to unpack the idea of context-specific 
standards or criteria for definitions of sex/gender. To preview the book’s overall 
argument: The purposes of definition, and the values and interests that competing 
definitions or definitional criteria advance, vary considerably by context. While 
self-identification or first-person authority should be presumptive whenever and 
wherever possible, I conclude that there are rare contexts in which something more 
than a potentially ephemeral self-identification is justifiable. As will become clear, 
the further that definitional criteria move away from self-identification (such as 
requiring gender reassignment surgery), the more compelling the justification for 
segregation by sex needs to be.
Defining “transgender”
“Cisgender” refers to people whose sense of gender corresponds to their assigned 
sex at birth. “Transgender” describes people whose sense of gender does not cor-
respond to their assigned sex at birth, and they wish to transition socially and 
sometimes medically to live and express their gender.3 As the National Center for 
Transgender Equality notes, “Gender expression is how a person presents their 
gender on the outside, often through behavior, clothing, hairstyle, voice or body 
characteristics” (2016b; see also Parsa & Katz-Wise 2021).
We learn the meaning of words that denote categories by seeing or hearing other 
language-users (initially, parents and caregivers) demonstrate how to use the word 
with respect to clear examples, which can be described as prototypical exemplars. 
Thus, most people learn the word “transgender” in reference to people who have 
both socially and medically transitioned, such as Caitlyn Jenner, Renée Richards, 
or Chaz Bono. Social transitioning typically includes a change of name, pronouns, 
clothing, and hairstyle. Medical transitioning can include hormone treatments and 
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surgery. In prototypical cases, the decision to transition is a response to a strongly 
felt discomfort with one’s assigned gender, known as gender dysphoria. As we will 
see, some regulatory definitions of men and women require a diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria as a necessary attribute for a transgender person to “count” as a woman 
or man in a particular context (such as the U.S. military).
For the purposes of this book, I  focus on the prototypical understanding of 
transgender as someone who a) experienced gender dysphoria and b) transitioned 
socially and often medically. That focus certainly is not intended to deny the word 
to people who do not share both attributes, but rather to identify and illumine the 
issues facing transgender people who navigate very specific contexts that have been 
segregated by sex, such as single-sex schools, bathrooms, sports, and prisons.
The transgender phenomenon is related but conceptually distinct from the 
larger cultural phenomenon of gender variance. Some people identify as gender non-
conformist, genderqueer, nonbinary, or other terms that challenge the traditional 
binary language of gender. For the most part, I will not be focusing on gender 
variance. Again, this is not meant in any way to marginalize the experience of 
nonbinary people or gender nonconformists, but is designed to maintain focus 
specifically on the regulatory definitions based on the binary of male and female.
An example of how the vocabulary of describing gender is, itself, fluid is how 
the actor and comedian Eddie Izzard has self-identified over the years. As a stand-
up comedian, Izzard often wore women’s clothing and self-described (at the time) 
as a transvestite, straight, and (tongue in cheek) as a “male lesbian.” In the Emmy-
winning show, Dress to Kill, Izzard talks about the category of transvestites to point 
out that it could include people ranging from “weirdo” transvestites to “executive” 
transvestites, and as a category distinct from drag queens (2002). Research I con-
ducted with colleagues Peter Gregg and Dean Hewes found that watching Dress 
to Kill not only helped to educate viewers about the category of transvestites but 
also reduced negative attitudes held toward the group (Schiappa, Gregg, & Hewes 
2005).
Since that time, Izzard has self-identified as transgender (Ruby 2016). Izzard 
and others embrace what has been depicted as the Transgender Umbrella4 that 
subsumes a wide variety of categories including “any individual who crosses over 
or challenges their society’s traditional gender roles and/or expressions” (Mays & 
Hill 2014).
Initially, the labels “nonbinary” or “gender nonconformist” would be more 
precise (from my standpoint), since Izzard said “I  identify somewhat boy-ish 
and somewhat girl-ish. I  identify both but I  fancy women” (Ruby 2016). More 
recently, however, Izzard has stated that she prefers “she/hers” pronouns and “at 
the moment, Izzard is self-identifying as a trans woman” (Hattenstone 2021). To 
be clear, Eddie Izzard can self-identify any way Eddie Izzard wants to self-identify. 
I make a distinction between transgender and nonbinary because it matters for how 
regulatory definitions function in sex-segregated contexts. Thus, when I use the 
word “transgender” in this book I am using it in the more limited, prototypical 
sense stipulated earlier.
4 Introduction
The objective of this book is a narrow one—to raise the question of how regula-
tory definitions of sex/gender should be thought about at a time I describe as the 
Transgender Exigency. There are other transgender issues that are important but 
go beyond the scope of this book, such as “At what age should children be able to 
make decisions about medical transitioning?” I set aside this particular question in 
part to keep the current project manageable, and in part because there are questions 
involving developmental psychology that I do not feel confident about handling.5 
I also do not address the issues of “desistance” or “detransitioning”—when a person 
who has begun or even completed social and medical transitioning to a different 
gender and later changes their mind. Important issues, to be sure, but for now 
I want to maintain a specific focus on regulatory definitions.
In Chapter 3, I recount some of the awful statistics of how transgender people in 
the United States are frequently treated. As a nation, we need to do better. It is my 
hope that this book can contribute to the ongoing national dialogue to articulate 
and enhance the rights of transgender people.
Notes
 1 Academic colleagues in philosophy tell me that my work here bears a relationship to work 
described as conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering. I agree that there is an affinity, 
FIGURE 0.1 The Transgender Umbrella
Source: Graphic courtesy of the GENDER book (thegenderbook.com)
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but must set aside for another day the task of integrating the growing literature in that 
area with my previous and current work on definitional practices (Schiappa 2003). See: 
Burgess, Cappelen, and Plunkett (2020), Cappelen (2018), and Cull (2020).
 2 Brubaker describes the two approaches as essentialist versus voluntarist (2016).
 3 In Transgender: A Reference Handbook, Aaron Devor and Ardel Haefele-Thomas stipulate 
that “Transgender or trans are both umbrella terms used to describe a range of people 
who share the feature of not feeling that the sex and gender assignments made for them 
at birth were correct” (2019, 8). See also Rawson and Williams (2014).
 4 There are a number of graphic representations of the Transgender Umbrella, the earliest 
of which can be found as Appendix E to the San Francisco Human Rights Commission’s 
Investigation Into Discrimination Against Transgendered People (Green 1994, 68).
 5 For a thoughtful history of transgender children, see Gill-Peterson (2018). Also, though 
I do not write here about age-related issues of transition, it is clear that legislation such 
as that passed by the Arkansas legislature to ban any and all medical treatment for those 
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Think about the word “woman.” What does it mean? In the Merriam-Webster Dic-
tionary the first definition listed for “woman” is “An adult female person.” While 
this is a perfectly reasonable definition, the point I want to make initially is that if 
English is your first language, it is highly unlikely that you learned how to use the 
word “woman” by looking up its dictionary definition. More likely, you have no 
memory of learning the word, though obviously at some point you did.
Learning a word like “woman”—a noun that refers to a category of people—
typically involves witnessing the word used by one’s parents or acquaintances to 
refer to what are described as prototypical exemplars. That is, we learn category-
denoting words by seeing or hearing more experienced language-users employ 
the word with respect to clear examples. As we see or hear the word used to refer 
to examples, we acquire what are called “learned similarities” among them such 
that we can successfully generalize from those examples to use the word correctly. 
When we use the word incorrectly as a child, generally someone corrects us so we 
learn what does or does not count as a woman.
In fact, most of our vocabulary is learned without ever needing to refer to a 
dictionary. History illustrates the fact that languages can grow and flourish without 
collecting formal definitions into a dictionary. After all, the first dictionary of Eng-
lish was Cawdrey’s Table Alphabetical in 1604, after William Shakespeare had written 
such masterpieces as Hamlet and Romeo and Juliet. Furthermore, scholars who study 
how children learn their first language document that formal dictionary definitions 
are rarely part of young children’s language learning process. Learning to define a 
word, especially with the classic Aristotelian form (“An X is [a kind of] class name 
that has such-and-such attributes”), is an advanced linguistic skill developed through 
“time, practice, and exposure” (Gandía 2016, 4).1
Dictionary definitions represent the publisher’s account of how words are most 
commonly used by a linguistic community. Dictionaries provide a descriptive 
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account of definitions commonly referred to as lexical definitions. Such definitions 
obviously change to reflect new language use. In November 2020, for example, 
Oxford dictionaries updated their account of the word “woman” to correct out-
dated and sexist usage (Zdanowicz 2020).
A definitional “gap” occurs when someone hears or reads a word they don’t 
recognize and need to look up the definition, such as someone hearing reference to 
a “shingle” haircut or hearing someone describe a political belief as “antediluvian.” 
Such gaps are easy to fill under most circumstances. Even if several definitions of 
the same word are listed in a dictionary, an experienced language user normally can 
consider the context in which the word appears and correctly identify the relevant 
definition.
Even if children do not learn the meaning of most words by reference to a 
dictionary, dictionary definitions nonetheless serve a valuable archival function of 
identifying the most common uses of the words of a given language. They serve 
as a sort of collective memory to fill in the gap when we read or hear a word with 
which we are unfamiliar. Dictionaries are descriptive in the sense that they pro-
vide the predominant meaning of words, but also prescriptive in the sense that they 
convey what is taken as the “correct” usage and hence implies how we ought to 
use words.
Certain definitions describe a category of objects or actions that are considered 
important only or primarily within highly specific contexts to a particular group of 
language-users. Thus, in addition to conventional dictionaries, there are dictionar-
ies that are designed for specialized language-users, such as legal dictionaries for the 
field of law and medical dictionaries for health care professionals. The larger and 
more complex a society becomes, the greater the need for such resources as special-
ized dictionaries to ensure that specialists talk the same talk, so to speak.
In this book, I am interested in a specific category of definitions that is a sub-
set of what are known as stipulative definitions. A stipulative definition of a word 
does not depend on prior usage (though it may be informed by it); rather, a group 
of language-users agree that in a given context, the word X has a specified and 
agreed-upon meaning. For example, in poker the word “flush” is defined by Mer-
riam-Webster as “a hand of playing cards all of the same suit,” and the word has 
no necessary relationship to uses of the word “flush” in other contexts, such as 
plumbing.
The focus of this book is on what can be called regulatory definitions, understood as stipu-
lative definitions that function to regulate some aspect of human behavior.
Regulatory definitions can be found in a wide array of contexts, from recrea-
tional games to laws governing matters of life and death. Learning to play a game 
typically involves learning the rules, and as games grow more sophisticated, such 
rules often require a set of specific definitions. The 2019 edition of Major League 
Baseball’s Official Baseball Rules includes a section titled “Definitions of Terms” that 
includes all of the key words found in the rules, from “adjudged” to “wind-up 
position.” Under normal circumstances, the umpires officiating a game have the 
power to decide what counts as a “balk,” “spectator interference,” and so forth.
The role of regulatory definitions 11
As I describe in an earlier book titled Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics 
of Meaning, the legal definition of “death” changed in the 1970s and 1980s. Prior 
to the change, the standard definition used to declare a person “dead” was the ces-
sation of cardio-respiratory activities. As technology changed such that patients 
could have their cardio-respiratory activities maintained with the aid of machines, 
the standard definition became one of the cessation of brain activities—so-called 
“brain death.” The legal change was important because there were patients who 
could be considered alive under one definition but dead under another, and indeed 
there was a case brought against a doctor for murder for harvesting organs for 
transplant before the patient was considered dead by current law. Under normal 
circumstances, it is stipulated by law that an authorized medical professional and 
only an authorized medical professional has the power to pronounce a person dead.
The two examples I just described may seem quite different, but from the per-
spective of regulatory definitions, they share important elements. First, from the 
standpoint of linguistic behavior, regulatory definitions advance what I describe as 
“denotative conformity.” That is, learning the definitional rule that “X counts as Y 
in context C”2 improves the odds that we understand and describe aspects of our 
reality in a common manner. We want to be able to observe a phenomenon and 
agree that X is a Y. We don’t always achieve this goal, as anyone who has observed 
an argument between a baseball manager and an umpire can attest, but the goal of 
regulatory definitions is that we use language to describe a situation in a predictable 
and shared manner. Thus, one important goal of regulatory definitions is denota-
tive conformity.
Second, we define words to serve one or more specific purpose and to promote 
certain values or interests for those involved. To play baseball, one has to know 
what counts as a balk, a walk, a run, etc., so the purpose of baseball’s rules and 
definitions is to ensure all players know what is going on and how to play the game. 
In matters of life and death, there are serious consequences to declaring someone 
dead, from filing criminal charges of murder in some cases to being permitted to 
harvest organs to transplant in another. We need to know if a particular person 
counts as alive or dead to meet all sorts of needs and interests—religious, legal, 
medical, familial, etc.
Groups, organizations, or institutions have various motivations for advancing 
regulatory definitions. In games, a paramount value is fairness. And because we 
value life, it is understandable that we want to be very careful not to make mistakes 
in pronouncing someone dead prematurely. As we will see later in this book, the 
question of why an organization or institution is defining a word—what values and 
interests are being served by a particular definition—is crucial.
Third, regulatory definitions are formulated and authorized by recognized 
organizations or institutions, such as Major League Baseball or a state legislature. 
Outside of the purview of those organizations or institutions, the rules potentially 
have no authority. As this book proceeds, there will be ample examples of how 
one organization or legal jurisdiction may have one set of definitions (of “male” 
and “female,” for example) that are different from another organization or legal 
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jurisdiction. Regulatory definitions always depend on the backing of some sort 
of recognized entity that has been empowered to regulate a particular domain 
of human activity. Within the relevant contexts, specific individuals typically are 
empowered by the regulating entities to decide whether X counts as Y or not 
in any given instance, from an umpire declaring a balk to a medical professional 
declaring a patient dead.
I argue in this book that—in some contexts—definitions of female and male, 
women and men, should be treated as regulatory definitions crafted to further 
social and personal purposes, needs, and interests. They are formulated for the pur-
pose of “determining gender” in specific contexts that are typically segregated by 
sex (Westbrook & Schilt 2014).3 For the foreseeable future, it is neither necessary 
nor possible to devise a “one size fits all” definition that will meet all our needs at all 
times and in all contexts. This will strike some as counter-intuitive, because most 
of us grow up believing that one’s identity as a man or woman is something stable, 
enduring, and “given” at birth. As we will see, as we move into the third decade of 
the 21st century, the situation is more complicated than that.
We have many “social selves,” as William James put it (1981, 294); some of 
those selves are recognized and acknowledged by institutions while others may 
be relevant only in informal social settings. The point with which I want to end 
this chapter is that the practice of having regulatory definitions that pertain to our 
personal identity is not new or unique to defining sex and gender. Each of us, as 
individuals, have many qualities and attributes that are used to define us in various 
social contexts. I am an educated, white, cisgender male well over the age of 21 
who is a resident of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The attribute of my age 
is irrelevant in some contexts and highly salient in others. My age “entitles” me 
to certain privileges afforded by governmental agencies or institutions, such as the 
legal right to buy alcohol, to vote, and to obtain a driver’s license. My eligibility 
for certain institutional benefits that are dependent on age, such as Social Security 
retirement and Medicare benefits, also is regulated by law. So, age is an identity-
attribute that is sometimes used to regulate aspects of human behavior and other 
times is irrelevant.
My status as a white cisgender male is supposed to be irrelevant to most insti-
tutional regulations, but I am not so naïve as to deny the unearned privileges his-
torically associated with such an identity. Privilege, including unearned privilege, 
is negotiated socially, thus various social settings will result in differences in the 
opportunities or obstacles my social self will encounter. Since I present as a male, 
for example, my male-identity is accorded privilege in some settings (such as walk-
ing down the street at night relatively free of fear of abuse or assault) and disapproval 
or worse in others (such as in a battered women’s shelter, a cloistered convent, or 
a women-only train car).4
One’s sex and gender identity is irrelevant in some contexts and highly salient 
in others. The contexts in which sex and gender identity are subject to specific 
regulatory definitions adjudicated by specific institutions are relatively rare, but that 
does not make them unimportant. To understand the complexity of defining sex 
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and gender in such contexts, the next chapter provides a brief review of how our 
understanding of them has changed in recent history.
Notes
 1 I develop the point that children learn language without relying on dictionaries at length 
in Chapter 2 of Schiappa (2003). See also Litowtiz (1977) and Nippold (1988), Chapter 4.
 2 After Searle (1995).
 3 As Paisley Currah puts it, “The only thing we can say for sure about what sex means is 
what a particular state actor says it means” (in Fischel 2019, 100).
 4 It should be noted that there are many more contexts that exclude women than exclude 
men, and that two of my examples of women-only spaces are the result of harassment and 
violence by men. See Chapter 9.
Transgender voices
“Gender, it turns out, is a language, and the more fluent I became in it, the more finding 
the words to express the messy humanity of myself and others like me became an urgent 
task—in part because it was becoming increasingly clear that, whether we asked for the 
job or not, trans people were going to play a key role in shaping the future of gender for 
everyone.”
Thomas Page McBee (2021)
“I was born biologically female. I use testosterone to masculinize myself so I feel more like 
me. I had a legal sex change and now live as a male. All male pronouns. I am a trans-
sexual and will never be biologically male. But I do live as a male. Simple.”
Buck Angel (2019)
“I can become a woman.
I have always wanted to. I have learned by accident that I can . . .
I can be a woman, he said. And he wept in relief, as the car drove itself. I am a woman, 
he said. Yes!
She said again, I am a woman, and wept.”
Deirdre Nansen McCloskey1
“I was not born in the wrong body. My body is perfect, and I love it. I see no contradic-
tion between this and the fact that I take hormones to alter my appearance or that I am 
considering surgeries to change the shape of my body. When a cis woman receives surgery 
to change the shape of her breasts, we don’t insist that she was born with the wrong breasts. 
When a child receives a surgery to snip a tied tongue, we don’t find it necessary to say the 
child was born into a tongue that didn’t match their ‘real’ tongue. The notion of being born 
into the ‘wrong’ body is, in my opinion, a convenient social lie that we have propounded 
to help the integration of transgender people into cisgender norms.”
Naomi A. Jackson2
DOI: 10.4324/9781003250494-4
For the purposes of this book, our understanding of “sex” and “gender” in the 
United States can be described as having moved through three stages over the past 
seven decades.3 The first stage was dominated by a simple biological understanding 
of sex. Prior to the advent of psychologists investigating what we would now call 
gender dysphoria in the 1960s and feminist theory and research in the 1970s, the 
terms “sex” and “gender” were rarely in dialogue, and “gender” was scarcely used 
at all in English.
The online Merriam-Webster Dictionary’s first definition of the noun “sex” is 
“either of the two major forms of individuals that occur in many species and that 
are distinguished respectively as female or male especially on the basis of their 
reproductive organs and structures.” Prior to the past 50 years, the word “gender” 
was used in English primarily to refer to grammatical gender as found in various 
languages, such as Spanish, French, and German. “Gender” finds common etymo-
logical roots with words such as genre and genus, related to classification (Connell & 
Pearse 2015, 9). The most common gender divisions include masculine, feminine, 
and neuter. In most cases the gender assignment is arbitrary, and in fact a word 
such as “manliness” has feminine grammatical gender in some languages (Spanish 
hombría, masculinidad, German Männlichkeit, Polish męskość, among others).
Computer-assisted research by linguistics professor Stefan Th. Gries with law 
professors Brian Slocum and Lawrence Solan found that aside from references to 
grammatical gender, “in American English in the 1960s, gender was an extremely 
uncommon word” (Brief for Amici Curiae 2019, 23). Though the word “gender” 
certainly could be used correctly to refer to males and females, masculinity and 
femininity, it was relatively rare to do so prior to the 1970s.
Thus, the first stage can be described as treating the categories of “woman” 
and “man,” “male” and female,” as biological givens. Stereotypically, behaviors and 
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traits thought of as “manly” or masculine would be assumed to be appropriate for 
men, and “womanly” or feminine for women. Such assumptions are described as 
the biological determinist or biological essentialist understanding of sex and gender, 
and it has been the dominant viewpoint toward the sexes for much of U.S. his-
tory, as subsequent chapters illustrate. Sociologists call this the “natural attitude” 
toward sex and gender (Garfinkel 1967; Kessler & McKenna 1978); that is, the 
taken-for-granted belief that people can be classified biologically into one of only 
two “natural” categories, each of which is determined by the presence of particular 
genitals, and for which exceptions are temporary or pathological—that is, a sign of 
physical abnormality.
The second stage of defining “sex” and “gender” emerged from work in two 
areas—psychiatry and feminist scholarship. A  thorough historical account of 
this period is beyond the scope of this book,4 but a few key moments deserve 
discussion.
The distinction between the words “sex” and “gender” in English first emerged 
in the 1950s and 1960s in the specialized literature of “psychiatrists and other med-
ical personnel working with intersexed and transsexual patients” (Moi 1999, 21; see 
also Mikkola 2019). Psychiatrists and psychologists needed to describe and explain 
the phenomenon of a patient who felt trapped in the proverbial “wrong body,” thus 
it became useful to distinguish a person’s biological sex from their psychological 
orientation. In a 1955 publication, New Zealand psychologist John Money and his 
colleagues introduced the notion of “gender role” based on their study of “her-
maphrodites”5 to distinguish attitudes and behaviors that were conceptually distinct 
from biological sex characteristics. According to Money, “Gender role is appraised 
in relation to the following: general mannerisms, deportment and demeanor; play 
preferences and recreational interests; spontaneous topics of talk in unprompted 
conversation and casual comment; content of dreams, daydreams and fantasies; 
replies to oblique inquiries and projective tests; evidence of erotic practices, and, 
finally, the person’s own replies to direct inquiry” (1955, 302).6 And in a 1963 paper 
presented to the International Psycho-Analytic Congress, American psychoanalyst 
Robert Stoller introduced the concept of “gender identity” to describe “the sense 
of knowing to which sex one belongs, that is, the awareness ‘I am a male’ or ‘I am 
a female’ ” (1964, 220).7
The 1980 edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) described the condition of a conflict 
between one’s biological sex and one’s gender identity as “gender identity disor-
der,” but the latest edition (DSM-V 2013) refers to it as “gender dysphoria.” While 
psychiatrists debate whether such feelings should be considered a “disorder,” the 
point here is that efforts by Stoller and other psychologists led to treating “gender” 
as a psychological rather than a biological concept.
The belief that men and women have essentially different natures, rooted in 
biology, has dominated thinking about sex roles throughout much of human 
history. Thus, drawing a distinction between biological sex and psychological 
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gender was an important step for feminists challenging the legacy of biological 
essentialism that has been used to justify discrimination against women (Bem 
1993; Fausto-Sterling 1985). In a number of influential feminist texts in the 
second half of the 20th century, “sex” was defined as a biological category, 
whereas “gender” came to be understood as a culturally dependent social or 
psychological category. The classic formulation is found as early as 1972 in 
sociologist Ann Oakley’s book, Sex, Gender, and Society: “ ‘Sex’ is a word that 
refers to the biological differences between male and female: the visible differ-
ence in genitalia, the related difference in procreative function. ‘Gender’ how-
ever is a matter of culture: it refers to the social classification into ‘masculine’ 
and ‘feminine’ ” (1972, 16).
Sandra Lipsitz Bem’s work as a psychologist is a useful illustration of the intel-
lectual trend of treating sex and gender as distinct, especially because her work was 
influential in and beyond her home discipline of psychology.
Bem’s feminism originated in the 1960s (“Early Career Awards” 1977). In 1970 
she and her husband Daryl J. Bem published “Case Study of a Nonconscious Ide-
ology: Training the Woman to Know Her Place” (Bem & Bem 1970). The paper 
argued that girls are not encouraged to consider professional careers as they grow 
up and women face discrimination in the workplace. A revision of the paper was 
published the next year for the Pennsylvania Department of Public Instruction for 
distribution to all Pennsylvania high school guidance counselors. In 1973, Sandra 
and Daryl Bem coauthored research (originally conducted as part of legal testi-
mony in sex discrimination cases) of how “sex-biased” job advertising leads to 
discrimination (Bem & Bem 1973).
In 1974, Bem introduced her Sex-Role Inventory in “The Measurement of Psy-
chological Androgyny.” The inventory built on earlier work by psychologists to 
assess masculinity and femininity as personality traits for diagnostic purposes,8 but 
was distinctive because it “treats masculinity and femininity as two independent 
dimensions, thereby making it possible to characterize a person as masculine, femi-
nine, or ‘androgynous’ ” (1974, 155). The traits represented the dominant think-
ing about what counts as masculine and feminine at the time, based on subjects’ 
perceptions of what attributes are desirable and appropriate for a man or a woman. 
The Bem Sex-Role Inventory, or BSRI, went on to become one of the more 
influential psychological measurement instruments of the past 50 years.
Bem’s project and others like it were important because they signaled a 
break from the long legacy of biological essentialism. Challenging the belief 
that one’s biological sex determines one’s psychological make-up, Bem argued 
that the traits we normally associate with masculinity and femininity could be 
found in males and females alike, and that a given person might score high on 
the masculinity scale, or on the femininity scale, or both. These traits, Bem 
suggested, were a matter of socialization. The “sex-typed person” is “someone 
who has internalized society’s sex-typed standards of desirable behavior for men 
and women” (155).
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The BSRI contains 60 items, categorized as follows:
Feminine Items
Affectionate Sympathetic Sensitive to the needs of others
Understanding Compassionate Eager to soothe hurt feelings
Warm Tender Loves children
Gentle Yielding Cheerful
Shy Flatterable Loyal
Soft-spoken Gullible Does not use harsh language
Childlike Feminine
Masculine Items
Defends own beliefs Independent Assertive
Strong personality Forceful Has leadership abilities
Willing to take risks Dominant Willing to take a stand
Aggressive Self-reliant Athletic
Analytical Self-sufficient Makes decisions easily
Individualistic Masculine Competitive









These items can be thought of as a catalogue of socially approved sex-specific 
traits for men and women in 1974. Interestingly enough, Bem did not use the word 
“gender” in the article. A  few years later, however, Bem made another impor-
tant contribution with the publication of “Gender Schema Theory: A Cognitive 
Account of Sex Typing” (1981). Bem defines “schema” as “a cognitive structure, 
a network of associations that organizes and guides an individual’s perception” 
(355). Bem contends that the “sex typing” socialization process is how “a society 
transmutes male and female into masculine and feminine” (354). Gender schema 
“becomes a prescriptive standard or guide” that “prompts the individual to regu-
late his or her behavior so that it conforms to the culture’s definitions of male-
ness and femaleness” (355). Offering empirical studies in support of her argument, 
Bem suggests that society “teaches” children a “substantive network of sex-related 
A brief history of defining sex and gender 19
associations” that become cognitive schema through which the world is under-
stood, and that “the dichotomy between male and female has extensive and inten-
sive relevance to virtually every aspect of life” (362). Indeed, later research by social 
scientists found that by age five children already have developed clearly defined 
notions of what constitutes appropriate behavior for men and women (Lytton & 
Romney 1991), and it should be no surprise that media portrayal of gender roles 
plays a significant gender socializing function (Ward & Grower 2020).
Bem followed up the introduction of her theory with efforts to encourage parents 
to raise what she described as “gender-aschematic children”—also described at the 
time as “nonsexist” or “gender-liberated” child rearing (1983). Bem’s goal was no 
less than to reduce the relevance of “gender” as a concept altogether: “[H]uman 
behaviors and personality attributes should no longer be linked to gender, and society 
should stop projecting gender into situations irrelevant to genitalia” (1983, 616).9
Bem was one of many feminists arguing that it is societal pressure, not biology, 
that shapes women’s and men’s understanding of gender roles. What is particularly 
noteworthy for our purposes is the fact that she attempted to specify the attributes 
defining masculine and feminine and to provide a simple paper and pencil test to 
operationalize and, in a sense, measure gender.
Various scholars documented the sort of normative messages that girls receive 
during socialization, such as “defer to men,” “nurture others,” and “be nice,” among 
others (see, for example, Unger 1975; Gilbert & Scher 1999). The sources of, and 
harm done by, gender typing and stereotypes became important topics especially 
to feminist psychologists (see, for example, Eagly & Steffen 1984). The Bem Sex 
Role Inventory became the most widely shared measure of gender, particularly for 
femininity (Mahalik et al. 2005, 418).
Efforts to identify the beliefs and attitudes associated with masculinity followed, 
including the Macho Scale (Villemez & Touhey 1977), a measure primarily of 
antifemininity and patriarchal beliefs; the Attitudes Toward Masculinity Transcend-
ence Scale (Moreland & Van Tuinen 1978); and the Brannon Masculinity Scale 
(Brannon & Juni 1984)—an influential measure of masculinity ideology.
Such work illustrates the important intellectual trend of the 1970s and 1980s to 
separate the concepts of sex and gender. One indication of the growing awareness 
and importance of the idea of “gender” is that the use of the word grew signifi-
cantly in publications from 1970 onward.10 The word gender “was rapidly popu-
larized in feminist political discourse as a tool to intervene in arguments against 
biology” (Fausto-Sterling 2016, 197). It did not take long for it to become standard 
in college textbooks in the humanities and social sciences to distinguish between 
sex as biological and gender as cultural/psychological.
For example, the glossary of a popular introductory textbook in sociology in 
1981 noted: “Sex (male and female): Refers to the division of the human species 
into the biological categories of male and female” and “Gender: Refers to social 
conceptions about what personality trait and behavior are appropriate for mem-
bers of each sex” (Robertson 1981, 629, 633). A textbook in psychology noted 
that “Femininity and masculinity are socially defined terms that are added to the 
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biologically determined sex class of the individual. Gender defines the social and 
cultural meanings brought to each anatomical sex class; that is, children learn how 
to ‘pass as’ and ‘act as’ members of their assigned sexual categories” (Lindesmith, 
Strauss, & Denzin 1999, 16).
Many authors and institutions continue to describe the difference between sex 
and gender as one of biology versus socialization. For example, in an essay on 
gender and sport, one finds “sex ‘refers to a person’s biological status’ and can be 
identified by ‘sex chromosomes, gonads, internal reproductive organs, and external 
genitalia’ while gender refers to ‘the attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given 
culture associates with a person’s biological sex’ ” (Fisher, Knust, & Johnson 2013, 
21, quoting the American Psychological Association 2011).
In a 2018 article titled, “Sex and Gender: What is the Difference?” science 
writer Tim Newman wrote in Medical News Today: “In general terms, ‘sex’ refers 
to the biological differences between males and females, such as the genitalia and 
genetic differences. ‘Gender’ is more difficult to define, but it can refer to the role 
of a male or female in society, known as a gender role, or an individual’s concept 
of themselves, or gender identity.” Also in 2018, researchers with the World Health 
Organization noted that, “Gender refers to the roles, behaviours, activities, attrib-
utes and opportunities that any society considers appropriate for girls and boys, and 
women and men. Gender interacts with, but is different from, the binary categories 
of biological sex” (Manandhar et al. 2018).
The case for what has been described as the social construction of gender was 
strengthened by a burgeoning scholarly literature documenting the cultural vari-
ability of gender roles, both over time and across cultures. Such scholarship, too 
voluminous to summarize thoroughly here, includes historical and cross-cultural 
research that documents the fact that what is considered “normal” and “appropri-
ate” for men and women is far from universal. For example, sociologist Raewyn 
Connell’s influential book, Masculinities (1995, 2005), became a classic on the cul-
tural specificity of gender role socialization that documents the notion of specific 
dominant or “hegemonic” understandings of masculinity.
Sometimes such historical or cultural gender variability seems trivial, such as 
the fact that knitting was once associated with men, especially sailors and fisher-
men, prior to the Victorian age; or the fact that over the past century, the gender-
appropriate color for boys or girls—blue or pink—has varied (Paoletti 2012; Del 
Giudice 2017). In other cases, the variability is quite consequential, such as the 
appropriateness or even legality of women holding a paying job, driving a car, or 
even being seen in public.
Anthropological and sociological scholarship on what has become known as 
third gender or third sex further illustrates the cultural variability of sex/gender. 
Gilbert H. Herdt’s collection, Third Sex, Third Gender: Beyond Sexual Dimorphism 
in Culture and History (1994) was an important landmark in such scholarship. How 
“third genders” are understood varies, of course, from culture to culture, but sev-
eral examples can illustrate their significance. Māhū translates to “in the middle” 
in Kanaka Maoli (Hawaiian) and Maohi (Tahitian) culture. The term is used to 
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describe those fitting into an indeterminate, intermediate gender that has both 
feminine and masculine qualities who play important cultural roles, and the māhū 
phenomenon “defies reduction to any of the notions of gender familiar to us in 
the West” (Robertson 1989, 314). As a recent article on CNN reports, “Their 
gender identity has been accepted on the island [Tahiti] since time immemorial, 
and mahu traditionally play key social and spiritual roles, as guardians of cultural 
rituals and dances, or providers of care for children and elders” (Ponsford 2020). In 
the early 21st century, the term mahuwahine was coined to refer specifically to what 
we would consider a male to female transgender identity (Ellingson & Odo 2008).
In recent decades the term “Two Spirit” has been used to describe someone 
who fulfills nontraditional gender roles in Native American cultures and that Euro-
peans actively discouraged (Brayboy 2018; Roscoe 1998). The label Two Spirit 
also has been criticized as eliding differences across groups. For example, for the 
Diné (Navaho) people of the southwestern United States, Nádleehi refers to a social 
category that we would describe as gender variable. Their role in the community is 
a fluid one, as Nádleehí may express their gender differently on different days, differ-
ent situations or contexts, and when holding positions that are traditionally filled by 
men or women. In Diné culture, the role of Nádleehí is recognized, accepted, and 
honored by members of the community and is a status unique to the Diné people 
(Epple 1998; Roscoe 1998).
Although the traditional cultural term does not align perfectly with Western 
definitions, fa’afafine are people who identify as being nonbinary or having a third 
gender in Samoa, American Samoa, and the Samoan diaspora. Fa’afafine are con-
sidered male at birth, but have a strong affinity toward feminine activities and a 
feminine identity, and take part in daily work training given to women. The term 
translates as “in the manner of a woman.” Fa’afafine have been part of Samoan cul-
ture for centuries, long before Western notions of “transgender” emerged (Dolgoy 
2000).
There are a number of other examples throughout the world of what we would 
now describe as gender variance. Though it is possible to describe such gender 
nonconformists using contemporary language, such as transgender or nonbinary, 
doing so misses the cultural specificity of the phenomenon. Indeed, some scholars 
have suggested certain cultures have a fourth or even a fifth gender (Graham 2007; 
Trumbach 1994). The point is simply that since the emergence of scholarship in 
the 1970s and 1980s that treats gender as a matter not of biology but of socializa-
tion, examples across history and cultures continue to accumulate, often pointing 
to centuries-old traditions and practices.11
* * *
The second stage I  have described has much to commend itself and it remains 
enormously influential. In many contexts, it has proven to be a useful framework 
to think about sex and gender. We are now in a third stage in which authors, in 
different ways and in different situations, sometime seek to collapse the catego-
ries of sex and gender. Because the motivations and purposes of those seeking to 
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reconsider definitions of sex and gender are quite varied, a simple “this happened 
and then that happened” narrative would be misleading. Accordingly, I  hope a 
more thematic approach can illustrate the complexity of the current definitional 
landscape. Specifically, I identify three strands of thinking that have emerged and 
proven influential.
The first strand of thought I want to identify can be described as the scientific 
argument for challenging the traditional sex categories of male and female. If one 
defines “sex” as biological and “gender” as psychological or cultural, then who has 
the right and the relevant expertise to define those terms? Because “gender” was 
introduced into the scholarly literature from the perspective of social scientists and 
humanists, and in light of the compelling evidence for the cultural and historical 
variability of gender norms that exists, it was not difficult for the idea that “gender 
is socially constructed” to become widely accepted. But what about “sex,” under-
stood as a biological category and hence the purview of natural science? This first 
strand accepts the epistemological authority of science; that is, the belief that sci-
entific definitions are somehow more “real” or certain than other kinds of knowl-
edge. Specifically: The scientific argument is that a nontrivial number of humans 
defy the traditional biological ways of defining male and female.
We typically view the number and type of sex-related genes and chromosomes 
as determining our sex (XX for women, XY for men), and we assume our genes 
determine external genitalia, internal reproductive anatomy (such as the uterus in 
females), sex hormone levels produced by the body (such as testosterone level), and 
the type of gonads (ovaries or testicles). But the situation is more complicated than 
that.12 The SRY (sex determining region Y) gene is found on the Y chromosome. 
The protein produced by this gene initiates processes that cause a fetus to grow 
male gonads and stop the development of female reproductive body parts (uterus 
and fallopian tubes). However, it is possible for a SRY gene to end up on an X 
chromosome and thus for someone with XX chromosomes to grow male charac-
teristics including testes. This is called the “46, XX testicular disorder” and occurs 
in 0.005% of births (1 in 20,000). Alternatively, it is possible for a person with XY 
chromosomes to develop typical female external genitalia, a condition known as 
the Swyer Syndrome, which is estimated to occur in 1 in 80,000 births. Further-
more, as many as 0.005% of XY males (2 to 5 per 100,000) experience androgen 
insensitivity, where their bodies do not respond to certain male sex hormones, 
known as androgens, and have mostly female external sex characteristics or “signs 
of both males and female sexual development” (U.S. National Library of Medicine 
2020). Other sorts of genetic variations are possible as well. In short, even if we 
define male and female strictly according to the science of genetics, not every 
human neatly falls into one or the other category.
Societies have long recognized the fact that some people are born, for example, 
with both male and female genitalia, and for centuries such individuals would be 
described as hermaphrodites. Today, a person whose body varies from the statisti-
cal norm for males and females in one or more of the areas described here may 
be categorized as “intersex” or having “Differences in Sex Development” (DSD).
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Just how many DSD people there are in the world is not known with precision. 
Because there is no systematic record kept of DSD births, some of the physical 
traits covered by broader definitions may not be discovered until puberty, attempts 
are made to conceive a child, or through genetic tests. Nonetheless, scientists have 
generated estimates based on the available data. Not surprisingly, how many DSD 
individuals there are depends on how one defines “intersex” or DSD. Using a nar-
row definition limited to cases where chromosomal sex is inconsistent with phe-
notypic sex (observable body parts), or in which the phenotype is not classifiable 
simply as either male or female, one estimate is as low as 0.018% (Sax 2002). Using 
a broader definition of any deviation from the prototypical male/female categories 
at the chromosomal, genital, gonadal, or hormonal level, biologist Anne Fausto-
Sterling estimates the figure could be as high as 1.7% (2000).13 More recently, 
estimates of the number of people described as having DSD have a similarly broad 
range. Medical conditions “in which an individual’s anatomical sex seems to be 
at odds with their chromosomal or gonadal sex” are quite rare—one in 4,500 or 
0.02% (Ainsworth 2018), a figure similar to Sax’s estimate. Some scientists feel that 
definition is too narrow. Eric Vilain, a clinician and former director of the Center 
for Gender-Based Biology at the University of California, Los Angeles, for exam-
ple, points out that the “most inclusive definitions point to the figure of 1 in 100 
people having some form of DSD” (Ainsworth 2018).
Fausto-Sterling has suggested, more as a thought experiment than as a serious 
policy proposal, that we imagine humans as divided into five sexes. Suggesting 
that the category of “intersex” was too broad, she suggested three subcategories 
be recognized: “the so-called true hermaphrodites, whom I call herms, who pos-
sess one testis and one ovary (the sperm- and egg-producing vessels, or gonads); 
the male pseudohermaphrodites (the ‘merms’), who have testes and some aspects 
of the female genitalia but no ovaries; and the female pseudohermaphrodites (the 
‘ferms’), who have ovaries and some aspects of the male genitalia but lack testes” 
(1993, 21).
Fausto-Sterling criticized the Trump administration’s Department of Health and 
Human Services efforts to define sex solely as male or female “based on immuta-
ble biological traits identifiable by or before birth” as based on “biological error” 
(2018). Noting that sexual development is “multilayered” and that the layers (such 
as chromosomal and hormonal) may be in conflict or resist simple binary division, 
she argued that the policy advocated by the Department of Health and Human 
Services “flies in the face of scientific consensus about sex and gender” (2018). 
Fausto-Sterling’s work will be discussed again in this book, but for now the point is 
that she represents a biologist (whose Ph.D. is in Developmental Genetics) who is 
often cited as providing scientific reasons to challenge the dominance of the two-
sex system (Fausto-Sterling 2020a, 2020b).
The second strand, by contrast, does not defer to the authority of scientific 
definitions but instead stresses that scientific definitions are social constructions, devised 
by scientists to meet certain needs and interests and subject to change. Thus, like 
gender, “sex” is also a socially negotiable category.
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The claim that scientific definitions are more stable than nonscientific defi-
nitions typically depends on the idea that the referents of scientific analysis are 
objective and represent what are called “natural kinds.” As philosopher Jerry Fodor 
summarizes the claim, “Science discovers essences, and doing science thereby links 
us to natural kinds as such” (1998, 158). The natural sciences, including biology, 
are assumed to be relatively immune to the challenges of redefinition. As historian 
and philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn puts it, “Their truths (and falsities) 
are thought to transcend the ravages of temporal, cultural, and linguistic change” 
(1989, 23).
The vocabulary of science provides what philosopher Saul Kripke called “rigid 
designators” that correspond to natural, not socially constructed, kinds. Kripke 
provides the example of gold—“[P]resent scientific theory is such that it is part of 
the nature of gold as we have it to be an element with atomic number 79” (1980, 
125). Thus, “gold” is a “rigid designator, whose reference is fixed by its ‘defini-
tion’ ” (1980, 136). In this line of thinking, “male” and “female” are rigid designa-
tors that refer to natural (biological) not social categories, and it is consistent with 
normal scientific progress if a third category, such as “DSD,” is added.
The history of science, however, challenges the idea that science produces per-
manently “rigid” designators. As Kuhn (1970) and other historians have demon-
strated, scientific definitions are always understood in the context of a particular 
scientific theory, designed to meet specific needs and interests. Theories change. 
Kuhn notes that the concept of an atomic number, used to identify gold, relies on 
a particular atomic-molecular theory, and only while such a theory “endures do 
the names it categorizes designate rigidly” (1990, 315).
A well-known example from history is the case of phlogiston, which was once 
considered a physical substance that is contained within certain objects and released 
during combustion. It was as real and empirically verifiable and measurable as any 
other scientific concept of its time. Now, of course, the theory of phlogiston has 
been superseded by a theory of gases in which phlogiston is no longer considered 
real (White 1973). The term has changed its status from a hypothesized rigid des-
ignator to fiction.
Not all examples of conceptual evolution are as dramatic as the rise and fall 
of phlogiston, of course. But most philosophers of science today agree that all 
scientific terms are similarly dependent on a larger set of beliefs, or theory. Even 
elementary concepts such as “force,” “species,” “heat,” “element,” and “tempera-
ture” have evolved over time as scientists revise their theories (Kuhn 1990, 313).14 
The controversy over whether to classify Pluto as a planet is the result of changing 
definitions promulgated by the International Astronomical Union. Once the IAU 
changed its definition of planets, it decided that Pluto did not meet all three of its 
definitional criteria and hence no longer counted as a planet. Even scientific defi-
nitions, then, may be described using the grammar of a regulatory definition: “X 
counts as Y in context C” if we think of a specific scientific theory as functioning 
as a historically situated context: “Gold counts as atomic number 79 in atomic/
molecular theory,” or “Pluto does not count as a planet according to IAU’s criteria.”
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The point of this second strand, then, is to apply the lesson of the history of 
science to our understanding of the biological categories of the sexes. Scientific 
language evolves to meets the needs and interests of specific scientific communi-
ties, and the current ways of categorizing humans’ biological sex is no less of a 
historically situated social construction than other scientific definitions. This is not 
to say that biological entities are not real, which is a common misinterpretation of 
describing a belief or practice as socially constructed. Rather, it is to call attention 
to the fact that emphasizing different definitional attributes (hormones versus chro-
mosomes, for example) for defining and categorizing woman and men, females and 
males, involves a choice of what values, interests, and purposes we see our defini-
tions advancing. Developmental biologist Rebecca R. Helm, for example, posted 
a widely circulated series of tweets in December 2019 stressing how complicated 
the idea of biological sex can become (Helm 2019). She notes, for example, that a 
person can be born with XY chromosomes but if the SRY gene appears on the X 
chromosome instead of the Y, that person could be physically female, chromosom-
ally male, and genetically female. So which attribute should be considered defini-
tive? In personal correspondence, Helm noted that, “as a developmental biologist, 
I define male/female as organisms producing sperm/eggs” (2020, emphasis added; 
see also Griffiths 2020). For the purposes of research as a developmental biologist, 
production of sperm or eggs (gametes) is “the key feature of biological sex.” How-
ever, Helm is quick to note that, in other contexts, using gametes as the definitive 
attribute for biological sex for categorizing humans “would be extremely problem-
atic” (2020).
Similarly, historian and philosopher of science Sarah S. Richardson argues 
against binary essentialist conceptions of sex and advocates what she describes as 
“sex contextualism” for the study of sex-related biological variables in basic, pre-
clinical biomedical research. She argues that there are multiple ways to define or 
“pragmatically operationalize” sex in biomedical research, especially in a labora-
tory context where the focus might be on hormone levels or chromosomes, for 
example, or involve “laboratory-tailored materials and technologies” (2021). Infer-
ences about humans may be based on other species with quite different sex-related 
processes, such as roundworms known as Caenorhabditis elegans. Difference in hor-
mone levels at different ages of mice indicates the most useful interpretation of the 
data would posit four sex categories, not just two. In short, Richardson’s analysis 
of a series of laboratory studies concludes that the definition/operationalization 
depends on the specific research context and purpose, so sex should be understood 
contextually (2021).
In short, as we will see in Part II of this book, the question of whether person 
X is male or female may have more than one correct answer. Those that want to 
rely on the authority of science to end the debate on how to define sex will be 
disappointed, as more than one definition is defensible, and the applicability of such 
definitions to public policy matters is open to debate.
The first two strands I have identified focus on destabilizing the concept of bio-
logical sex—the first strand by accepting the epistemological privilege of scientific 
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knowledge but pointing out how the category of DSD people challenges the 
exclusivity of the categories of male and female, and the second strand by empha-
sizing that scientific categories are always dependent on theories that are open to 
revision, and hence can be thought of as revisable social constructions. The point 
of both strands is that treating sex as a biological “given” that transcends social and 
cultural differences is not as obvious as once thought, and hence separating sex and 
gender relying on the assumption that gender is socially constructed while sex is 
not is no longer a safe assumption to make.
A third strand suggests that even if one could point to clear biological differences 
between the sexes, the meaning and significance of those differences is a product of 
social and cultural factors. That is, the concept of gender would not have emerged 
if there had not already been considerable cultural baggage associated with ideas of 
what it means to be male or female, even if those beliefs were not yet categorized 
as “gender” beliefs. As Judith Butler argues, cultural beliefs about what we now 
call gender figure in “the very apparatus of production whereby sexes themselves 
are established” (1999, 11). That is, a culture’s ideas about gender shape how we 
understand biological sexes (1999, 139).
As an example, think about the contemporary practice of “gender reveal” par-
ties. Friends of a couple expecting a baby gather and a dramatic “reveal” occurs that 
is always coded male or female, typically with blue or pink objects. The “mean-
ing” of an ultrasound reading is that it signifies a gender—typically, if a penis and 
scrotum are observed, the prenatal assignment is a boy; otherwise, it is a girl. Even 
before the baby is born, a host of cultural beliefs and practices are thus activated 
that reinforce the dominant cultural gender norms. Obviously, the relevant body 
parts of a baby are “real,” but according to Butler, social conditioning makes those 
body parts meaningful (and gendered). Once declared a boy or girl, the actions of 
parents, friends, institutions such as churches, schools, the medical establishment, 
and popular culture all work to socialize the child as to what it means to be a boy or 
girl. “Society”—if I may use the term as shorthand for the wide variety of social-
izing agents—both conveys messages about what it means to be a boy or girl, and 
serves as audience for girls’ and boys’ “performance” of gender roles (Butler 1988). 
According to Butler, gender is realized socially by a performative repetition of acts 
associated with being girls and boys, women and men—how we look, dress, move 
in the world, speak, think, feel, and behave. It is through such repetitive perfor-
mance that gender is constituted and perpetuated.
For Butler and certain other feminist philosophers, the fact that our understand-
ing of biological sex is deeply embedded in cultural assumptions and what we now 
call gender means that we should combine the concepts of sex and gender into a 
single construct: sex/gender. Gayle S. Rubin’s influential 1975 essay, for exam-
ple, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex,” described 
what she called the sex/gender system: “the set of arrangements by which a society 
transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in which these 
transformed sexual needs are satisfied.” Rubin contends that, “Gender is a socially 
imposed division of the sexes” motivated primarily by economic considerations as 
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women are commodified and exchanged within patriarchal societies (1975, 179). 
Historically, one man giving the gift of a daughter or a sister to another man for 
the purpose of matrimony fosters kinship ties between two men and the transfer of 
“sexual access, genealogical statuses, lineage names and ancestors, rights and peo-
ple” to take place (1975, 177). Women become “gendered” when the distinction 
between male giver and female gift is made in such exchanges.
While some theorists have embraced the blended term “sex/gender” to stress 
how interdependent the two concepts are, others have adopted the practice of 
treating the term “gender” as superordinate to include beliefs, assumptions, and 
practices about biological sex. Raewyn Connell and Rebecca Pearse’s definition of 
“gender” is an example: “Gender is the structure of social relations that centers on 
the reproductive arena, and the set of practices that bring reproductive distinctions 
between bodies into social processes” (2015, 11). In both cases—treating gender 
as the superordinate label, or adopting the blended term sex/gender—the point of 
this third strand is that the deep-rooted social and cultural assumptions about what 
it means to be a man or a woman, male or female make a clear distinction between 
“sex” and “gender” problematic.
The authority of science and scientific knowledge is often invoked to further 
various social, cultural, and political values. As a salient example, when infants were 
born with an apparent DSD (Difference in Sex Development), the result would 
be what Katrina Karkazis calls a “social emergency in which medical experts are 
called on to intervene.” The breach of the social order “caused by the birth of a 
baby with atypical genitals (and thus no obvious gender assignment) produces a 
crisis that must be addressed because it threatens social norms” (2008, 96). The 
decision to pathologize what used to be called a hermaphroditic condition is a 
cultural one, not simply an objective diagnosis. A decision by doctors to do surgery 
to “fix” DSD infants’ genitalia to make them into a boy or girl, was often based 
on their subjective assessment of genital size (Fausto-Sterling 2020b, 59–66). It 
has been only in the past few decades that a more patient-centered approach has 
emerged that questions whether infant surgery should be allowed until the person 
with DSD conditions can consent meaningfully (Davis 2015; Dreger 2015; Kessler 
1998; Luthra 2020).
It should be remembered that homosexuality was pathologized in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
to varying degrees until 1987.15 The removal from the DSM was politically impor-
tant to gay rights. Dr. Jack Drescher credits those changes for facilitating legal 
changes for homosexuals, and in particular the legal path toward same-sex mar-
riage. Writing three years before the Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex 
marriage, Drescher noted the progress of gay rights and declared: “Whatever that 
outcome, none of these changes in executing and discussion social policies that 
affect gay people would have occurred without the APA decision” (2012, 133).
The APA’s decision was not necessarily the end of the story; it may have been 
a necessary condition for gay rights, but not a sufficient one. The role of science 
is unpredictable when it comes to issues of sexual and gender identity. There was 
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a time when the search for the so-called “gay gene” was heralded by some gay 
rights advocates as proving that homosexuality was as an immutable characteristic 
and thus justified protection against discrimination.16 But as Robert Alan Brookey 
warned, had a gay gene been discovered, it could have become the basis for new 
lines of pathologizing tests and treatments by the biomedical industry (2002, 128).17
The fact that research is emerging in the 21st century that claims there may be 
a genetic explanation for gender identity is a mixed blessing, and should be treated 
with caution. The most provocative research in this vein posits that transgender 
people appear to be born with brains more similar to the gender with which they 
identify rather than their assigned gender (Wu 2016).18 On one hand, such research 
may persuade those who doubt the “realness” of expressions of gender dysphoria. 
On the other hand, as soon as one identifies a genetic basis for behavior some 
consider abnormal, it is not difficult to envision the emergence of tests and inter-
ventions with less than supportive aims (Swartz 2018). This does not mean such 
research should not be conducted, it means that the results need to be interpreted 
with care (see Powell, Shapiro, & Stein 2016).
In short, this last strand of thinking about sex/gender reminds us of the influ-
ence of culture and politics. As Fausto-Sterling noted in an essay titled “Science 
Won’t Settle Trans Rights”—citing political scientist Laura Ephraim’s important 
work (2017) on the political work that scientific “world-building” performs:
Gone are the days when only medical experts define sex, gender, and sexual-
ity. As social movements disrupt a previously comfortable scientific consen-
sus, traditional scientific groups grapple with questions of authority. Who, in 
this new world, speaks for science, and for whom does science speak? The 
answer is both unsettling and unsettled.
(2020a)
Similarly, Eric Vilain suggests the scientific situation with biological sex is suffi-
ciently unclear that it might be easier just to ask people their gender identity:
So if the law requires that a person is male or female, should that sex be 
assigned by anatomy, hormones, cells or chromosomes, and what should 
be done if they clash? “My feeling is that since there is not one biological 
parameter that takes over every other parameter, at the end of the day, gender 
identity seems to be the most reasonable parameter,” says Vilain.
(Ainsworth 2018)19
Defining gender in the 21st century:  
Fluid and multi-dimensional
Not surprisingly, different definitions of “gender” have proliferated, ranging from 
very broad descriptions to sophisticated efforts to specify how gender is understood 
in a specific population.
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An example of a broad definition is the one cited previously from the World 
Health Organization: “Gender refers to the roles, behaviours, activities, attributes 
and opportunities that any society considers appropriate for boys and girls, and men 
and women” (Manandhar et al. 2018). Or, consider the American Psychological 
Association:
Gender refers to the attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given culture asso-
ciates with a person’s biological sex. Behavior that is compatible with cultural 
expectations is referred to as gender-normative; behaviors that are viewed 
as incompatible with these expectations constitute gender non-conformity.
(2012, 11)
Such definitions are necessarily general, since specific gender norms can vary over 
time and across cultures. As sociologist Mary Holmes has stated, gender is a com-
plex phenomenon, the meaning of which in a specific moment in history and in 
a specific geographic location is influenced by issues of class, race, beliefs about 
the human body, and political ideology (2007). Accordingly, the best an initial 
definition of gender can do is to gesture toward the fact that cultures have different 
norms and expectations for women and men, though the details vary considerably.
Furthermore, many gender theorists see the constraining influence of gender 
norms as a social force to be opposed. Some favor the idea and practice of gender 
bending—that is, dressing or behaving in a non-gender conforming manner—as a 
form of activism to challenge dominant gender norms. Some promote the labels 
“gender fluid” or “gender fluidity” to stress the wide variety of social, cultural, and 
individual preferences (Hines 2018). Of course, what counts as gender bending is 
just as culturally variable as gender itself. A man wearing high heels and a lengthy 
wig might be considered gender bending today, but both were quite conventional 
for privileged men in Europe in the 17th and 18th century.
In contrast to efforts by some gender theorists to define gender broadly and 
deliberately loosely, other scholars have attempted to become increasingly detailed 
and specific in their understanding of how gender is understood in specific cul-
tures. Psychologists in the United States studying gender are a good example.
The Bem Sex Role Inventory was an attempt to measure masculinity and femi-
ninity as discrete if potentially complementary wholes, that is, the different items 
on the masculine and feminine list would be added together to create a single score 
on masculinity and a single score on femininity. This means that the BSRI treats 
masculinity and femininity as distinct dimensions of one’s personality, even if one 
person could score high in both. In the parlance of social science, the concepts of 
masculinity and femininity are each treated as unidimensional.
In recent decades, social scientists have explored masculinity and femininity as 
multi-dimensional, suggesting that a single individual might conform to some soci-
etal expectations regarding their gender but not others.
An example of a multi-dimensional approach to gender can be found in the 
work of psychologist James R. Mahalik and his colleagues, who produced the 
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“Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory” (2003) and the “Conformity to 
Feminine Norms Inventory” (2005). These norms include the following:
Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory
Winning Controls Emotions Risk Taker
Accepts Violence Playboy Dominance
Power over Women Self-Reliant Work is Primary
Disdain for Homosexuality Pursues Status
Conformity to Feminine Norms Inventory
Nice in Relationships Values Thinness Modest
Cares for Children Domestic Values Romance
Values Sexual Fidelity Interested in Appearance
Mahalik et al.’s inventories have been cited by literally hundreds of other studies 
and are influential examples of an effort to operationalize what is meant by gender in 
the 21st century, though—like many of the terms in the Bem Sex Role Inventory— 
most of the norms might be understood as stereotypes of how masculinity and 
femininity are perceived. Other examples of scales or inventories that explore 
femininity multi-dimensionally include the Adolescent Femininity Ideology Scale 
(Tolman & Porche 2000) and the Feminine Gender Role Stress Scale (Gillespie & 
Eisler 1992). Other examples that explore masculinity multi-dimensionally include 
the Male Role Norms Scale (Thompson & Pleck 1986) and the Male Role Norms 
Inventory (Levant et al. 1992). By 1990, hundreds of tests and measures associated 
with gender roles and issues had been developed and made available in handbooks 
(Beere 1990a, 1990b).
While social scientists have tried to articulate conceptions of gender with 
increasing specificity and accuracy, other scholars have advocated an understanding 
of gender that goes beyond the traditional categories of masculine and feminine 
with such concepts as gender fluidity, variability, transgender, gender-queer, and 
gender nonconformity. In The Apartheid of Sex: A Manifesto on the Freedom of Gen-
der, Martine Rothblatt advocates a chromatic system of gender would differentiate 
among hundreds of different gendered personality types—343 “shades” of gender, 
in fact (1995).
* * *
Thus, for various reasons, we enter the 21st century with less certainty and con-
sensus about how to define “sex” and “gender” than in any other point in modern 
history. The situation has become even more uncertain in light of the Transgender 
Exigency, and so it is to that topic I now turn.
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Notes
 1 McCloskey (2019, 50–51, emphasis in the original).
 2 Email to the author, July 31, 2021.
 3 I limit my focus mostly to the United States and approximately the past seven decades 
for the purposes of clarity. If one looks beyond mainstream and mostly white U.S. 
culture, the notion of third sex (or more) has an older history, including among Native 
Americans. And in the United States one can find antecedents of transgender lifestyles 
dating back centuries. See, for example, Susan Stryker’s Transgender History (2017) and 
Jen Manion’s fascinating book, Female Husbands: A Trans History (2020).
 4 See, for example, Crisler and McHugh (2011).
 5 “Hermaphrodite” is no longer the term preferred to describe DSD individuals, as I dis-
cuss later on. See Vilain et al. (2007) and Lundberg, Hegarty, and Roen (2018).
 6 For a detailed account of Money’s work and its legacy, see Germon (2009), especially 
Chapter 2.
 7 The phrase “gender role” can be found as early as 1955 (in Money, Hampson, & Hamp-
son 1955), but Stoller’s formulation is generally credited as the one informing subse-
quent gender theorists: “The term [gender identity] was introduced to the psychiatric/
psychoanalytic worlds in 1964” in Stoller’s article (Green 2010, 1457).
 8 Such tests included the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) Masculinity-Feminin-
ity Index, the masculinity and femininity scales of the California Psychological Inven-
tory, the Masculinity-Femininity score of the Franck Drawing Completion Test, and the 
Mf scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). These tests were 
used as diagnostic tools for mental health purposes, or, in the case of the Franck Drawing 
Completion Test, an effort to explore the relationship between personality attributes and 
creativity.
 9 I suspect Bem would have been a fan of the subreddit group, “pointlessly gendered”: 
www.reddit.com/r/pointlesslygendered/
 10 See the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) and Google Books Ngram 
Viewer (https://books.google.com/ngrams/) search for “gender” in English and Ameri-
can English.
 11 Other examples include the Hijra of South Asia, dating back centuries (Nanda 1994), 
the so-called third gender muxe of the indigenous Zapotec people of Mexico (Stephen 
2002); the femmenielli of Neapolitan culture that dates back centuries (Bertuzzi 2015), 
and the kathoey (กะเทย) of Thailand (Morris 1994; Totman 2003).
 12 See Richardson (2013) for a valuable account of the various efforts in the past century 
to find “sex itself ” in the human genome.
 13 Fausto-Sterling’s oft-cited figure of 1.7% is based on a research review conducted with 
her students and reported in the American Journal of Human Biology (Blackless et al. 2000). 
Hull (2003) accuses Blackless et al. of a variety of serious errors and suggests a figure 
of 0.37%. Sax’s (2002) figure of 0.018% is based on a definition that only “counts” 
congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) and complete androgen insensitivity syndrome as 
DSD conditions. Conditions that Sax excludes but Fausto-Sterling includes are Late-
Onset Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, Vaginal Agenesis, and any sex chromosome 
combinations other than XX or XY (including but not limited to Klinefelter syndrome 
47, XXY, Turner syndrome 45X, XXX, XYY, and other “less frequent arrangements”). 
Sax’s explanation for the exclusion of these categories is that they do not cause ambigu-
ous genitalia or, he believes, “any confusion regarding sexual identity” (2002, 177). He 
notes that 88% of those whom Fausto-Sterling classifies as “intersex” (DSD) are those 
with Late-Onset Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia or nonclassic CAH (LOCAH). Hull 
makes a similar argument (2003, 113). Sax claims: “From a clinician’s perspective, how-
ever, LOCAH is not an intersex condition. The genitalia of these babies are normal at 
birth, and consonant with their chromosomes: XY males have normal male genitalia, 
and XX females have normal female genitalia” (176). Any medical problems people with 
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LOCAH have, Sax argues, are not “intersexual in nature” (176). See also Fausto-Sterling 
(2020b, 324–326).
 14 The idea that the meaning of individual scientific terms, including so-called “observa-
tion terms,” depend on a larger theory is typically credited to Duhem (1954) and Han-
son (1958).
 15 After lobbying by gay rights advocates, “in December 1973, APA’s Board of Trustees 
voted to remove homosexuality from the DSM” (Drescher 2015, 571). The removal was 
neither immediate, nor complete. If a person with same-sex attraction was distressed, they 
could still be diagnosed as having “Sexual Orientation Disturbance” (SOD), according 
to the DSM II. In DSM III, published in 1980, “Sexual Orientation Disturbance” was 
re-named “Ego Dystonic Homosexuality.” Thus even in 1980, “cures” and “conversion 
therapies” persisted and doctors could justify their actions with reference to the DSM as 
a source of scientific authority. Thus, while the change in 1973 was significant and is still 
widely celebrated as a turning point, it did not end efforts by many to treat homosexual-
ity as a pathology (Drescher 2015, 571). It was only in 1987 that a revision of the DSM 
III finally and permanently removed “Ego Dystonic Homosexuality.”
 16 For a critique of such scientific research, see Stein (1999). For an argument against an 
entrenched “bioessentialist” approach to conceptualizing LGBTQ citizenship, see Wuest 
(2022).
 17 The current scientific consensus appears to be that there is no such thing as the gay gene 
(Lambert 2019).
 18 The idea that there are meaningfully different “male” and “female” brains has been cri-
tiqued at length (Eliot 2009; Rippon 2019). There are observable differences between 
certain physical features of female and male brains (cortical thickness, white matter vari-
ation, etc.), and it is these differences that have been compared to transgender subjects. 
Some studies conclude that the brains of transgender individuals are closer in structure, 
function, and activation patterns to the brains of their self-identified gender. See, for 
example, Bakker (2018) and Guillamon, Junque, and Gómez-Gil (2016).
 19 As a scholar of argumentation, I need to note here that the existence of difficult border 
cases or exceptions does not completely vitiate the utility of categories. The headline 
to Ainsworth’s article is: “Sex Redefined: The Idea of 2 Sexes is Overly Simplistic,” fol-
lowed with the subtitle “Biologists now think there is a larger spectrum than just binary 
female and male” (2018). While facially valid in light of research on people with DSD, 
there are some who infer from such headlines that the ideas of male and female are mere 
fictions. An equally valid headline could read: “The Idea of 2 Biological Sexes is Accu-
rate for 98%+ of the population.” That is, because the vast majority of humans have an 
anatomy, hormones, cells, and chromosomes that are consistently male or female, most of 
the time and in most contexts, people use the words “female” and “male” without confu-




“I have been out in rock and roll as transgender for 28 years. It was a different world back 
then. When I came out, the cross-dressing laws were across all the nation, so everything 
that I did as a trans person was illegal.”
Venus de Mars1
“That was the first day I ever heard the word ‘transgender.’ I remember feeling this over-
whelming sense of relief that there was finally a word that described me—a girl who had 
accidentally been born into a boy’s body.”
Jazz Jennings2
“Visibility, of course, is not the same as belonging. Language creates nuance, but not neces-
sarily legislation. Stories save lives and also, paradoxically, endanger them.”
Thomas Page McBee (2021)
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An exigency is a situation marked by an urgent need or demand, and the point 
of this book is that the rise of transgender visibility and civil rights has created a 
need for thinking through how we define sex and gender. I describe the situation 
as an exigency because attitudes, practices, and laws are changing rapidly and, as 
social and political efforts clash, lives are in the balance. Because the very method 
of defining sex and gender is now contested, we can describe the current exigency 
as a definitional rupture calling for a thoughtful consideration of the process of 
defining itself.
This chapter begins by noting the evidence for substantial prejudice against 
transgender people. I  then provide a brief description of the dramatic rise in 
transgender visibility that took place in the 2010s in the United States. That rise in 
visibility has had mixed results. On one hand, research proves that as people learn 
more about a minority group, including transgender people, there is an opportu-
nity for prejudice to be reduced and civil rights to advance. On the other hand, 
the evidence is clear that there has been a backlash in certain contexts, resulting 
sometimes in the deliberate exclusion of transgender people. Some of the specific 
contexts where definitions of sex and gender are being contested are examined in 
Part II of this book.
To illustrate how far and how fast U.S. culture has moved with respect to 
transgender individuals, I share two examples drawn from popular film that many 
readers of a particular age will recall.
In the 1991 comedy Soapdish, the villain of the movie is Montana Moorehead 
(played by Cathy Moriarty), an actress who schemes to undercut and replace the 
beloved star of a soap opera, Celeste Talbert (played by Sally Fields) and her newly 
united adult daughter, Lori (played by Elizabeth Shue). Just as Montana is about to 
triumph with Celeste’s character’s demise on a live broadcast, it is revealed from an 
old high school yearbook photo that Montana is actually a transsexual, formerly 
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“Milton Moorehead, of Syosset, Long Island.” Humiliated and horrified by the on-
air revelation, Montana flees the set, defeated.
A year later, The Crying Game was released. Described as a thriller, the movie 
explores themes of race, gender, nationality, and sexuality against the backdrop of 
the conflict in Northern Ireland. One of the most talked-about scenes in the movie 
occurs when the lead character, Fergus (played by Stephen Rea) is about to make 
love with Dil (played by Jaye Davidson), but discovers that Dil is transgender when 
he sees Dil has a penis.3 After hitting Dil in the face, Fergus rushes to the bathroom 
to vomit.
Soapdish assumed audiences would find it funny that Montana Moorehead 
was a transsexual and understand her reaction to being revealed as such. Crying 
Game similarly assumed we would find Fergus’s initial reaction plausible—even 
if the movie went on to demonstrate Fergus’s acceptance of and love for Dil. In 
both cases, the characters in the movie illustrate the “natural attitude” toward sex 
and gender described in the previous chapter; that is, the widespread and taken-
for-granted belief that people should be classified biologically into one of only 
two “natural” gender categories, each of which is determined by the presence of 
particular genitals and for which exceptions are temporary or pathological. The 
considerable societal forces at work to perpetuate traditional sex and gender roles 
discussed in the last chapter function to normalize masculine heterosexual males 
and feminine heterosexual females and thus treat deviations from those norms as 
“unnatural” or “abnormal.”
Thirty years later, attitudes toward sexual minorities are more complicated than 
when Soapdish and Crying Game were released.4 A sexual minority—now more often 
referred to as a Sexual and Gender Minority or SGM—is a group whose sexual 
identity, orientation, or practices differ from the heterosexual majority and who 
consider themselves part of the LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, & 
Queer or Questioning)5 population (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan 2009). If a given per-
son believes that the only “natural” or “normal” sex is heterosexual sex between 
masculine men and feminine women, and believes that biology determines one’s 
sexual and gender identity, then that person is more likely to hold prejudicial beliefs 
about SGMs.
There is considerable research documenting prejudice against SGMs in the 
United States. Particularly important are those surveys specific to attitudes about 
transgender individuals. In the first major national study, surveying 2,281 hetero-
sexual U.S. adults in 2005, Aaron T. Norton and Gregory M. Herek reported that, 
“ratings of transgender people were strongly correlated with attitudes toward gay 
men, lesbians, and bisexuals, but were significantly less favorable” (2013, 738). Nor-
ton and Herek used a holistic measure known as a “feeling thermometer” to assess 
how warmly or coolly respondents felt about different groups using a score from 
0 to 100, with 50 being a neutral response. In their study, women and men rated 
“women in general” as a group at an average “temperature” of 67.56 and “men in 
general” at 62.44. The average score for “gay men” was significantly cooler at 38.89 
and for “lesbians” at 42.10. The average score for “transgender people” was 32.01, 
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with males’ average score at 27.63 and females’ at 36.22. As noted by Norton and 
Herek, these scores are highly correlated with those for gay men and lesbians, but 
notably lower. “Highly correlated” means that if a person provided a low score for 
gay men, they were likely to provide a low score for transgender people as well (see 
also Billard 2018).
Studies reported by other scholars in the first decade of the 21st century docu-
mented similar negative attitudes toward SGMs, especially transgender people. Hill 
and Willoughby (2005) found that test subjects who were committed to traditional 
gender roles were more likely to hold negative views of SGMs. Julie Nagoshi and 
her colleagues (2008) found strong differences between men and women in their 
attitudes toward transgender people, with “hypermasculine” males in particular 
more likely to dislike homosexuals and transgender people. Shelia T. Brassel and 
Veanne N. Anderson confirm in a study of over 1,000 students that anti-trans 
prejudice correlates with “gender traditionalism,” similar to what I have described 
as biological essentialism (2020).
Such negative attitudes toward SGMs matter. There is considerable evidence 
of discrimination and violence against transgender people in the United States. 
A  report by the Gay, Lesbian,  & Straight Education Network states that 75% 
of transgender students felt unsafe at school because of their gender expression 
(GLSEN 2017). The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey reported that stu-
dents “perceived as transgender while in school (K-12) experienced some form of 
mistreatment, including being verbally harassed (54%), physically attacked (24%), 
and sexually assaulted (13%) because they were transgender. Further, 17% expe-
rienced such severe mistreatment that they left a school as a result” (James et al. 
2016, 4). Life after school is no easier for transgender people. According to the 
same survey,
In the year prior to completing the survey, 30% of respondents who had a job 
reported being fired, denied a promotion, or experiencing some other form 
of mistreatment in the workplace due to their gender identity or expression, 
such as being verbally harassed or physically or sexually assaulted at work. In 
the year prior to completing the survey, 10% of respondents were sexually 
assaulted, and nearly half (47%) were sexually assaulted at some point in their 
lifetime.
(James et al. 2016, 4–5)
A survey of over 80,000 youth in Minnesota found that transgender and gender 
nonconformity teens reported a suicidal ideation rate more than three times higher 
than cisgender youth (Eisenberg et al. 2017). In a survey of over 1,500 self-identi-
fied LGBTQ adults in June, 2020, 62% of transgender Americans reported facing 
discrimination of some kind in the past year: “Two-thirds (66 percent) reported 
that discrimination moderately or significantly affected their psychological well-
being, with nearly half (46  percent) reporting moderate or significant physical 
impacts” (Mahowald, Gruberg, & Halpin 2020).
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Zack Marshall and a team of researchers (2019) published an extensive lit-
erature review of publications between 2010 and 2014 that focused on research 
with transgender, nonbinary, and other gender diverse individuals and commu-
nities. They identified 99 articles exploring discrimination and marginalization 
of transgender people, and another 47 documenting violence and trauma. In 
November 2020, the Human Rights Campaign published An Epidemic of Vio-
lence: Fatal Violence Against Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming People in the 
United States in 2020, reporting at least 22 transgender and gender nonconform-
ing people killed in 2019 at the time of the report (HRC 2020). The American 
Medical Association also used the term “epidemic” to describe increasing vio-
lence against transgender people, especially transgender women of color (AMA 
2019). A review of 42 studies conducted between 1989 and 2015 by the Williams 
Institute reported that for transgender people, between 31 and 50% experience 
Intimate Partner Violence in their lifetime (Brown  & Herman 2015; see also 
Hoston 2018). Wikipedia maintains a constantly updated “List of unlawfully killed 
transgender people.”
Transgender people often face formidable obstacles to obtaining needed medical 
care. There is a shortage of knowledgeable and well-trained health care providers 
to aid transgender patients. Other obstacles include “financial barriers, discrimina-
tion, lack of cultural competence by providers, health systems barriers, and socio-
economic barriers” (Safer et al. 2016, 168). Transgender individuals can become so 
desperate for medical support for transitioning that they turn to “Do It Yourself ” 
measures:
Without access to quality medical care, trans people around the world are 
seeking hormones from friends or through illegal online markets, even when 
the cost exceeds what it would through insurance. Although rare, others are 
resorting to self-surgery by cutting off their own penis and testicles or breasts.
(Santora 2020; see Rotondi et al. 2013)
Though the Supreme Court has ruled that employment discrimination against 
transgender people violates federal law, no such protection exists for health care. 
The Trump administration reversed the Obama-era protection against discrimina-
tion for LGBTQ people in health care and health insurance (Simmons-Duffin 
2020). The Biden administration at the time of this writing is in the process of 
reversing the Trump administration’s anti-transgender policies, though it is clear 
that such efforts will encounter resistance from conservatives (Schmidt, Wax-Thi-
bodeaux, & Balingit 2021).
Thus, in the early decades of the 21st century transgender people face con-
siderable prejudice, too often culminating in violence. Simultaneously, we are 
witnessing an unprecedented rise in visibility of transgender people. While there 
is evidence that public attitudes are gradually changing, prejudicial attitudes are 
fueling a backlash in some states (Andrew 2021; Moreau 2021).
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Declaring a transgender moment
The second decade of the 21st century was a pivotal one for transgender people 
in the United States. On October 30, 2012, then-Vice President Joe Biden was 
quoted calling transgender equality “the civil rights issue of our time” (Bendery 
2012).6 Time magazine featured transgender actress and advocate Laverne Cox on 
its June 9, 2014 cover and declared “The Transgender Tipping Point: America’s 
next civil rights frontier.” Less than eight months later, in his 2015 State of the 
Union Address, Barack Obama became the first U.S. president to utter the word 
“transgender” in public. Sarah McBride was the first transgender speaker in history 
at a major party national convention when she spoke to the Democratic National 
Convention in July, 2016. It is likely that Lady Gaga’s halftime song “Born This 
Way” at Super Bowl LI was the first time the word “transgender” was uttered in 
that internationally televised venue (McNamara 2017). In 2020, a record number 
of openly transgender candidates ran for public office (Prager 2020), and transgen-
der protections were included in the first slate of Executive Orders issued by the 
Biden administration in January  2021. Collectively, such moments signify the 
arrival of a new era in U.S. social and political history.7
People who identify themselves with such labels as “transvestite,” “transsexual,” 
or “transgender” have been around for a long time, and efforts to organize for 
transgender rights are not new (Nownes 2019). As we enter the third decade of 
the 21st century, however, the moments mentioned earlier along with others make 
clear that we are in new conceptual and political territory. As Jack Halberstam 
declares, “In the last decade, public discussions of transgenderism have increased 
exponentially. What was once regarded as an unusual or even unfortunate disorder 
has become an accepted articulation of gendered embodiment as well as a new site 
for political activism” (2018, 17).
For most people, the first contact with a transgender person is through mass 
media, and for many in the United States their introduction occurred when Cait-
lyn Marie Jenner came out as a trans woman in April 2015 in a televised inter-
view with Diane Sawyer (Dooley et al. 2015). Jenner’s transition was noteworthy 
because she was already a global celebrity as a result of a highly acclaimed career as 
an Olympic athlete in the 1970s and her appearance in the reality series Keeping Up 
with the Kardashians that began in late 2007.
Why would such media exposure matter?
Social psychologists have generated literally hundreds of studies studying what is 
known as the Contact Hypothesis or Intergroup Contact Theory (Pettigrew & 
Tropp 2006). The theory is based on the belief that prejudice is often based on 
ignorance, thus meaningful personal contact under proper circumstances with 
members of a minority group can challenge negative stereotypes and lead to a 
better understanding of that particular category of people. A  stereotype is an 
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oversimplified, typically false, negative attribute or quality that is associated with a 
group of people. Thus, as we learn about that group of people, we learn that the 
stereotype is false, or overgeneralized, and we learn about positive attributes of that 
group. The result can be a reduction of prejudice.8
A good deal of research has identified what the necessary conditions are to 
influence prejudicial beliefs, including sufficient contact that disconfirms stereo-
types and forges intergroup friendships. Under the right conditions—including 
sustained and meaningful contact, equal status, shared goals, and lack of oppo-
sition by salient authority figures—majority group members are more likely to 
change how they categorize minority group members (Schiappa 2008, 94). The 
category may still exist (such as “Arabs” or “gay men”) but the relevant attributes 
that “define” the category can be modified if the contact experience has been suf-
ficiently positive to change attitudes (Brewer & Brown 1998; Hewstone, Rubin, & 
Willis 2002, 589–593; Oakes, Haslam, & Reynolds 1999, 64). Though “defini-
tion” is too formal a term in this context, we can say that a person’s list of defining 
attributes for a minority group can change through the process of getting to know 
members of that minority group under the right conditions.
My colleagues and I conducted a series of studies that were the first to document 
empirically that mediated or “parasocial” contact also can reduce prejudice (Schiappa, 
Gregg, & Hewes 2005, 2006). We called our theory the Parasocial Contact Hypoth-
esis and in the years since it has been introduced, a number of other studies also have 
proven that prejudice toward minority groups, and in particular Sexual and Gender 
Minorities, can be reduced through positive mediated contact (see, for example, 
Bond & Compton 2015; Vezzali, Stathi, Giovannini, & Trifiletti 2015). Our studies 
focused primarily on the portrayal of gay men on such shows as Will & Grace, Six Feet 
Under, and Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, but we also found that mediated contact 
from watching a televised stand-up comedy routine by cross-dressed Eddie Izzard 
could reduce prejudice toward transvestites, and portrayals of SGMs in feature movies 
could reduce prejudice (Schiappa 2008, 110–112, 151–155).
The potential influence of parasocial or mediated contact is strongest for peo-
ple who lack an opportunity to meet members of a minority group in person. 
Our research found that the largest reductions of prejudice took place with indi-
viduals with the least amount of “real world” contact with sexual minority group 
members. Since surveys have shown that most people are not aware of knowing 
transgender people personally, mass media contact can play a particularly important 
role for people to learn about them.
The number of non-trans people directly familiar with transgender people is 
still small but has increased significantly. In 2015, GLAAD (formerly the Gay & 
Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation) relayed the results of a Harris Poll of over 
2,000 U.S. adults that found that the number of people reporting knowing or 
working with someone who is transgender had doubled from 8% in 2008 to 16% in 
2015 (Adam & Goodman 2015). Similarly, political scientist Barry Tadlock and his 
colleagues (2017) conducted two national surveys in 2015 involving nearly 3,000 
respondents and found that 15% reported knowing at least one transgender person.
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Using the feeling thermometer measure discussed earlier, Tadlock et al. found 
that the scores for transgender people were lower than most other groups, includ-
ing gay and lesbian thermometer scores. As Contact Theory would predict, those 
respondents who knew transgender people personally reported higher feeling ther-
mometer scores, suggesting they felt more warmly toward transgender people than 
did those without personal contact. Higher thermometer scores also correlated 
with greater support for civil rights policies for transgender people. Other research 
supports the applicability of Contact Theory to transgender people as a sexual 
minority. Jordan E. Greenburg and A. Celeste Gaia found that among a group of 
undergraduate students, interpersonal contact predicted lower prejudice toward 
transgender people, while acceptance of stereotypes and traditional gender roles 
predicted higher levels of prejudice (2019). Andrew R. Flores (2015) reports that 
positive attitudes toward transgender rights increase when there is direct contact 
with gay and lesbian friends or family, which Flores calls secondary interpersonal 
contact. A  study of over 800 randomly selected Hong Kong Chinese residents 
found that previous contact with trans people was significantly associated with 
decreased social discrimination and “transprejudice,” and increased support for 
transgender civil rights (King, Wainter, & Webster 2009). Susan Walch and her 
colleagues documented that contact, even as minimal as attending a panel dis-
cussion featuring transgender people discussing their experiences, can lead to at 
least a short-term reduction in prejudice (Walch et al. 2012). Similarly, Flores and 
his colleagues found that people unfamiliar with transgender people could have 
their prejudice reduced even with brief, “mere exposure” to a photograph and 
brief vignette (Flores et al. 2018a). Collectively, such research suggests that learn-
ing about the particularities of transgender people’s lives through direct contact 
can reduce prejudice, just as it has been shown to reduce prejudice toward other 
minority groups.
Research also demonstrates that mediated or parasocial contact with transgen-
der people can decrease prejudice, as the Parasocial Contact Hypothesis would 
predict. The Caitlyn Jenner story is a possible example. In a survey of nearly 
2,000 adults in 2015, Patrick R. Miller and his colleagues found that nearly 80% 
of respondents followed the story to some degree. As they note, “Jenner may be 
the first transgender person that many encountered either directly or parasocially. 
And, even among those who know a transgender person, Jenner could be the 
first familiar person they ‘knew’ throughout their gender transition” (Miller et al. 
2020, 624).
Because the survey collected data after Jenner’s public announcement, it cannot 
prove directly whether learning about the transition changed attitudes. Nonethe-
less, some of the data imply that Jenner’s public announcement made an impact, 
especially among older respondents who remember Jenner’s Olympic career. The 
authors found that
older respondents who were more transphobic were less likely to see her 
story as representing negative social trends if they followed it in the media. 
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Furthermore, more transphobic older respondents were more likely to sup-
port pro-transgender policies if they viewed Jenner’s story less negatively.
(2020, 622)
Using a statistical technique known as Propensity Score Matching, Miller et  al. 
report in an unpublished version of the study that exposure to the Jenner story 
predicted reduced prejudice, thus “following the Jenner story itself as a form of 
parasocial contact may have caused ameliorated attitudes towards transgender peo-
ple and rights” (2019, 26).9 Miller and his colleagues conclude that “the parasocial 
contact effect” underscores
the critical role of mass media portrayals of transgender persons—real or 
fictional—in shaping transgender rights attitudes. These portrayals can be 
politically impactful and are likely to reach larger audiences than transgen-
der Americans can easily reach in face-to-face social interactions given their 
small numbers.
(2020, 631)
Moreover, Minjie Li’s analysis of news coverage on major TV and newspaper 
outlets concerning transgender topics in the months before and after Caitlyn Jen-
ner’s coming out showed a significant change.
After Jenner’s 20/20 interview, national news outlets are significantly more 
likely to apply alternative gender discourses, feature gender nonconforming 
individuals, address the complexity of transgender issues through mention-
ing race, class, and sexuality differences, differentiate transgender issues from 
LGB [lesbian, gay, bisexual] issues, and apply a thematic reporting approach.
(Li 2018, 70)
Jenner’s story was not the only case of increased transgender visibility. Though 
not receiving the same level of media coverage, the child of Cher and Sonny Bono 
transitioned from “Chastity” to “Chaz” between 2008 and 2010. A series of stories 
on Entertainment Tonight in 2009 provided national exposure to Chaz’s transition, 
which reached the milestone of a legal name and gender change in May 2010. In 
2013, Chelsea Manning (assigned Bradley Edward Manning at birth) medically 
transitioned while serving a seven-year (2010–2017) imprisonment for violating 
the U.S. Espionage Act for providing classified materials to Wikileaks about U.S. 
military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In addition to the extensive media coverage of Jenner’s transition in 2015, a 
reality show titled I am Cait ran for two seasons in 2015 and 2016. Other popular 
reality shows also featured transgender characters. Debuting in 2015, I am Jazz 
features “Jazz Jennings,” a transgender teen young woman, and her family dealing 
with “typical teen drama through the lens of a transgender youth” (Grinberg 2015). 
As of 2020, I am Jazz is in its sixth season. New Girls on the Block, another reality 
The Transgender Exigency 43
show but one that features six transgender women, also debuted in 2015 and ran 
one season. Becoming Us was a reality show that ran for 10 episodes in 2015 focusing 
on a family whose father came out as a trans woman. Li’s analysis of I am Cait, I am 
Jazz, and Becoming Us demonstrates
1) how family members unlearn gender hegemony and redefine gender 
and sexuality, and 2) how trans individuals reevaluate what it means to be 
a transgender person through negotiating with family members and other 
trans people. Together, they demonstrate a multidimensional construct of 
transgender subjectivity, which embraces and transcends transgender people.
(2021, 518)
Cumulatively, the shows provide an opportunity for parasocial contact through 
which cisgender viewers can learn about what it means to be transgender. As Li 
notes, “Most importantly, the depiction of the psychological shifts and coping 
mechanisms of transitioning with transgender loved ones guides outgroup audience 
through the process of learning what transgender identity is, how to live with it, 
and unlearning gender hegemony” (2021, 518).
In February 2017, the National Geographic network aired a two-hour docu-
mentary titled Gender Revolution: A  Journey with Katie Couric that explored “the 
rapidly evolving complexities of gender identity” (Couric 2017). The program 
explored the history and changing beliefs and practices concerning the birth of 
babies with “intersex” (DSD) characteristics, as well as interviewing a number of 
transgender individuals of varying ages.
In addition to reality and news programing, fictional TV programs also increased 
transgender visibility. It is worth noting that the studies referenced earlier suggest 
that attitudes toward minority groups can be changed through mediated contact 
whether that contact is with “real” or fictional characters. Orange is the New Black 
debuted in 2013 and introduced the world to Laverne Cox as Sophia Burset, a 
transgender inmate in a woman’s prison. The popular and award-winning com-
edy Transparent, starring Jeffrey Tambor, debuted in 2014 and ran for 41 episodes. 
Transgender characters have become increasingly common in mainstream pro-
gramming, such as the introduction of “Nia Nal” in the fourth season of Supergirl in 
2018, played by real-life transgender actress Nicole Maines.10 GLAAD reports that 
in the 2020–2021 television season, there were 29 regular and recurring transgen-
der characters, a record high (2021).
Traditional television and movies are not the only media through which peo-
ple can learn about transgender people. YouTube, for example, has emerged as a 
particularly noteworthy platform for transgender youth to share their experiences. 
Film Studies professor Laura Horak suggests that
trans YouTube videos succeed because their formal strategies exploit the plat-
form’s penchant for the personal and the spectacular. Trans ‘talking head’ vid-
eos expand the tradition of the feminist consciousness-raising documentary 
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to establish trans youth as experts and create a sense of intimacy between 
vloggers and viewers.
(2014, 572)
Brandon Miller surveyed the content of YouTube videos and studied an enormous 
amount of educational content by eight popular transgender YouTubers. Because 
the Internet is a relatively safe space for people to explore new information and 
lifestyles, Miller hypothesizes that “the Internet may be able to function as a tool 
for decreasing transphobia in society” (2017). Nikkie de Jager, a highly success-
ful Dutch YouTuber who specializes in beauty tutorials, came out as transgender 
in January  2020 to her 13  million subscribers (“NikkieTutorials” 2020). As of 
October 1, 2021, her 17-minute “I’m Coming Out” video has been viewed over 
37.5 million times.11
Cumulatively, such media content provides an opportunity for many viewers to 
get to know transgender people and learn about their experiences. Such parasocial 
contact has the potential to reduce anti-trans prejudice and, indirectly, increase 
support for transgender rights (Flores et al. 2018b). A promising empirical example 
is reported by Li, who conducted an experiment using short clips from the reality 
show Becoming Us, to support the contention that a positive narrative involving 
a transgender character can result in a modest improvement in attitudes toward 
transgender people as a whole (2019a).
The positive influence of parasocial contact is not limited to programming that 
focuses chiefly on transgender characters. A study involving over 400 U.S. adults 
conducted by scholars at the University of Southern California examined whether 
exposure to a single episode of Royal Pains that focused on a transgender character 
could influence attitudes: “Those U.S. respondents who saw a storyline featuring 
a transgender adolescent on the TV show Royal Pains had more positive attitudes 
toward transgender people and policies compared to Royal Pains’ viewers who 
did not see this particular storyline” (Gillig et al. 2018, 523). For the purposes of 
educating those without direct personal contact with transgender people, “even 
single-episode characters and relatively brief storylines can be influential” (2018, 
523). The fact that the lead character of Royal Pains is not transgender may have 
increased the odds that viewers who were not otherwise trans-friendly might view 
the episode and still learn from the parasocial contact. As the study’s authors note, 
“smaller storylines featuring transgender characters in mainstream programming 
have the potential to improve the attitudes of more conservative viewers who may 
not seek out transgender depictions” (2018, 524). This sort of attitude influence is 
not limited to television or video. Ligia Orellana, Peter Totterdell, and Aarti Iyer 
found that even reading fictional narratives involving transgender characters has the 
potential to decrease prejudice (2020).
According to a survey commissioned by the Human Rights Campaign in 2016, 
35% claimed to know someone personally who is transgender (HRC 2016). And 
in a survey reported by The Economist in 2019, that number had climbed to 39% 
(Frankovic 2019). These figures are considerably higher than surveys conducted a 
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year or two earlier and may be statistical outliers. Or it may be that the dramatic 
increase in transgender visibility in 2015 led more transgender people to come 
out as trans, or perhaps those answering the survey felt that they knew people 
via the media well enough to “count” as personal acquaintances. In any case, the 
significant increase in the number of people claiming to know someone who is 
transgender is noteworthy.
The Transgender Exigence
It is clear that transgender visibility is increasing, and with it, a reduction of anti-
trans prejudice among some Americans resulting from direct or mediated contact. 
In the legal sphere, the reduction of anti-trans prejudice has been accompanied by 
“remarkable success” in the advancement of transgender rights (Taylor, Lewis, & 
Haider-Markel 2018, 302). The past 25 years of gay and lesbian legal rights demon-
strates how quickly the legal situation potentially can change for a sexual minority 
(Michelson & Harrison 2020). In a relatively short time, historically speaking, the 
United States has moved from being a nation in which homosexual acts could be 
criminalized (affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick), to one 
in which homosexuals could not be singled out as a group by discriminatory laws 
(Romer v. Evans 1996), could not be prosecuted for homosexual conduct (Lawrence 
v. Texas 2003, overturning Bowers), to having a constitutionally protected right to 
marry (Obergefell v. Hodges 2015), and be protected from job discrimination (Bostock 
v. Clayton County 2020).
Just as public opinion and the U.S. court system has become more favorable 
toward the rights of gay men and lesbians, one might anticipate a similar shift 
toward more favorable attitudes toward transgender equality. When asked in gen-
eral terms, most survey respondents claim to support rights and legal protections 
for transgender people (Jones & Cox 2011). In a 2017 survey of 1000 people, for 
example, 73% agreed with the statement that transgender people should be pro-
tected from discrimination (Luhur et al. 2019). A PBS NewsHour/NPR/Marist 
poll reported in April, 2021 that about two-thirds of Americans “are against laws 
that would limit transgender rights,” including legislation that would prohibit gen-
der transition-related medical care for minors and that prohibits transgender stu-
dent athletes from joining sports teams that match their gender identity (Loffman 
2021, cf. McCarthy 2021).
Despite signs of progress, however, reports of increasing violence against 
transgender individuals, especially women, underscored the extreme antipathy still 
held by many. As trans author Katelyn Burns claims, the decade 2010–2019 was 
a double-edged sword for trans people: “The internet made trans people visible. 
It also left them vulnerable” to various backlash efforts (2019). Mia Fischer in her 
book, Terrorizing Gender, describes the increased visibility of transgender people as 
a “trap.” Fischer quotes trans activist Tourmaline: “Just because we’re being seen, 
doesn’t mean we’re any safer. Hypervisibility endangers us, representation is a trap” 
(2019, 169; see also Stanley, Burton, & Gossett 2017).
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Media coverage can contain “legitimizing” as well as “delegitimizing” language 
to describe transgender individuals and issues. Thomas J. Billard analyzed nine 
aspects of the language used in media coverage and argues that delegitimizing 
language can “detrimentally impact both the projected legitimacy of transgender 
claims in the political arena and public perceptions of the transgender community” 
(2016, 4193). Barry L. Tadlock notes that the dominant frames in mainstream 
newspaper coverage during the period of 1992–2011 of transgender people and 
issues was different from the framing of gay and lesbian issues. While framing of les-
bian and gay rights issues typically pit equality versus “traditional values,” the frames 
for articles about trans issues or people were more diffused and included education, 
equality, liberty, safety/security, and pathology. Transgender issues are almost always 
described in highly individualistic rather than systemic terms. Tadlock also found 
that in about half of the studies analyzed, there is “an explicit positive or negative 
perspective” articulated about rights. Ten of the 29 articles with an explicit orienta-
tion were “antirights” (2014, 36).
How do we reconcile support stated in surveys for transgender rights with the 
considerable evidence of discrimination and prejudice toward transgender people? 
First, while many people will agree with abstract statements about transgender 
civil rights, the answers turn in a less tolerant direction when the issues are more 
concrete. Political Scientist Philip Edward Jones and his colleagues’ study of public 
attitudes toward transgender people, for example, found “majority support on most 
policy questions, but more tepid views of transgender people, and solid opposition 
to supporting a transgender candidate for office” (Jones et al. 2018).
Second, it is worth recalling that productive, prejudice-reducing contact requires 
the support—or at least the lack of opposition—of salient authority figures. In 
the aftermath of the election of Donald Trump as president in 2016, “attacks on 
transgender rights intensified both at the national and local levels,” as the Trump 
administration moved quickly to reverse Obama-era protections for transgender 
students, prison inmates, and troops (Michelson & Harrison 2020, 6). As Jones and 
Paul R. Brewer document, public opinion toward transgender rights can be influ-
enced by what political elites publicly advocate (2020). Beginning in 2016, liberal 
and conservative elites became increasingly and visibly polarized on transgender 
rights, and their debates in turn influenced the electorate: “If political elites con-
tinue to send ideologically polarized messages in the future, then we would expect 
to see increasing polarization among the mass public” (Jones & Brewer 2020, 82). 
Such continued polarization is evidenced by the fact that by early 2021, more than 
20 “anti-LGBTQ” bills have been introduced in more than a dozen states (Andrew 
2021; Moreau 2021).
Third, for reasons researchers are still exploring, prejudice toward transgen-
der people is more resistant to change than prejudice toward gay men and lesbi-
ans. The sources of prejudicial attitudes and behaviors toward transgender people 
can include the belief in heteronormativity that animates anti-gay prejudice, but 
also includes lack of accurate information, deeply held beliefs in a gender binary, 
lack of contact with transgender people, and political conservatism (Michelson & 
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Harrison 2020, 7). Jones and Brewer summarize the survey research: “Respondents 
who hold higher levels of authoritarianism, more disgust sensitivity, less egalitarian 
attitudes, more conservative ideologies, and greater religiosity view transgender 
people less warmly and are less likely to support their rights” (2020, 72). Further-
more, the contexts associated with transgender rights—such as access to public 
bathrooms—appear to elicit fears that no longer surface in discussions of gay rights. 
In some contexts—notably in competitive sports—the gains made by transgender 
people may be perceived as requiring a commensurate loss by cisgender people. 
As Melissa R. Michelson and Brian F. Harrison note in their book, Transforming 
Prejudice: Identity, Fear, and Transgender Rights:
Transgender women Marsha Johnson and Sylvia Rivera were leaders of the 
Stonewall Riots of 1969 that marked the symbolic launch of the modern gay 
rights movement. Yet, 50 years later, the ability of transgender people to live 
openly and without fear of discrimination or violence lags far behind that of 
gay men and lesbians.
(2020, 154)
As is explored at length in Part II of this book, there are multiple sites of conflict 
in the U.S. over transgender rights that are informed by conflicting definitions of 
sex and gender. While some states have moved to enable high school transgender 
athletes to compete with the gender of their choice, other states have moved in the 
opposite direction to forbid transgender athletes from competing. There is disa-
greement over how to define men and women for the purposes of incarceration in 
state and Federal prisons. State and local efforts arose in 2016 to preclude transgen-
der individuals from using the public bathrooms of their choice, leading to highly 
visible political battles amplified by calls for economic boycotts of jurisdictions 
passing such restrictions. In 2017, President Trump announced his intention to ban 
transgender individuals from the U.S. military, eliciting considerable opposition 
and claims of illegal discrimination. In 2021, one of the first actions of President 
Biden was to reverse Trump’s ban. There is disagreement over whether transgender 
students should be allowed to matriculate to single-sex high schools and colleges. 
Some academic and activist feminists are at odds over whether and how to “count” 
transgender women. Cumulatively, these factors have made it clear that there is 
considerable disagreement over how sex and gender ought to be understood and 
defined as well as who should have a right to define them.
The situation will grow more urgent as we move forward. Andrew Flores 
and colleagues estimated in 2016 that 0.6% or 1.4 million Americans identify as 
transgender (Flores et  al. 2016).12 That number is likely to grow in the future. 
Data collected by the Minnesota Department of Education in 2019 about nearly 
125,000 students in the 8th, 9th, and 11th grade found that 1.4% of them described 
themselves as transgender, nonbinary genderqueer, genderfluid or “something 
else” other than cisgender. About half of those students identified as transgender, 
the other half as nonbinary genderqueer, genderfluid or “something else.”13 The 
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number may be higher nationally: Survey data collected in 2017 from 10 states and 
nine urban school districts reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion found that an average of 1.8% of high school students identify as transgender 
(Johns et al. 2019). What sort of rights will they have? Who should have the power 
to define sex and gender?
As stated in the Introduction, there are two quite disparate ways of defining sex 
and gender. Biological determinists argue that gender and biological sex are evident at 
birth or earlier, and that one’s medical designation should determine a host of legal 
and societal constraints based on one’s assigned sex. For example, the Southern 
Baptist Convention approved a resolution on transgender identity that affirmed 
“God’s good design that gender identity is determined by biological sex and not 
by one’s self-perception—a perception which is often influenced by fallen human 
nature in ways contrary to God’s design” (“On Transgender Identity” 2014).
On the other end of the spectrum, those who might be called autonomous nomi-
nalists or advocates of an unadulterated version of “self-identification” contend that 
gender identity is a purely personal decision and, as such, should be respected and 
never regulated or discriminated against. The very first item in the International 
Bill of Gender Rights approved at the fourth annual International Conference on 
Transgender Law and Employment Policy states that “all human beings have the 
right to define their own gender identity regardless of chromosomal sex, genitalia, 
assigned birth sex, or initial gender role; and further, no individual shall be denied 
Human or Civil Rights by virtue of a self-defined gender identity which is not in 
accord with chromosomal sex, genitalia, assigned birth sex, or initial gender role” 
(Frye 1995, ix). An example of the practical application of that right can be found 
in the San Francisco Human Rights Commission’s Compliance Guidelines to Prohibit 
Gender Identity Discrimination, which states: “An individual determines their own 
gender identity and the sole proof of a person’s gender identity is that person’s 
statement or expression of their self identification” (2003).
Regulatory definitions involving sex/gender are where the proverbial rubber 
meets the road when it comes to transgender rights. I turn now, in Part II, to a 
series of contexts where such definitions are being contested.
Notes
 1 De Mars (2017).
 2 Jennings (2016, 14).
 3 For a discussion of the cultural significance of the scene, see Piatkowski (2017).
 4 The documentary Disclosure (2020) illustrates how pervasive negative portrayals of 
transgender people have been in TV and film history and how much progress has been 
made.
 5 There are longer acronyms that are even more inclusive, including LGBTQQIAAP: 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Questioning, Intersex, Allies, Asexual, 
Pansexual.
 6 Biden repeated this comment in the Foreword to McBride (2018, xii).
 7 In the world of academia, it is worth noting that Transgender Studies Quarterly began 
publication in May 2014.
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 8 The Contact Hypothesis was an important argument in racial desegregation cases in the 
1950s, including Brown v. Topeka Board of Education (Jackson 2001).
 9 Propensity Score Matching is a statistical matching technique that estimates the effects 
of a test condition (in this case, engagement with the Jenner story) by accounting for 
the covariates that predict receiving the test condition (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983). 
The relevant portion of the unpublished essay is as follows: “Propensity Score Match-
ing: Our analysis thus far suggests that engagement with the Jenner story corresponded 
to improved attitudes towards transgender people and rights, most notably for older 
respondents who also exhibited higher transphobia. Obviously, our ability to draw con-
clusions about the mechanisms at work here are limited given the observational nature 
of our survey data. If we conceive of following the Jenner story as the dichotomous 
‘treatment’ to which respondents were either exposed or not, a clear limitation in our 
non-experimental data is systematic self-selection in choosing whether to follow that 
story which then confounds any comparison of outcomes between the two treatment 
groups.
However, addressing RQ2, it is possible to estimate treatment effects from non- 
experimental or observational data using propensity score analysis which is convention-
ally interpreted as inferring causality (Guo & Fraser 2015). We used the Stata psmatch2 
package for our propensity score analysis, using nearest neighbor greedy matching with 
replacement and a standard caliper of 0.25 SD. Given these specifications, all cases were 
matched. As with our earlier analysis, the treatment was whether the respondent fol-
lowed the Jenner story to any degree (1) versus not at all (0). Consistent with our analysis 
of following the Jenner story, variables used to calculate propensity scores included: 
age, church attendance, education, income, race, sex, partisanship, ideology, and LGBT 
identity. Bias on matches was within the conventional 5% tolerance.
Using this method, we assessed treatment effects on four outcomes: the transphobia 
scale, a transgender feeling thermometer, comfort with transgender persons, and the 
transgender rights policy scale. In the unmatched analysis, the mean scores on all four 
outcome measures for the treated group that followed the Jenner story varied signifi-
cantly in the pro-transgender direction from the mean scores of the untreated group: 
These included mean differences of 0.55 units on the transphobia scale (p < .001), 0.34 
units on the comfort item (p < .001), 11.56 units on the feeling thermometer (p < .001), 
and 2.61 units on the policy scale (p < .001). The matched analysis respectively reduced 
the magnitudes of these differences to 0.47 units (p = .005), 0.25 units (p = .044), 8.56 
units (p < .001), and 1.37 units (p = .027). The treatment, then, yielded significant dif-
ferences on the four outcome variables. Though these matched effects were of reduced 
magnitude, this suggested that following the Jenner story itself as a form of parasocial 
contact may have caused ameliorated attitudes towards transgender people and rights” 
(Miller et al. 2019, 25–26).
 10 Wikipedia maintains a page titled “List of transgender characters in film and television” 
that documents the increasing frequency of transgender characters in T.V. and film.
 11 My thanks to Lauren Murray for calling my attention to NikkieTutorials and the impact 
of her coming out as transgender.
 12 The question of counting the number of transgender people in the U.S. is more com-
plicated than citing a simple figure would suggest. In 2015, the entire February issue 
of Transgender Studies Quarterly was devoted to a discussion of “tensions among what to 
count, whom to count, how to count, why to count, or whether to count or be counted 
at all” (Currah & Stryker 2015, 1). See also the meta-analysis of medical literature pub-
lished by Collin et al. (2016).
 13 Data available at: https://public.education.mn.gov/MDEAnalytics/DataTopic.jsp?TO 
PICID=242

Part II of the book does not attempt to discuss all situations in U.S. life that segre-
gate females and males, but rather focuses on a set of contexts where there are con-
troversies specifically involving transgender men and women. It is my hope that the 
principles, values, and interests involved in these contexts can be applied by analogy 
to other contexts. The modus operandi of these chapters is to describe the history 
and rationale for separating males and females in a particular context, then explore 
the definitional controversies evinced by what I am describing as the Transgender 
Exigency. Then we can be in a position to explore the questions: Who has the 
right to define? What is the purpose of definition in this context? What values and 
interests are advanced by different definitions?
It may be useful at this juncture to distinguish between two related but distinct 
phenomena. What I am describing as the Transgender Exigency is the challenge 
to traditional definitions of women and men fueled by individuals whose gen-
der identity is specifically at odds with their assigned sex. Well-known examples 
include Caitlyn Jenner and Chaz Bono, discussed in Chapter 3. These two exam-
ples involved a medical as well as social transition from one gender to another. 
I  fully recognize that not all transgender people undergo medical transitioning 
efforts that include hormones and/or surgery. Nonetheless, categories come to be 
understood with what are prototypical examples, and I think it is fair to say that 
for most people, as noted in the Introduction, the category “transgender” describes 
people whose personal sense of gender does not correspond to their assigned sex, 
and they wish to transition at least socially if not physically.
As noted earlier, the transgender phenomenon is related but conceptually dis-
tinct from a larger cultural phenomenon of gender variance. People who exhibit gen-
der variance have been described variously as androgynous, gender fluid, gender 
bending, gender diverse, nonbinary, pangender, and in general “gender noncon-





1980s, the point of identifying gender norms and social conventions was to under-
cut their cultural force—to free people from behavioral and social expectations 
that were based on their biological sex. For some gender nonconformists, traits 
traditionally identified as masculine or feminine are accepted as masculine or femi-
nine, but nonconformists want the freedom to express their gender with whatever 
combination of traits they choose. For example, a person can present as a “femme” 
transgender woman and still consider themselves as nonbinary (Williams 2019).
To the extent that labels of being a woman or a man are important to the indi-
vidual, the strongest form of gender nonconformity is consistent with the idea 
previously described as autonomous nominalism (self-identification), but with the 
added idea that any particular gender identity can be ephemeral—that is, transitory 
and temporary—as opposed to an enduring commitment. Such a position stands 
in opposition to typical regulatory requirements that connect “the legitimacy of an 
identity with its duration across time” (Draz 2019).
For some gender nonconformists the very idea of “gender” seems obsolete and 
as a society we should embrace “postgenderism.” Shulamith Firestone advocated 
the spirit of postgenderism even before “gender” entered the vocabulary of femi-
nist politics. She wrote in 1970 that, “[The] end goal of feminist revolution must 
be, unlike that of the first feminist movement, not just the elimination of male 
privilege but of the sex distinction itself: genital differences between human beings 
would no longer matter culturally” (11). Similarly, though Sandra Bem did not use 
the term “post-gender,” in hindsight it seems fair to describe her dream as a post-
gender society: “[H]uman behaviors and personality attributes should no longer be 
linked to gender, and society should stop projecting gender into situations irrel-
evant to genitalia” (1983, 616).
Though I know of no empirical work yet done on the question, I would hypoth-
esize that a majority of (though certainly not all) transgender individuals do not 
adopt a “post-gender” attitude; in fact, the choice to transition most often accepts 
the gender categories of women and men. I concede it is hazardous to general-
ize. Indeed, in the inaugural issue of Transgender Studies Quarterly, Eric A. Stanley 
suggests that an ethic of gender self-determination must resist efforts to normal-
ize and thus perpetuate traditional gender categories. Apparently well-meaning 
transgender equity efforts “work to translate and in turn confine the excesses of 
gendered life into managed categories at the very moment of radical possibility” 
(Stanley 2014, 90).
The famous transgender tennis player, Renée Richards, is interviewed in the 
documentary Gender Revolution and explicitly accepts a binary approach to gen-
der: “I had a very happy life for 40 years as a man and I’m having a very happy 
life for 40 years as a woman, but that doesn’t mean that I’m gender fluid” (Couric 
2017; see also Pieper 2012). Asked about the gender binary, Richards comments 
“I think it’s appealing and I like it.” In the same interview, trans activist Hari Nef, 
by contrast, hopes for what she calls a fluid and “gender chill future,” which sounds 
much closer to a post-gender culture. Surveys of adolescents find that an increasing 
number embrace a label other than cisgender or transgender. In addition to the data 
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reported by the Minnesota Department of Education, cited in the last chapter, a 
2017 national survey of over 17,000 young people (13–17 years old) who identify 
as LGBTQ found over twice as many described themselves as nonbinary than as 
transgender (Watson, Wheldon, & Puhl 2020).
Why is it useful to draw a distinction between the Transgender Exigency and 
the larger question of gender nonconformity? The definitional rupture I describe 
as the Transgender Exigency matters only when a person is committed to being a 
woman or man in a particular organizational or institutional context that actively 
separates men and women, such as competitive sports, single-sex schools, prisons, 
etc. If I was assigned the sex “male” upon birth, how I choose to express my gen-
der—how I dress, how I behave, and how I describe myself—is up to me until 
such time that I interact with organizations or institutions that regulate member-
ship or activities according to how they define gender. As sociologist Tey Meadow 
observes, “We all carry a gendered subjectivity, but we live that subjectivity inter-
subjectively” (2018, 226). That is, when gender is a salient feature of our social 
identity that requires social recognition, sometimes negotiation, then definitional 
regulation may be part of that process. It is the process of reformulating these regu-
latory definitions in a time of growing awareness and controversy over transgender 
rights that is the focus of the following chapters.
Each chapter will consider a specific context in which there are competing defi-
nitions of sex and/or gender. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the classic Aristotelian 
form for definition is “An X is (a kind of) class name that has such-and-such attrib-
utes.” Accordingly, the initial question when describing and understanding com-
peting definitions is: What attributes are considered definitive? Then we are in a 
position to ask: Why? What values, interests, or purposes are served by privileging 
one set of attributes, say, XX v. XY chromosomes, over other attributes, such as 
one’s gender expression (a person’s behavior, mannerisms, interests, and appearance 
that are associated with a recognized gender) in a particular cultural context?
A note about terminology
For the rest of the book, I use the word sex when a conventional biological sense 
is appropriate (often reflected with the terms male/female), gender when the focus 
is on cultural recognition of the social roles we associate with girls/boys, women/
men, and sex/gender when it strikes me as prudent to treat the two concepts as dif-
ferent sides of the same coin, as described in the third stage of theorizing sex and 
gender in Chapter 2.   
Transgender voices
“I had a bit of suspicion that my application [to Smith College] would not receive the same 
treatment as any FAAB (female assigned at birth) applicant.”
Calliope Wong1
“When I was younger, I went to an all-boys school, and right across there was this school 
just for girls. And I remember telling myself, oh my gosh, I want to go there.” [After arriv-
ing at Wellesley] “as soon as I put my feet into the ground, I just rooted like a tree. I told 
everybody, ‘I belong here! I belong here!’ ”
Ninotska Love, first openly transgender student
at Wellesley College, 20172
“What I love so much is that Barnard really challenges you to rethink and reshape the 
identities you come in with and to both form a space and a self that has room for everything 
you want to be. . . . This is not a space that I think of as excluding people who don’t fall 
into a predetermined category of women, but rather of coming together to reshape how we 




Colleges in the United States began as male-only institutions, typically funded by 
religious denominations. What is now known as Harvard University was founded 
in 1636 to train clergy for the growing colonial population from England. Har-
vard, like other colleges founded before 1800, such as Yale, Princeton, William & 
Mary, St. John’s, and the University of Pennsylvania, only admitted men. The first 
coeducational college in the United States was Oberlin College in Ohio. Though 
founded in 1833, its first female students did not matriculate until 1837. The 
first women’s colleges were Wesleyan College in Georgia, chartered in 1836, and 
Mount Holyoke College in western Massachusetts in 1837.
The exclusion of women from U.S. colleges reflects the cultural norms of the 
time. Men were educated to participate in the public sphere of business and politics 
whereas women were largely confined to the private sphere to care for home and 
family:
The colonial view of woman was simply that she was intellectually infe-
rior—incapable, merely by reason of being a woman, of great thoughts. Her 
faculties were not worth training. Her place was in the home, where man 
assigned her a number of useful functions.
(Rudolph 1962, 307–308)
Women’s colleges were founded with a mission to provide young women with an 
education of the same quality as that available to men. As historian Estelle B. Freed-
man noted, “When elite male institutions refused to educate women, the sister 





While some early women’s institutions of higher learning were limited mostly 
to preparing women to be wives and mothers, others were designed to be seminar-
ies for women, and others still had a more feminist goal of educating and empow-
ering women to be successful leaders in any field (Horowitz 1993). The very idea 
of women attending college was opposed by some who felt that women belonged 
in the home, or that women were too frail for college, or would lose their femi-
ninity by attending college. In the famous Declaration of Sentiments emerging from 
the first Women’s Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, one of the injuries on the 
part of man toward woman is that “He has denied her the facilities for obtaining 
a thorough education, all colleges being closed against her” (Stanton 1848). Social 
movements such as women’s suffrage and the abolition movement contributed to 
the founding of some women’s colleges (Langdon 2001). The founder of Wellesley 
College declared in The Spirit of the College that
We revolt against the slavery in which women are held by the customs of 
society—the broken health, the aimless lives, the subordinate position, the 
helpless dependence, the dishonesties and shams of so-called education. The 
Higher Education of Women is one of the great world battle-cries for free-
dom; for right against might. It is the cry of the oppressed slave. It is the 
assertion of absolute equality.
(Durant 1890, 3)4
Only some founders of women’s colleges publicly embraced tenets we would 
now call feminist (indeed, some felt the need to be quite circumspect in their 
politics), but in hindsight the establishment of significant number of high-quality 
women’s colleges can be seen as a profoundly feminist accomplishment.
We have moved from an age when all U.S. colleges were single-sex (specifically 
male) to an era where single-sex colleges are a rarity. Of the 233 women’s colleges 
in 1960 (Langdon 2001), less than 40 remain operating today, and there are only 
four men’s colleges left. Women’s colleges persist largely for what can be described 
as feminist reasons—to counteract the discrimination and sexism that is still evident 
in coeducational institutions, even though women now outnumber men in col-
lege (Goldin, Katz, & Kuziemko 2006), and thus to provide a more supportive and 
favorable climate for women’s learning and achievement (Langdon 2001).
Describing how these single-sex colleges have responded to the Transgender 
Exigency is the objective of this chapter.
Women’s colleges
In 2013, Calliope Wong, a transgender woman who was a senior in high school, 
was denied admission to Smith College because her Federal Student Aid appli-
cation form identified her as male. Her application and application fee were 
returned to her with the explanation that Smith College required applicants to 
be female at the time of admission. Wong certainly was not the first trans woman 
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to seek admission to an all-women’s college, but aided by the power of social 
media, she became a cause célèbre as her blog and her story were widely shared 
and became national news. Sympathetic Smith students formed Facebook groups 
in support, and national organizations such as the Transgender Legal Defense & 
Education Fund rallied to her cause (see, for example, McQuade 2013). Wong 
ultimately chose to attend the University of Connecticut. Nonetheless, accounts 
of women’s colleges’ policies toward transgender applicants typically point to her 
efforts as a catalyst for women’s colleges to clarify and publicize their policies. 
Admission policies involving transgender applicants ultimately turn on a ques-
tion that resists but requires definition: “What does it mean to be a woman?” 
(Davis 2017, 82).
A year later, in May of 2014, Mills College became the first U.S. women’s col-
lege to create a formal written admissions policy that includes transgender and gen-
der fluid applicants. Their stated policy says “Mills admits self-identified women 
and people assigned female at birth who do not fit into the gender binary” (Mills 
2020). Both Mills and Smith Colleges claim to have been open to transgender 
students before their official policy statements, but because such decisions were 
made on an ad hoc basis, there was a lack of clarity that could lead to controversies 
such as Wong’s denial of admission to Smith (Bennett-Smith 2013; Martin 2013; 
Mitchell 2014). Smith College followed suit in May of 2015, and in a remarkably 
short period of time, most women’s colleges in the United States have published 
policies allowing transgender women to apply.
As of April, 2020, a substantial majority of the 39 colleges that are members of 
the Women’s College Coalition have revised their policies to permit transgender 
women as applicants, including Agnes Scott College, Alverno College, Barnard 
College, Bay Path University, Bennett College for Women, Brenau University, 
Bryn Mawr College, Cedar Crest College, College of Saint Benedict, Converse 
College, Cottey College, Hollins University, Mills College, Moore College of 
Art and Design, Mount Holyoke College, Russell Sage College, Salem College, 
Scripps College, Simmons University, Smith College, Spelman College, Stephens 
College, Sweet Briar College, Trinity Washington University, Wellesley College, 
and Wesleyan College.5
The precise definitional criteria at work at these institutions vary. At one end of 
the spectrum, some institutions merely require applicants to self-identify as women. 
Smith College’s admission policy declares, “We welcome applicants who identify as 
women, including those who were assigned male at birth. No specific documentation 
is required to verify an applicant’s gender” (Smith 2020, emphasis added). Bennett Col-
lege for Women, Cedar Crest College, Mills College, Russell Sage College, Sim-
mons University, are others who simply ask for self-identification, and Cedar Crest 
explicitly says “We do not require government issued documentation for purposes 
of identifying an applicant’s gender identity” (Cedar Crest 2020). Mount Holyoke’s 
admission webpage states simply, “We welcome applications from female, transgen-
der and nonbinary students” (Mount Holyoke 2020). Put into the form of a regula-
tory definition (X counts as Y in context C), then the sole definitive attribute is 
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self-identification: Anyone who self-identifies as a woman (X) counts as a woman 
(Y) in the context of applying to this institution (C).
A second common definitional approach goes a step further to require applicants 
to have an established history as women. The most common wording here requires 
applicants to “consistently self-identify and live as women.” Similar wording to 
“consistently live and identify as women” can be found at a variety of schools, 
including Alverno, Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Spelman, and Wellesley. The FAQs for 
some colleges admission policies answer the obvious follow-up question of “What 
does it mean to consistently live and identify as a woman?” Barnard College states:
The applicant must identify herself as a woman and her application materi-
als must support this self-identification. If the applicant is concerned about 
discrepancies in her application materials, she can speak with an admissions 
counselor or address any concerns in the essay or personal statement.
(Barnard 2019)
Hollins University similarly suggests that “The applicant must affirmatively identify 
herself as a woman and her application materials must support this self-identifi-
cation” (Hollins 2020). It is not unusual at these institutions to seek supporting 
evidence of this self-identification (see also Bryn Mawr 2020; Wesleyan College 
2020). Hence the regulatory definition could be formulated as: Anyone who con-
sistently lives and identifies as a woman (X) counts as a woman (Y) in the context 
of applying to this institution (C).
The first definitional approach, explicitly requiring only self-identification, var-
ies from this second approach primarily based on the reduced emphasis on the 
definitive attribute of duration. Sherie Gilmore-Cleveland, Director of Admissions 
of Mills College, states,
Students’ self-identification does not have to match school documentation. 
If we have questions regarding a student’s self-identification we inquire with 
the student based on their answers for clarification. The question of eligibil-
ity is based on the student’s self-identification not a span of time.
(Gilmore-Cleveland 2020)
The President of Cedar Crest College, Dr. Elizabeth Meade, explained that deci-
sions about gender identity sometimes emerge late in adolescence, and some 
students may come from homes where gender nonconformity might not feel com-
fortable or safe. A decision to transition to female might begin at the start of col-
lege, in other words. Accordingly, at Cedar Crest there is no specific requirement 
about the previous duration of an applicant’s self-identification as a woman, but 
there is an “expectation that you will come to the college and continue to identify 
as a woman” (Meade 2020).
A third and less common definitional requirement is that applicants must 
have completed the process of legally changing their sex on official documents. 
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According to the survey conducted by Vox (North 2017), Converse College, Cot-
tey College, Salem College, and Scripps College will admit trans women if they 
have been legally assigned female. Sweet Briar College will admit a trans woman 
if she has been able to change her birth certificate to female. Stephens College 
admission policy says they “will also admit and enroll students who were not born 
female, but who identify and live as women; those students will need to provide 
legal documentation that they are legally women or that they are transitioning to 
female” (Stephens College 2018). Thus the regulatory definition would be anyone 
who is legally recognized as a woman (X) counts as a woman (Y) in the context of 
applying to this institution (C).
It is interesting to note that some institutions have loosened definitional cri-
teria over time. In a 2017 survey, Hollins University required applicants to have 
legally and surgically transitioned (North 2017). As of 2020, their website uses the 
more common wording of requiring applicants to “consistently live and identify as 
women” (Hollins 2020).
The other area of variation is how different women’s colleges treat students who 
transition from female to male while attending the institution. Some institutions 
require such students to leave, while others allow them to stay and graduate (North 
2017). Converse College, for example, stresses that, “At the heart of Converse 
College is a women’s college which offers a distinctive undergraduate program for 
women.” Accordingly, taking a new self-identification seriously, the College does 
not permit students who transition to male (medically or legally) to continue their 
studies there, and may relocate them in terms of their campus housing (Converse 
College 2020). Wellesley College, on the other hand, explicitly states that they will 
“support” students who no longer identify as women after matriculation, allowing 
such students to stay at Wellesley or transfer to another institution (Wellesley Col-
lege 2020). At Mills College, a transgender man not only was permitted to stay at 
the college but was elected student body president (Mitchell 2014).
Why have women’s colleges moved to accept transgender applicants? The core 
value that seems to inform the changing policies is a commitment to the cause of 
feminism, which includes an acknowledgment that women have long endured 
discrimination. Priya Kandaswamy, a faculty member at Mills College who was 
on the subcommittee that drafted their new transgender policy, is quoted as saying 
“We strongly identify with our original mission, but we do think that women’s 
colleges were originally founded to make education more accessible for those who 
were discriminated against based on gender and today that includes transgender” 
(in Mitchell 2014). Similarly, trans activist and law professor Dean Spade argued 
that trans people “fit” at women’s colleges to create a space “that is about addressing 
gender oppression in higher ed” (Spade 2014). In a public letter by Wellesley Col-
lege’s president and Board of Trustees chair announcing the decision to consider 
any applicant who “lives as a woman and consistently identifies as a woman,” it was 
noted that the origin of Wellesley was an important social-political accomplish-
ment: “The creation of Wellesley College was a revolutionary act, challenging and 
confounding entrenched views about the roles and capacities of women.” They 
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further said, “Despite all the progress of the past century, women still face hurdles 
in realizing their potential.” Accordingly, the feminist rationale for the formation of 
the College continues: “It is clear to us that the concept of a women’s college, and 
the reasons for having one, are as valid today as they have been at any time in the 
past” (Gates & Bottomly 2015).
As described in Chapter 2, feminist scholars were the first to describe the social 
and cultural variability of gender identity. Thus, for one graduate of Mills, allowing 
transgender women to apply was “the right move” to “remain a women’s college 
while also having a more inclusive view of gender identity rather than relying on 
what it says on a person’s documents” (in Mitchell 2014). It is also worth mention-
ing at this point that women generally report lower levels of transgender prejudice 
or “transphobia” than men do (Nagoshi et al. 2008).
Not everyone at women’s colleges is happy with the admission of transgender 
students. There is a strand in contemporary feminist theory that will be examined 
at greater length in a later chapter known as “gender critical” feminism that ques-
tions whether cisgender women and transgender women share sufficient history 
and interests to be politically allied. At times the debates between feminist scholar/
activists have grown quite heated. In April 2020, Ninotska Love, one of the first 
openly transgender woman admitted to Wellesley College, was subjected to a series 
of hostile postings in the online platform Reddit in a discussion group titled Gen-
der Critical Feminism (with roughly 60,000 members).6 The incident prompted 
Wellesley’s president to send out an email reaffirming the College’s commitment to 
“the basic human rights, dignity, and well-being of all Wellesley transgender and 
gender nonbinary community members” and declaring that the incident is “cur-
rently being investigated by both our Title IX coordinator and by Campus Police” 
(Johnson 2020).
To summarize the chapter thus far, women’s colleges have responded to the 
Transgender Exigency in various ways. Some do not admit transgender women, 
and those that do vary in the definitional criteria used to decide who “counts” as 
a woman for the purposes of admission. The colleges and universities that admit 
transgender women do so, it would seem, because they see “women” as a category 
in which cisgender and transgender women share similar social-political status.
Men’s colleges
As of 2020, the number of single-sex colleges for men has dwindled to four in the 
U.S.: Wabash College in Crawfordsville, Indiana; Morehouse College, a historically 
black men’s college in Atlanta, Georgia; Hampden-Sydney College in Hampden-
Sydney, Virginia; and Saint John’s University in St. Joseph, Minnesota. Currently, 
two of the four do not admit transgender men (Jaschik 2019). St. John’s University 
announced in November 2016 that it would consider transgender applicants:
In furtherance of our mission, tradition, and values as an undergraduate 
college for men, and in recognition of our changing world and evolving 
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understanding of gender identity, Saint John’s University will consider for 
undergraduate admission those applicants who consistently live and identify 
as men, regardless of the gender assigned to them at birth.
(SJU Trustees 2016)
The mission of St. John’s University is specific to men:
Grounded in Catholic and Benedictine values and tradition, Saint John’s 
University provides young men a distinctive residential liberal arts educa-
tion, preparing them to reach their full potential and instilling in them the 
values and aspiration to lead lives of significance and principled achievement.
(SJU 2020)
Furthermore, the University identifies a set of values to which the institution is 
committed:
• Community built upon relationships of hospitality, respect, cooperation, and 
challenge.
• Openness to learning, inquiry, beauty, truth, and difference.
• Respect for persons, tradition, creativity, experience, faith, reason, and reli-
gious practice.
• Depth in understanding, relationships, faith, and spirituality.
• Sacredness of God, being, truth, place, nature, and knowledge.
• Passion for excellence, truth, learning, beauty, love, and personal growth.
Less than three years later, Morehouse College announced that it would admit 
transgender men, though if a student transitions from a man to a woman, that 
student would be asked to leave (Dodd 2019). Specifically, the policy states that,
In furtherance of our mission, tradition, and values as a men’s college, and 
in recognition of our changing world and evolving understanding of gender 
identity, Morehouse will now consider for admission applicants who live and 
self-identify as men, regardless of the sex assigned to them at birth.
(Morehouse College 2019)
The mission statement of Morehouse College is worth quoting here:
The mission of Morehouse College is to develop men with disciplined minds 
who will lead lives of leadership and service. As the only historically black col-
lege or university dedicated to the development of men into leaders, we realize 
this mission by providing a world-class liberal arts education while emphasiz-
ing the intellectual and character development of our students. We assume a 
special responsibility for teaching the history and culture of black people.
(Morehouse College 2021)
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Like St. John’s, Morehouse also identifies a series of values that shape the College’s 
culture, including spirituality, community, accountability, trust, respect, integrity, 
honesty, civility, and compassion.
The point is that St. John’s University and Morehouse College saw no conflict 
between their mission and values as men’s colleges and a definition of “men” that 
includes transgender men. They both ask only that applicants “live and self-identify” 
as men. The definitive attributes identified here are twofold: To self-identify is 
an explicit act that is at the discretion of the applicant. To live as a man is obvi-
ously more vague, given that there are many ways of living as a man. In an email 
exchange with a former administrator at St. John’s University, I learned that they 
do not necessarily expect evidence of a past commitment but rather are looking 
toward the future: There is no requirement for
legal documentation or previous requirement of identifying as a trans man. 
Our expectation has been that the trans applicant intends to identify as a man 
going forward. In other words, we would accept a trans student who intends 
to identify as a man throughout his college career.
Vice President for Student Development at the College of Saint Benedict, Mary 
Geller, who helped formulate the admission policy for both Saint Benedict and 
St. John’s, confirmed that future intention is more important than past duration 
(Geller 2020). Thus, for all practical purposes at St. John’s, the two attributes col-
lapse into one and function in a manner similar to women’s colleges that only 
require self-identification.
Hampden-Sydney College (or H-SC) only allows applicants who were assigned 
male at birth and identify as male (Jaschik 2019; Stimpert 2020). H-SC is the tenth 
oldest college in the United States, founded in 1775. It is located in Prince Edward 
County, notoriously known for having refused to abide by the Supreme Court’s 
desegregation decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education (Green 2015). Vestiges 
of racism linger: In 2012, a group of about 40 students protested the reelection of 
Barack Obama as president, gathering outside the minority students’ union. Stu-
dents “shouted racial slurs, tossed bottles, set off fireworks and threatened physi-
cal violence,” leading to four of the protesting students being disciplined (Winter 
2012).
There is no question that there are progressive elements within the College and 
student body;7 nonetheless, the College has earned a reputation overall of being 
conservative, and that conservatism apparently includes gender politics. For exam-
ple, in 2016 the College first terminated, then reappointed, a visiting faculty mem-
ber who had made public statements that were interpreted by some as advocating 
violence against transgender women who use a women’s restroom (Kapsidelis 2016). 
More recently, the editor-in-chief of the student newspaper published an editorial 
titled “Transgender Lies Become Tyrannical” that, among other things, refers to 
the “false ideology of transgenderism” and considers the word “transphobic” to be 
a “nonsense word.” Proclaiming that “The transgender delusion has carried on far 
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enough,” the author argues that opposition to “transgenderism” is being censored 
to a degree he considers tyrannical (Bredin 2019). The editorial is consistent with 
other conservative press coverage that treats transgender claims with skepticism, 
such as the headline “Women’s college to admit male students posing as women” 
(Haverluck 2018). Implicit in the H-SC editorial is a commitment to biological 
determinism, though obviously it cannot be assumed that commitment is shared by 
the College’s administration. Furthermore, the editorial swiftly received substantial 
criticism from parties from within and outside of H-SC (Black 2019; Gender Issues 
Committee 2019; Page 2019; Plichta-Kellar 2019; Stimpert 2019; Utzinger 2019).
Dr. Larry Stimpert, President of Hampden-Sydney College, explained that 
H-SC’s commitment to form “good men and good citizens” dates back to the Col-
lege’s founding and continues to inform its policies today (2020). The admissions 
policy has evolved since 2011 from requiring that applicants be legally considered 
male (which, in theory, might allow a transgender applicant who had changed his 
birth certificate) to a 2017 requirement that applicants must be born and identify 
as male. When asked, President Stimpert did not identify a rationale for exclud-
ing transgender men other than the historic commitment of the College to being 
a men’s college. With the University of Virginia beginning to admit women as 
undergraduates in 1970, and the Supreme Court requirement that the Virginia 
Military Institute admit women in 1996, H-SC is the last men’s college in Virginia. 
Stimpert noted that an on-going concern of alumni and Board of Trustees is stay-
ing true to that commitment and tradition, and that there is resistance to changes 
that might be interpreted as moving the college toward becoming co-educational. 
Admitting transgender applicants could be perceived by some as just such a move. 
At the same time, Stimpert noted that there have been discussions among senior 
leadership about what to do if a current H-SC student transitioned to become a 
woman, and the unanimous response was that the College would support such 
a student to complete their degree at H-SC rather than requiring the student to 
leave.8
Wabash College’s Student Senate debated the question of admitting transgender 
men several times and rejected the idea because they felt admission would, in fact, 
hinder the College’s pursuit of its mission. A spokesperson for Wabash told Inside 
Higher Ed that
the college’s admissions policy is to evaluate candidates based on our singular 
and historic mission to be a liberal arts college for men chartered in the state 
of Indiana. All of our programs and policies are designed to support our mis-
sion.” Asked if this meant that the college would admit only those classified 
by the government as male, he said, “legally male as defined by the state in 
which we are chartered.”
(Jaschik 2017)9
The explicit Mission Statement for Wabash College is not all that different 
from those of Morehouse or St. John’s: “Wabash College educates men to think 
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critically, act responsibly, lead effectively, and live humanely” (Wabash 2020). The 
Core Values advertised differ a bit from those of St. John’s and Morehouse:
Our Core Values
A rigorous liberal arts education that fosters
• An appreciation for the intellectual and physical aspects of a good life
• An understanding of and appreciation for other cultures
A personal context to teaching and learning that encourages
• Candid, respectful, face-to-face conversations
• Freedom of thought
• A local scholarly community that creates lifelong relationships
Individual responsibility and trust that are
• Based on moral and ethical awareness
• Expressed in the Gentleman’s Rule
• Required for leadership and teamwork
A socially, economically, and ethnically diverse student body 
characterized by
• A dedication to the serious pursuit of learning
• A culture of competition without malice
• A few years of residence, a lifetime of loyalty
A tradition and philosophy of independence that
• Keeps the College from external control
• Allows the Wabash community to shape significantly its own destiny
• Promotes independence and self-reliance in its students and graduates
(Wabash 2020)
One might interpret the emphasis on the Gentleman’s Rule, competition, 
independence, and self-reliance as reflecting certain traditional masculine norms, 
and, indeed, there is evidence that at least some who opposed the admission 
of transgender students were motivated by a desire to maintain those norms. 
Though one needs to be careful not to overgeneralize, concerns have been 
expressed about the degree of sexism on campus. An account in the Chicago Trib-
une reported that some faculty “worry about the locker-room talk that sometimes 
erupts in classrooms, and the sexist attitudes some students express. Classroom 
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discussions that touch on women’s issues can be particularly strained”  (Breslin 
2001). A student editorial in the school newspaper, The Bachelor, defends Wabash 
as a Brotherhood of Men, and argued that “allowing a transgender individual 
here would violate our single-sex education as well as our Brotherhood” (Rus-
sel 2018). Criticizing the idea that “traditional male gender roles are harmful,” 
the author defends the norms of “self-reliance, competition, and dominance” as 
“helpful in life.” Echoing what I have described earlier as biological determinism, 
the student states, “I believe, as do many of my brothers, that a person is born 
with their sex determined” (Russel 2018). An equally strong statement about 
the biological basis for sex was articulated by a Student Senator who opposes 
the admission of transgender students: “I fully disagree with the idea that some-
how somebody’s perception in their mind changes their biological and genetic 
nature. Honestly the only common denominator when it comes to manhood 
is that genetic [component]. You are genetically male or female” (Block 2016, 
3). Another student editorial argued, “it is unproductive to push for the admit-
tance of women who claim to be men, not only because it would cease to make 
Wabash an all-male school, but it would utterly distort the nature of authentic 
manhood on campus” (Kaufman 2016).
The author’s choice of words here, referring to “the nature of authentic man-
hood,” is described as the language of essentialism (Schiappa 2003, 36). The 
language of essentialism refers to linguistic practices that reflect and depend on 
metaphysical absolutism—the belief that things have independent, “objective” struc-
tures or essences that are knowable “in themselves” (Barnes 1982, 79–83). One can 
discern such metaphysical absolutism when a distinction is made between “real” 
versus “apparent” Xs, as in this case between “the nature of authentic manhood” 
versus, implicitly, inauthentic or only apparent manhood. My argument in Defining 
Reality is that the language of essentialism is problematic for two reasons.
First, metaphysical absolutism is a mostly discredited philosophical doctrine 
when it comes to the practice of definition. Most philosophers have long since 
rejected the idea that we can identify timeless essences to describe what the 
“nature” of things are (Schiappa 2003, 39–41). Rather, as described in Chapter 2, 
our definitions of things, even in the physical sciences, depend on historically situ-
ated theories that change over time. Indeed, the point of Chapter 2 was to illustrate 
that we are at a moment of history when the question of how to define sex and 
gender, in particular, has never been so unsettled. Our culture is very far from a 
shared understanding of what “the nature of authentic manhood” is.
Second, deploying an alleged metaphysical distinction often obfuscates impor-
tant social needs and values that are involved in acts of definition. As William James 
pointed out over a century ago, what we deem as an “essential” attribute of a thing 
is motivated by our purposes: “The ‘essence’ of a thing is that one of its properties 
which is so important for my interests that in comparison with it I may neglect the 
rest” (1981, 961).10 That is why, for example, Rebecca R. Helm stipulated, “as a 
developmental biologist, I define male/female as organisms producing sperm/eggs” 
(2020, emphasis added).
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If someone says “oh that is not ‘real’ music” or “he’s not a ‘real man’,” we can 
be sure that the person has a preferred form of music or definition of manhood that 
s/he has deemed “essential,” “authentic,” or “real.” Thus, in a definitional contro-
versy, it is important to put one’s cards on the table, so to speak, and identify the 
attributes that define “men” or “manhood” in the context of a college setting that 
one considers as most valuable. Only then can an assessment of whether transgen-
der men should “count” as men in that context be made.
Wabash College and Hampden-Sydney rely on one’s assigned sex at birth to 
define men and women. Why?11 At least in the case of Wabash, there is some 
evidence that the exclusion of transgender men is based on a belief in biological 
determinism:
[Our] brotherhood exists due to the very nature of our experience grounded 
in and shaped by our biological masculinity that sets us apart, but not above, 
women. Once we make one move to change this standard, it will compromise 
what manhood means at this institution and we will never recover from that.
(Kaufman 2016)
One might ask why Morehouse College and St. John’s University decided oth-
erwise? Both institutions’ official policy state simply that they will admit transgender 
students “[i]n furtherance of our mission, tradition, and values as an undergraduate 
college for men, and in recognition of our changing world and evolving under-
standing of gender identity” (SJU 2016; Morehouse 2019).
It is worth noting that Morehouse and St. John’s both coordinate with sibling 
all-women’s colleges—Spelman College for Morehouse and the College of Saint 
Benedict for St. John’s. The institutions share curriculum and access to certain 
facilities of the other. The conversation at Morehouse was prompted, at least in 
part, by Spelman College’s decision in 2017 to admit transgender women (Jaschik 
2019). I  suspect it would be difficult to explain why a women’s college should 
accept transgender applicants while their sibling men’s college should not. If a com-
mitment to self-identification and living as a woman is sufficient for the women’s 
college, why should it not be functionally similar for the affiliated men’s college? 
At this point in time, I am not aware of any affiliated sibling single-sex institutions 
that have conflicting policies.
To sum up, there are two regulatory definitions at work for men’s colleges. 
Excluding transgender applicants, the first can be formulated as: Only those 
assigned the sex male at birth (X) count as men (Y) in the context of apply-
ing to this institution (C). Including transgender applicants, the second can be 
described as: Those who consistently live and identify as men, regardless of the 
gender assigned to them at birth (X) count as men (Y) in the context of applying to 
this institution (C). These competing regulatory definitions appear to be informed 
not only by competing approaches to definition (biological determinism versus 
self-identification) but also competing values associated with different visions of 
what it means to be a man.
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What about single-sex K-12 schools?
There are over 1,400 single-sex K-12 schools in the U.S. (Reilly 2019). Even 
focusing solely on high schools, the vast majority of single-sex schools do not 
have publicly stated policies about admitting transgender students. This does not 
mean that none do, but rather that “official” policy statements are rare and most 
handle the matter on a case-by-case basis. Many schools are still wrestling with 
the challenges of minors facing difficult choices and circumstances, and balancing 
a desire to serve students with care with the traditions associated with a single-sex 
school (Lane 2016). Not only are single-sex schools devising admission policies for 
transgender students, but they also must enact policies for whether to allow stu-
dents who transition “out” of the school’s single sex to stay or ask them to transfer. 
Meanwhile, transgender students across the nation report higher rates of depres-
sion, poor educational performance, and face greater risks of self-harm (GLSEN 
2017). A number of high schools that my research assistants and I called or emailed 
for further information about their transgender admission policies did not respond. 
Those that did said that they had not received applications from students self-
identified as transgender, though it is possible some have applied without outing 
themselves as trans.12
Generally speaking, women’s colleges have moved to a more inclusive model 
than most girls’ secondary schools, despite the rise of public discussion and 
awareness about transgender issues at the high school level (Swartz 2017). 
A study done in spring 2017 gathered information from a sampling of 33 inde-
pendent girls’ schools and found that while 29 of the 33 reported having at least 
one transgender student, only eight had yet approved guidelines or policy for 
admissions decision (Mencher 2017). Reuters’ news service contacted dozens 
of girls’ schools in 2018 and found that “several said they had already devel-
oped transgender policies, some said they are having early discussions or have 
created taskforces and a number of others have taken no action” (Kvetenadze 
2018). A chart provided by the National Coalition of Girls’ Schools published 
in 2018 about independent all-girls schools suggests that the trend is toward 
admitting transgender girls on a case-by-case basis and relying on student self-
identification, at all educational levels, to determine eligibility (NCGS 2018). 
The NCGS provides a database of research and advice about serving the needs 
of transgender students (2020).
The International Boys’ Schools Coalition lists a Transgender Task Force and 
Transgender Resources on their website, but does not publicly provide a posi-
tion statement or policy recommendations. An internal document does not take a 
definitive position concerning the admission of transgender boys, but recommends 
an individualized and incremental approach:
Because each school is different and each boy’s journey is unique, IBSC 
encourages schools to establish guiding principles and then to work with 
students and families on a case-by-case basis, rather than adopt rigid policies. 
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This recommendation includes the enrollment process and students’ full 
experiences at the school.
(IBSC 2018)
It is unclear how much interest there is among transgender boys to apply to all-
boys schools at the K-12 level. Former Head of School of the all-boys Belmont Hill 
School, Rick Melvoin, told me that “on my watch we would have absolutely wel-
comed the application of a trans boy,” but no such applications were received. The 
Director of Admissions at an elite all-boys school on the east coast similarly told me 
that they had not received applicants who have identified themselves as transgen-
der. A school counselor at an all-boys school told me that she was not aware of 
trans applicants, but there may well be applicants who are trans that refrain from 
disclosing that status in order to avoid discrimination in the application process.
Should a transgender boy apply to an all-boys’ school? It is a difficult question. 
On one hand, past research has suggested that all-boys schools cultivate “more sex-
ist environments” and that students at boys’ schools “display more traditional forms 
of masculinity” than co-ed schools (Reilly 2019). One could imagine that trying to 
attend such a school at the age of 14 or 15 would be daunting for a transgender boy. 
Filmmaker and Professor of Philosophy and Gender Studies Thomas Keith agrees, 
contending that all-boys schools are more likely to be characterized by what Keith 
terms “bro culture,” which
is made up mainly of boys and men who eschew  the feminine and bond 
around their sexist and homophobic alliances with one another. Those of 
LGBTQ communities are typically used as fodder for insults, homophobic 
and transphobic punch lines in jokes, and people to deride and castigate in 
the service of bonding around their cisgender, heterosexual alliances to each 
other.
(Keith 2020)
It is reasonable to assume that trans boys who fear the risks of such a culture might 
want to avoid it.
On the other hand, it is clear that the leadership of some boys’ schools is striv-
ing to improve the culture. A survey by the International Boys’ Schools Coalition
found that boys’ school leaders think the most important challenge facing 
their schools today is “healthy concepts of masculinity and relationships.” 
Asked about the challenges that boys’ schools will face over the next five 
years, a plurality of respondents said “gender issues”.
(Reilly 2019)
Furthermore, some parents want to be convinced that “a boys’ school will not 
be an incubator of male privilege and entitlement and misogyny” (Reilly 2019). 
Former Headmaster Melvoin told me that he felt the “bro culture” accusation was 
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“dramatically exaggerated,” and pointed to greater acceptance of self-identified gay 
students as an example of progress. He suggested that the environment of boys’ 
schools can give boys more freedom to explore who they are than often is the case 
in coed schools (2020). Similarly, Jason Robinson, the Headmaster of St. Albans 
School, claims that boys’ schools “provide an affirming environment for boys to 
‘interrogate unhealthy notions of masculinity’ and discuss anxieties and frustrations 
without feeling self-conscious” (Reilly 2019).
Adam Howard, Professor of Education, is not so sure. His ongoing research of 
young alums (18–25) acknowledges that all-boys schools “are increasingly facili-
tating activities, experiences, discussions and so on around issues of gender and 
sexuality as well as privilege and social justice in response to what’s happening in 
larger society.” However, the alums in his research “largely describe these efforts as 
‘going through the motions’ and not really a significant learning experience. Some 
participants, in fact, understand it as an ‘attack’ on men and masculinity” (2020; 
see also Howard 2019). Accordingly, it seems too soon to know whether the pro-
gress that some boys’ schools report provides a climate that would be supportive of 
transgender students.
The more pressing issue for all-boys schools appears not to be admission policy 
but what to do when a student admitted and attending a boys’ school decides to 
identify as a girl. The limited information available suggests that decisions about 
whether to allow a student to remain in a single-sex school after they transition 
is done on a case-by-case basis, and depends in part on where the student is in 
their education. For example, a student at a private boys’ school in Virginia who 
attended the school beginning in kindergarten and who transitioned to identify as 
a woman the spring before their senior year requested and was given permission to 
graduate with their cohort.
Conclusion
As described in Chapter 1, regulatory definitions have three characteristics. First, 
regulatory definitions are formulated and authorized by recognized organizations 
or institutions. In this case, individual schools have been the organizations for-
mulating the definitions. National organizations have refrained from advocating 
specific policies and definitions so far. There is, at this point in time, no particular 
legal or regulatory mechanism to compel a common definitional practice across 
the nation.
Second, regulatory definitions are designed to promote denotative conformity; 
that is, when using language, we want to be able to observe a phenomenon and 
agree that X is a Y. It is clear that at this point in time, we lack denotative conform-
ity with respect to gender identification for admission to single-sex schools because 
the definitions vary in a nontrivial manner. For some institutions, only cisgender 
males or females “count” as men or women for the purposes of admission. For oth-
ers, a transgender applicant can count as an eligible boy or girl, woman or man, but 
the specific definitive attributes vary significantly, requiring only self-identification 
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on one end of the spectrum, to some evidence of duration in the middle (“consist-
ently live and identify as Y”), to having “legally” transitioned to the school’s gender 
on the other end of the spectrum.
What this means is that we are still in a state of definitional rupture, wherein a specific 
person would be defined as a boy or man by one school and a girl or woman by another.
A third characteristic of regulatory definitions is that words are defined to serve 
one or more specific purpose and promote certain values or interests for those 
involved. It is reasonable to infer that when there are different and competing 
definitions, it is a result of competing values and interests at work. This point is, 
I believe, key to understanding why different single-sex schools have generated dif-
ferent definitions.
At the collegiate level, it seems reasonable to generalize that colleges permitting 
transgender women to apply have done so because such institutions often have 
feminist histories, values, and commitments—by which I mean a distrust of bio-
logical determinism (often used to justify the oppression of women), an acknowl-
edgment that transgender women face discrimination similar (though not identical) 
to what cisgender women experience, and a desire to empower women for success 
in a world still dominated by sexism.
The four remaining men’s colleges are currently divided 50/50. Both Saint 
John’s University and Morehouse will admit applicants who “consistently live and 
identify as men,” but there is little public indication of why. Saint John’s University 
simply says the change was made “in recognition of our changing world and evolv-
ing understanding of gender identity” (SJU 2016). Morehouse College offers iden-
tical wording: “in recognition of our changing world and evolving understanding 
of gender identity” (Morehouse 2019). Again, it is worth noting that both schools 
work closely with partner women’s schools. In either case, it is clear that neither 
institution sees a problematic conflict between their historical missions, traditions, 
and values as men’s colleges and the admission of transgender men. The other two 
men’s colleges, Wabash and Hampden-Sydney, are reluctant to make public state-
ments explaining their decision, but from the limited available evidence it seems 
evident that there remains a commitment to biological determinism and traditional 
notions of masculinity.
There is a paucity of information about the motivations of single-sex K-12 
institutions. Most note that they need to demonstrate care for their students while 
protecting the historical mission of their institutions. One could reasonably surmise 
that the competing values and interests are parallel to those facing colleges, with 
the added complication of the young age of K-12 students. The question of when 
young people are in position to decide about such a fundamental question as gen-
der identity is a matter of contestation, but not one I can pursue here.
Notes
 1 Quoted in Bennett-Smith (2013).
 2 Love (2020) and Carapezza (2018).
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 3 Quoted in Cregan (2018).
 4 Durant gave the speech in the year Wellesley College was founded, 1875, though the 
speech was not published until 1890 for a gathering of the Alumnae Association (Tay-
lor  & Glasscock 1975, 1). My thanks to Wellesley College library archivist Natalia 
Gutiérrez-Jones for her assistance.
 5 This list comes from the research efforts of Wellesley undergraduate Grace (Yongxi) Pan 
and from North (2017).
 6 The discussion group subsequently was banned, and moderators launched an invitation-
only site with far fewer members called Ovarit.com (Fain 2020).
 7 The school’s Equity and Inclusion webpage states: “Hampden-Sydney College is com-
mitted to an inclusive structure that is coordinated and integrated, that celebrates all 
forms of diversity, and that ensures equitable educational and social benefits for all.” Such 
a statement, alumni and faculty from H-SC told me, primarily reflects the College’s 
efforts to support minority and gay cisgender male students.
 8 Interestingly, H-SC has a long-standing policy to allow the admission of daughters of 
faculty and staff. The numbers are quite low each year (zero to two). President Stimpert 
(2020) relayed that there was some controversy when one of these young women gradu-
ated first in her class. As  senior staff has reviewed the College’s  admission policy, he 
reported, they have discussed whether ending the policy would reinforce the college’s 
commitment to being a men’s college.
 9 It is not altogether clear what it means to be “legally male as defined by the state.” To 
change one’s birth certificate in Indiana requires a court order, and to change a driver’s 
license requires either an updated birth certificate or State Form 55617 signed by a phy-
sician that the applicant successfully underwent treatment to permanently change gender 
(National Center for Transgender Equality 2020).
 10 Scare quote marks added. James did not believe in essences in the way the idea was 
understood by most metaphysicians of his time, but is pointing out that the attributes we 
take as a thing’s essence is a reflection of our own needs, interests, and values.
 11 I asked the President and Director of Admissions at Wabash College to provide a brief 
explanation of why they do not admit transgender men applicants, and was told they had 
nothing to add other than what was reported in Jaschik (2017).
 12 My thanks to Wellesley student Alex Hussey for her research efforts in this regard.
Transgender voices
“I’ve been out for almost 30 years as transgender. . . . I learned how to self-dehydrate 
myself, so that I could avoid bathroom stops while I drove across the country for eight, 
maybe ten hours, if I do it right. And I do this still today because I am more nervous now 
about using the public washrooms than I was before because of the political atmosphere 
with trans people presently.”
Venus de Mars1
“I was screamed at in a women’s bathroom that I was a ‘pervert’ and should be ‘harassed 
to my death’ as I was chased out. I was cornered in a men’s bathroom, being asked by 
some huge guy ‘how the fairy got in here’.”
Skylar2
The principal told my mom that because Bixby [High School] had only male and female 
restrooms, no unisex, it was too complicated for me to be a student there.”
Katie3
“I was in a Russian club in New York and was dressed in tight pants and a little jacket. 
My hair was short, and I had no makeup on. So I entered the boy’s bathroom, because 
how could I go to the women’s bathroom? The usher literally grabbed me and said ‘Miss, 
Miss you’re in the wrong bathroom!’ And to this day that was probably one of the best 
experiences in my life. I was just so grateful that someone could see in me what I was also 
seeing in myself.”
Ninotska Love4
“At last, my victory feels final. But I shouldn’t have had to fight this hard.”
Gavin Grimm5
FIGURE 5.1 Tweet by Michael Hughes, used by permission.
Source: Photo by Michael Hughes, used by permission
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The practice of bathroom sex segregation is relatively recent, historically speaking. 
In the United States, restrooms were all single-user water closets, privies, or out-
houses until the 1870s when plumbing and public works infrastructure advanced to 
the point that multi-user public restrooms were feasible. The design and regulation 
of public restrooms in the latter 19th century did not take place in an ideologi-
cal vacuum (Kogan 2007). Feminist historian and rhetoric scholar Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell describes the dominant gender ideology of the 19th century, known as 
the cult of domesticity or the cult of true womanhood:
As the cult of domesticity was codified in the United States in the early 
part of the [19th] century, two distinct subcultures emerged. Man’s place 
was the world outside the home, the public realm of politics and finance; 
man’s nature was thought to be lustful, amoral, competitive, and ambitious. 
Woman’s place was home, a haven from amoral capitalism and dirty politics, 
where “the heart was,” where the spiritual and emotional needs of husband 
and children were met by a “ministering angel.” Woman’s nature was pure, 
pious, domestic, and submissive. She was to remain entirely in the private 
sphere of the home, eschewing any appearance of individuality, leadership, 
or aggressiveness.
(Campbell 1989, 10)
Laws requiring separate restroom facilities for women and men emerged at a 
time when the philosophy of separating public and private spheres by gender was 
colliding with the economic necessities of women working in the industrial revo-
lution (Kessler-Harris 1995). The well-known “Cult of True Womanhood” was 
a myth, but one that Victorian society was loathe to abandon (Kogan 2007, 23). 




(and limited) in the name of their health and safety. Such regulations were sup-
ported by a collection of disparate advocacy groups juggling “women’s legitimate 
demands for economic independence and thus increased role in the workplace on 
the one hand, and a desire to preserve traditional family life under a mother’s influ-
ence on the other” (Kogan 2007, 17).
The first state law mandating that workplace toilet facilities be separated by sex 
was enacted in 1887 in Massachusetts (Kogan 2007). Other states soon followed 
suit, typically by amending statutes on the books designed to protect women in 
the workplace. Such legislation was motivated less by the sort of philosophical 
or religious motivations of earlier times and more by supposed scientific research 
documenting the differences between the sexes that declared women weaker and in 
need of protection, especially in light of the need to safeguard women’s reproduc-
tive capacity: “Moved by the scientific pretensions of realism after mid-century . . . 
legislators began to take seriously the threat that allowing vulnerable women into 
the public realm would endanger both their own weaker bodies and the welfare of 
future generations” (Kogan 2007, 27).
In addition to laws regulating how women could participate in the workplace, 
the second half of the 19th century also saw the growth of protected public spaces 
for women. Public libraries created “ladies’ reading rooms,” there were designated 
“ladies’ cars” on railroads, and various businesses created separate “parlor” spaces 
for women in department stores, hotels, and restaurants: “While acknowledging 
the ever-increasing presence of women in public, these spaces reinforced the cul-
tural message that, as the weaker sex, women needed special home-like protections 
when they ventured outside their domestic havens” (Kogan 2007, 34).
Kogan’s examination of an extensive 1910 Department of Commerce and Labor 
study on the condition of women and child wage earners found an endorsement 
across all industries to separate toilet facilities by sex. His reading of the study iden-
tified four justifications:
1 The sex-separated water closet was necessary as a haven to protect the weaker 
body of the woman worker.
2 The sex-separated water closet was necessary as one aspect of a factory’s provid-
ing its workers with sanitary—“clean and adequate”—toilet accommodations.
3 The sex-separated water closet was necessary to protect a worker’s interest in 
privacy.
4 The sex-separated water closet was necessary to protect and vindicate social 
morality, a morality rooted in the early nineteenth century separate spheres 
ideology.
(Kogan 2007, 41, emphasis in original)
Kogan’s account concludes that,
the historical and social justifications for the ubiquitous practice of separating 
public restrooms by sex were based not on a gender-neutral policy related to 
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simple anatomical differences between men and women. Rather its origins 
were deeply bound up with early nineteenth century moral ideology con-
cerning the appropriate role and place for women in society.
(2007, 55)6
Similarly, the debate over bathroom bills in the 21st century is informed by beliefs 
about gender. I list the four justifications identified by Kogan because three of the 
four emerge, implicitly or explicitly, in the debate over so-called bathroom bills. 
Writing in 2007, Kogan presciently noted,
Separate public restrooms for men and women foster subtle social under-
standings that women are inherently vulnerable and in need of protection 
when in public, while men are inherently predatory. Moreover, the two-
restroom model teaches that there are two, and only two sexes, a message 




Laws that require the construction of separate bathroom facilities are not, of course, 
the same as laws or regulations concerning who uses them. Not all jurisdictions 
prohibit the use of a sex-designated restroom by a member of the “opposite” sex, 
but many do. For example, the Raleigh, North Carolina, municipal code regarding 
toilet facilities states that, “it shall be unlawful for a member of one sex to enter 
or use a facility provided for members of the opposite sex” (Section 13–2015). 
Many jurisdictions rely, instead, on regulating specific behavior. For example, if 
a proprietor tells a customer s/he is in the “wrong” restroom or locker room and 
should leave, and the customer persists, the behavior could be considered criminal 
trespass.7 Behavior in bathrooms also is governed by laws that prohibit disorderly 
conduct or assault. In other words, unless a bathroom user acts in a manner con-
sidered inappropriate, such as a man trying to open a toilet stall being used by a 
woman,8 merely using the restroom of one’s choice is unlikely to encounter legal 
difficulties. Jurisdictions that have a regulation concerning bathroom use have not 
typically taken the extra step of defining what counts as male or female, so if we 
were to describe such regulations as a regulatory definition, the key would appear 
to be perceptions of appropriateness; thus, a person perceived as a male/female 
(X) counts as a man/woman (Y) in the context of public bathrooms and changing 
facilities (C).
Obviously, perceptions can be subjective, and without specific legislative or reg-
ulatory guidance in place, DSD, gender nonconforming, and transgender people 
are vulnerable to implicit or explicit sanctions, including being denied access to 
the restroom consistent with their gender identity, loss of employment, harass-
ment, and acts of violence. In the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, 75% of transgender 
men and 53% of transgender women reported that they “sometimes or always 
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avoided [public] bathrooms in the past year” (James et al. 2016, 228). The Survey 
also reported,
Respondents were also asked if they had experienced any physical prob-
lems as a result of avoiding restrooms in public places, at work, or at school. 
Nearly one-third (32%) of the sample avoided drinking or eating so that they 
would not need to use the restroom, and 8% reported having a urinary tract 
infection or kidney-related medical problem as a result of avoiding restrooms 
in the past year.
(229)
The consequences of hostility toward transgender people using the restroom 
consistent with their gender identity are significant. Sociologist Sheila Cavanagh’s 
research team interviewed 100 transgender and gender-nonconforming individu-
als and found that “public reactions to their presence in the toilet, ranging from 
curiosity, inquisition, surprise, confusion, and avoidance to fear, anger, hostility, 
and hatred” (2010, 55). The experiences relayed by her interviewees document 
profoundly negative consequences to their lack of acceptance in the restroom of 
their preference, even if the responses are limited to nonverbal expressions that 
communicate the interviewee is in the “wrong” bathroom: “Trans interview-
ees often say that transphobic looks generated by aggressive and intentional gen-
der misreadings are nullifying and devastating to one’s person” (2010, 58). Other 
reactions reported include efforts to contact security, threats, harassment, physical 
assault, and arrest.
There is considerable research demonstrating that school environments, in par-
ticular, are stressful for transgender students (Davies, Vipond, & King 2019; James 
et al. 2016). This stress is aggravated by concerns about bathroom access. Transgen-
der people report that safe access to restrooms is one of their most persistent and 
frightening challenges (Doan 2010). A survey of 23,000 LGBTQ students between 
the ages of 13 and 21 found that transgender students attending a school with 
transgender or gender-nonconforming policies or guidelines felt greater belonging 
to their school community, were less likely to miss school because they felt unsafe, 
and less likely to be compelled to use bathrooms of their “legal” (assigned at birth) 
sex (Kosciw et al. 2018, xxiv). A study of college students in Colorado found that 
when transgender identities are not considered in bathroom designs, transgender 
students, staff, and faculty experience exclusion and invisibility, tend to feel less safe 
on campus, and try to avoid bathrooms on campus (Seelman et al. 2012). A survey 
of 507 transgender and gender-nonconforming students found that gender-inclu-
sive restroom policies received the highest importance score of 17 trans-inclusive 
policies and practices (Goldberg, Beemyn, & Smith 2019).
Kristie L. Seelman’s (2016) analysis of over 2,300 people completing the 
National Transgender Discrimination Survey found that denial of access to gen-
der-appropriate bathrooms in colleges or universities was correlated to increased 
suicide attempts. Seelman’s analysis controlled for multiple variables, including 
Bathrooms 77
income, race, disability, and other interpersonal victimization, and found that those 
who had been denied access to a school bathroom or other facility due to being 
transgender are 1.32 times as likely to have attempted suicide compared to those 
who were not denied access to a school bathroom or facility (2016, 1389). That is 
to say, a person who was denied access is 32% more likely to attempt suicide than 
a transgender or gender nonconforming individual who has not.
Efforts to protect the rights of transgender individuals to use the restroom of 
their choice have been made through a combination of court cases, legislative 
initiatives, and guidance by government offices. Beginning even before the period 
I have described as the Transgender Exigency, states including Colorado (2008), 
Connecticut (2011), Hawaii (2006), Iowa (2007), Maine (2005), Massachusetts 
(2016), Nevada (2011), New Mexico (2003), Oregon (2007), Rhode Island 
(2001), Vermont (2007), and Washington (2015) enacted legislation or regulations 
that prohibits discrimination in public accommodations based on gender identity. 
California passed a law specific to public educational institutions in 2013. There 
are also at least 200 municipal statutes that prohibit discrimination based on gender 
identity (Wang et al. 2016).
In May 2016, the U.S. Departments of Justice and Education released a “Dear 
Colleague” guidance document to stipulate that Title IX’s prohibition of discrimi-
nation based on sex included gender identity: “The Departments treat a student’s 
gender identity as the student’s sex for purposes of Title IX and its implementing 
regulations” (Lhamon & Gupta 2016, 2). The document addressed the issue of 
restrooms and locker rooms explicitly: “A school may provide separate facilities on 
the basis of sex, but must allow transgender students access to such facilities consist-
ent with their gender identity” (Lhamon & Gupta 2016, 3).
The key definitive attribute at work in the regulatory definition informing 
these anti-discrimination efforts is a person’s self-identified gender. Thus, a person 
whose (self-declared) gender identity is male/female (X) counts as a man/woman 
(Y) in the context of public bathrooms and changing facilities (C).
We can describe these first two definitions as the “perceptual” definition and 
the “self-identified” definition of sex/gender for the purposes of sex-segregated 
bathrooms and locker rooms. There can be a tension between the two inasmuch as 
the same person might “count” as male in one context or jurisdiction and female 
in another. The situation became even more complicated with the imposition of 
the “strict biological” definition.
On May 28, 2014, the Houston City Council passed an anti-discrimination 
ordinance known as the Houston Equal Rights Ordinance (HERO). HERO 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, sex, 
race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, religion, disability, pregnancy, genetic 
information, family, marital, and military status. HERO applied to businesses that 
serve the public, private employers, housing, city employment and city contract-
ing. Religious institutions were exempt (Feldman 2014). Of the various forms of 
discrimination banned in the ordinance, it was discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity that gained the most attention.
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Almost immediately, critics condemned HERO specifically because they 
thought the ordinance permitted transgender people to use public restrooms 
consistent with their gender identity. Following city law, opponents of HERO 
successfully petitioned to have HERO subject to voter approval as a ballot ques-
tion. At the core of stated opposition to Proposition 1 was the fear of male 
sexual predators entering women’s restrooms. Texas Lt. Governor Dan Patrick 
recorded a 30-second video in opposition to Proposition 1. He claimed that it 
was not about equality, but “it’s about allowing men in women’s locker rooms 
and bathrooms” (Patrick 2015). Rev. Max Miller of the Baptist Ministers Asso-
ciation of Houston similarly argued, “We’re standing up to protect our women 
and our children” (in Morris 2014). The Houston Chronicle reported that, “Foes 
have dubbed the measure [HERO] the ‘Sexual Predator Protection Act’ ” (Mor-
ris 2014). An organization called Campaign for Houston aired a television ad 
that claimed “even registered sex offenders could follow women or young girls 
into the bathroom and if a business tried to stop them they’d be fined.” Filmed 
in black and white and presented with an ominous soundtrack, the ad ends with 
a young girl going into a bathroom stall, only to be followed by what appears 
to be an adult male predator. The voiceover concludes with the admonition to 
“protect woman’s privacy, prevent danger, vote no” (Campaign for Houston 
2015b).
Despite the support of Houston Mayor Annise Parker and organizations includ-
ing the ACLU and Houston’s NAACP chapter, on November  3, 2015, a 27% 
voter turnout of the city of Houston voted on “Proposition 1” to overturn it by a 
61%–39% margin.
The failure of Proposition 1 meant that gay and transgender people in Houston 
continue to lack legal protection against discrimination. Its failure also left intact a 
status quo that permits businesses to deny bathroom access to gay and transgender 
people without fear of violating anti-discrimination laws. Other jurisdictions across 
the U.S. would soon consider taking bathroom regulation a step further by explic-
itly forbidding transgender individuals from using public restrooms consistent with 
their gender identity. The first state to pass such legislation was North Carolina.
In February  2016, the City Council of Charlotte, North Carolina, passed 
Ordinance Number 7056, which expanded the city’s anti-discrimination laws to 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of “marital status, familial status, sexual ori-
entation, gender identity, [and] gender expression” (Charlotte 2016). The ordi-
nance previously prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, 
national origin, ethnicity, age, or disability. Passage of what would appear to be a 
routine update and addition to the city’s anti-discrimination policy triggered a swift 
response from the North Carolina General Assembly, which was called back into 
session to pass the “Public Faciities Privacy and Security Act” on March 23, about 
a week before the Charlotte amendment was scheduled to take effect. The law, 
commonly known as HB2 (for “House Bill 2”) requires public educational insti-
tutions and most state offices to “require every multiple occupancy bathroom or 
changing facility to be designated for and only used by persons based on their biological 
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sex.” HB2 defined “biological sex” as “The physical condition of being male or 
female, which is stated on a person’s birth certificate” (General Assembly 2016). 
The law says that “places of public accommodation” must be free of discrimination 
because of “race, religion, color, national origin, or biological sex,” but preempts 
ordinances like Charlotte’s by specifying that only discrimination based on biologi-
cal sex is actionable.
As the language of the bill suggests, there was a straightforward commitment to 
biological determinism being the sole definitional authority on gender. Governor 
Pat McCrory characterized transgender people as “boys who may think they’re a 
girl” (Garloch 2016), a characterization that erases and delegitimizes transgender 
categories altogether. The General Assembly felt strongly enough about promot-
ing its biological deterministic definition that HB2 preempts any local jurisdictions 
within the state of North Carolina from permitting transgender people from using 
the public restroom of their choice.9
Based on HB2, the “strict biological” regulatory definition could be formulated 
as: Only a “documentable” (by birth certificate) biological male/female (X) counts 
as a man/woman (Y) in the context of public bathrooms and changing facilities (C).
One might reasonably ask why such a law was necessary.
Though the governor and General Assembly did not lay out a clear case for 
HB2 prior to its passage, efforts were made to justify it soon after. Similar to the 
argument advanced in Houston against Proposition 1, the governor and supporters 
defended the bill as designed to prevent men who may be sexual offenders from 
pretending to be a woman and entering a woman’s restroom or changing area (Kelly 
2016). Defending the law on Fox News, the governor emphasized the importance 
of protecting educational settings, including high schools, middle schools, and 
elementary schools. Asked by Megyn Kelly for the evidence that allowing people 
to use the restroom of their gender identity “was a problem,” the governor shifted 
to the importance of “respect for privacy,” especially for young people entering a 
bathroom or shower room: “It’s a tradition we have had for many years.” Blaming 
“the Left” for creating the problem ostensibly by trying to protect transgender stu-
dents’ rights, the governor argued HB2 is just “common sense.” In the same story, 
Ted Cruz was shown making fun of the idea of gender identity by declaring, “If 
Donald Trump dressed up as Hillary Clinton, he still can’t use the girl’s restroom” 
(in Kelly 2016). McCrory’s comments repeat a refrain that was used repeatedly in 
Houston’s debate and vote on Proposition 1. Steven Hotze, President of Campaign 
for Houston, described opposition to HERO as “standing up for common decency 
and common sense” (Campaign for Houston 2015a). And Lt. Governor of Texas 
Daniel Patrick proclaimed that, “Men in women’s bathrooms defies common sense 
and common decency” (Patrick 2015).
Comments such as those by McCrory, Cruz, Hotze, and Patrick illustrate 
what was described in Chapter 3 as the natural attitude toward sex and gender; 
that is, the taken-for-granted “common sense” belief that people can be classified 
biologically into one of only two “natural” categories. As famed anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz noted, “common sense” represents entrenched beliefs that are 
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culturally specific, and what may be common sense in one culture may be absurd 
in another.10 Appropriately enough, one of Geertz’s examples is sex and gender. 
Noting that, “Gender in human beings is not a purely dichotomous variable,” 
Geertz discusses the differences among how three cultures treat “intersex” indi-
viduals (1975, 13). Geertz cites a 1964 paper by Robert B. Edgerton that notes 
the American response to what we now call Differences in Sex Development 
“combines psychological horror with social incompatibility,” including such 
practical problems as “How can an intersexed person behave in school shower 
rooms, [and] in public bathrooms?” (1964, 1289). Not surprisingly, psycholo-
gists Matthew Callahan and Kyle Zukowski found that negative reactions to 
transgender people using the bathroom corresponding to their gender identity is 
correlated with a belief in biological essentialism—the “natural attitude” toward 
biological sex discussed previously (2019). Those believing in biological essen-
tialism “may conclude that it is impossible to change one’s gender—that one’s 
birth sex remains a fixed, immutable social category” (2019, 17).11 Apparently, 
“common sense” for some in the United States regarding bathroom sex segrega-
tion has not progressed all that far in the past century. Advocates of bathroom 
bills, as illustrated with Governor McCrory’s and others’ defense, echo three of 
the four reasons that Kogan (2007) identifies from the late 19th century, includ-
ing providing a “haven” for the weaker sex from would-be predators, protecting 
privacy, and validating a kind of social morality of what is “proper” for men and 
women.
Contrary to the claims of “common sense,” there is no evidence that allowing 
transgender people to use the restroom of their choice poses any sort of threat to 
anyone. Reports from 12 states that protect gender identity as the basis of bathroom 
use reported no evidence that non-discrimination laws “have any relation to inci-
dents of sexual assault or harassment in public restrooms” (Maza 2014). Similarly, 
The Advocate reported that
Although hundreds of trans-inclusive nondiscrimination ordinances have 
been in force in cities around the country for several decades, there has never 
been a verifiable, reported instance of a trans person harassing a cisgender 
person, nor have there been any confirmed reports of male predators “pre-
tending” to be transgender  to gain access to women’s spaces and commit 
crimes against them.
(Brydum 2015)
A study by researchers at the Williams Institute of the UCLA School of Law noted 
in 2019 that “reports of privacy and safety violations in public restrooms, locker 
rooms, and changing rooms are exceedingly rare” and that fears of increased safety 
and privacy violations resulting from nondiscrimination policies “are not empiri-
cally grounded” (Hasenbush, Flores, & Herman 2019, 70). A  year before HB2 
was proposed, spokespeople from the Human Rights Campaign, ACLU, and 
Transgender Law Center all reported that “no statistical evidence of violence exists 
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to warrant this [bathroom] legislation” (Bianco 2015). Dr. Janet A. Laylor, writing 
in the American Journal of Public Health, described the alleged threat of predatory 
men to be “complete nonsense, as there has never been a single documented case 
of this occurring” (2016). In short, prior to the passage of HB2, no credible evi-
dence suggested that it was needed to protect bathroom users in North Carolina.
North Carolina was not the only jurisdiction to consider a bathroom bill. 
Between 2013 and 2019, a bill was introduced in a majority of states to restrict 
access to multiuser restrooms, locker rooms, and other sex-segregated facilities on 
the basis of one’s biological sex, typically defined as the sex assigned at birth (Ali 
2019; Kralik 2019). In 2017 alone, 16 states considered such legislation, with 
another six considering legislation to preempt municipal and county-level anti-
discrimination laws or ordinances. The state of Texas considered several bathroom 
bills, including HB 1748 in 2015, which
would make it a Class A misdemeanor—punishable by up to one year in 
jail and a maximum $4,000 fine—for any person 13 years or older to use a 
restroom that does not match the “gender established at the individual’s birth 
or by the individual’s chromosomes.”
(Gordon 2015)
To date, none of these state-level proposals have been enacted. The decision to 
refuse such laws may be due to what unfolded in North Carolina after the passage 
of their bathroom bill. The passage of HB2 provoked an immediate outcry, includ-
ing public protests and calls to boycott doing business in the state. Musicians such as 
Bruce Springsteen, Ringo Starr, Boston, Pearl Jam, and others cancelled scheduled 
concerts in North Carolina in protest (Glum 2016). Multiple states barred govern-
ment employees from non-essential travel to the state, film companies canceled 
production plans, and major sporting events, including the National Basketball 
Association and the NCAA, canceled planned events in the state.12 In a matter of 
months, North Carolina lost an estimated $400 million as a result of concerts and 
sporting events moving out of the state because of HB2 (Ellis 2016).
Furthermore, the Department of Justice filed suit against North Carolina, 
claiming that,
access to sex-segregated restrooms and other workplace facilities consistent 
with gender identity is a term, condition or privilege of employment. Deny-
ing such access to transgender individuals, whose gender identity is different 
from their gender assigned at birth, while affording it to similarly situated 
non-transgender employees, violates Title VII.
(Sterling, McLaughlin, & Berlinger 2016)
Title VII is a section of the Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination against 
workers on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion. The federal 
suit also said the state was in violation of Title IX, “the Education Acts Amendment 
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of 1972 that bans gender discrimination in education, and the Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act that outlaws discrimination on the basis of sex” 
(Sterling, McLaughlin, & Berlinger 2016). North Carolina responded by filing a 
countersuit, claiming the Obama administration had overstepped federal authority 
because transgender status is not a protected class under federal law.
The economic blow that North Carolina experienced appears to have deterred 
other states from following suit. Despite enthusiastic support initially by Gov-
ernor Greg Abbott and Lt. Governor Dan Patrick for a bathroom bill in Texas, 
by election time in 2018, the governor had changed his stance to say it was no 
longer a priority. Business leaders in the state “worried  that Texas could invite 
the same  economic blows the Tar Heel State faced after passing a similar bill, 
including canceled corporate expansions and sports tournaments” (Ura 2017). 
The Texas Association of Business was reported as estimating that Texas “could 
have lost about $5.6  billion through 2026 if it had enacted such a measure” 
(Reuters 2018).
It did not take the North Carolina General Assembly long to reconsider the 
decision to pass HB2. Governor McCrory unsuccessfully attempted to strike a deal 
where HB2 would be repealed if the city of Charlotte would repeal its ordinance 
(Campbell, Morrill, & Harrison 2016). McCrory was defeated in his attempt to 
gain a second term as governor. In 2017, a compromise bill was passed by the 
Republican-controlled legislature and signed by the newly elected Democratic 
governor that repealed HB2’s documented sex requirement but maintained the ban 
on local anti-discrimination ordinances until 2020 and gave the General Assem-
bly “sole power” to regulate access to “multiple occupancy restrooms, showers, 
or changing facilities” (Fausset 2017). In a subsequent settlement of the lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of the bathroom bills, a federal judge approved an 
agreement “that prohibits the state government from banning transgender people 
from using bathrooms in state buildings that match their gender identity” (Levin 
2019), thus bringing an end to North Carolina’s efforts to impose a strict biological 
definition to determine bathroom eligibility.
***
The debate over bathroom bills is far from settled (Flores & O’Neill 2020). On 
one hand, there appears to be, at the time of this writing, little appetite for state-
level laws such as North Carolina’s HB2. What I have called the “strict biological” 
regulatory definition apparently has been shelved at the state level. But its spirit 
certainly lives on, and absent specific ordinances or laws that protect transgender 
rights to access the bathroom consistent with gender identity, the “perceptual” reg-
ulatory definition is left intact, along with the risk of implicit or explicit sanctions 
for violating perceived propriety. Furthermore, school districts and local jurisdic-
tions can impose their own versions of HB2 that are informed by a strict biological 
definition of sex/gender.
On the other hand, additional jurisdictions have moved to protect transgender 
bathroom rights, or to otherwise add “gender identity” as a protected category 
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against discrimination (Ali 2019). Thus, all three definitions—the “perceptual,” 
“self-identified,” and “strict biological” regulatory definitions remain at work in 
the U.S. in different contexts.
The election of Donald Trump as president in 2016 further complicated the 
regulatory landscape. Soon after Trump assumed office, the Departments of Justice 
and Education sent out a new “Dear Colleague” letter that formally withdrew the 
May  2016 letter sent out by the Obama administration, thereby rescinding the 
legal interpretation that prohibitions against discrimination based on “sex” protect 
transgender students (Battle & Wheeler 2017). The reversal had important impli-
cations, since it left open which regulatory definition should be at work in public 
schools, work places, and public accommodations.
An example of the implications of the reversal can be seen in the case of Glouces-
ter County School Board v. G.G. The case involves a high school student named Gavin 
Grimm, who challenged the local school board’s policy that prohibited transgender 
students from using sex-segregated facilities consistent with their gender identity—
a policy described as similar to HB2. At the time the case was filed, the legal 
arguments were, in part, based on the Obama administration’s interpretation of 
Title IX’s prohibition of sex discrimination. However, with the rescission of that 
interpretation by the Trump administration, the Supreme Court vacated an appeals 
court decision favorable to Grimm and sent the case back for further considera-
tion. In August 2019, U.S. District Court Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen ruled for 
Grimm, declaring that the School Board’s policy “violated Mr. Grimm’s rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972” (Allen 2019). The case was appealed 
(Marimow 2020), with the School Board advocating a strict biological definition 
of sex, arguing that Gavin “remains biologically and anatomically female” (Cor-
rigan et al. 2019). In August of 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the District Court ruling on the basis of equal protection (under 
the Fourteenth Amendment) and Title IX, invoking the June 2020 Supreme Court 
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County (Floyd 2020). In June 2021, the Supreme 
Court without comment refused to review the case further, effectively ending the 
case in Grimm’s favor (Liptak 2021).
Federal judges in Illinois, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have also ruled in favor of 
transgender students suing for access to the restroom consistent with their gender 
identity (Zaveri 2018). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit recently 
upheld a federal judge’s earlier ruling in Adams v. School Board of St. John’s County, 
Florida that it is unconstitutional for schools to ban transgender students from using 
the restroom matching their gender identity (Cohen 2020). Other suits and appeals 
are in progress, so it is possible that the matter will go before the Supreme Court 
(Moreau 2018b, Sheer 2020). On June 16, 2021, the Biden administration reas-
serted that Title IX protects students from discrimination based on gender identity 
(U.S. Department of Education 2021). Thus, the definitional rupture continues, 
with three different, competing regulatory definitions at work in various contexts 
across the United States.
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It is likely that so-called bathroom bills and regulations will continue to be 
politically controversial at least in the short run. Opinions tend to correlate with 
age and political persuasion. In a survey of nearly 700 young people (14 to 24 years 
old), 79% stated that bathroom use by transgender people should not be restricted. 
Their reasons included:
1) bathroom use is private and should be a personal decision; 2) choosing 
bathrooms is a matter of equality, freedom, and human rights; 3) transgender 
people are not sexual perpetrators; and 4) forcing transgender people to use 
particular bathrooms puts them at risk.
(Crissman et al. 2019)
In an analysis of 9,764 online comments posted on the 13 most-shared articles 
or blog posts about transgender bathroom accommodation from September 2015 
to September  2016, Blumell, Huemmer, and Sternadori (2019) found support 
for transgender access was most prevalent in discussions on left-leaning sites, 
whereas opposition was most prevalent in discussions on right-leaning sites. Com-
mon themes from opponents included arguments promoting what the authors call 
“benevolent sexism”—the belief that women and girls need protection by men and 
from men, and that sex differences are biologically natural. Vestiges of the cult of 
true womanhood persist into the 21st century.
Some scholars and activists have argued that we should rethink sex-segregated 
bathrooms altogether. As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, sex-segregated 
bathrooms are a relatively recent development in U.S. history. Sociologist Sheila 
Cavanagh, for example, advocates a move to gender-neutral toilet designs: “The 
institutionalization of gender-neutral toilet designs is an urgent and important 
political project to ensure access for all who depart from conventional sex/gender 
body politics” (2010, 5). Similarly, Terry Kogan advocates a rethinking of how 
public accommodations are designed: “sex-segregated public restrooms be replaced 
by all-gender, multi-user facilities that protect the privacy and safety concerns of all 
patrons, while discriminating against no one” (2017, 1205).
Transgender scholar and activist Heath Fogg Davis points out that transgender 
people are not the only ones subject to problems in contexts where the perceptual 
regulatory definition is at work:
[M]any people who do not self-identify as transgender are in fact harmed 
by this institutionalized social custom. This includes masculine-appearing 
cisgender women, feminine-appearing cisgender men, as well as all people 
who are directed to use female-designated bathrooms. I describe this far-
reaching sexism as sex-identity discrimination. And because sex-segregated 
public restrooms, by their very nature, always prompt and enable this kind 
of discrimination, I argue that we should eliminate them, and use inclusive 
design to build no-gender public restrooms that meet our reasonable expec-
tations for personal privacy and safety.
(2018b, 199)
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The U.S. still may be some distance from universal unisex public restrooms, 
but given the available evidence from jurisdictions that have protected transgender 
people’s right to access the restroom of their choice, it appears difficult to justify 
defining sex/gender in a manner to try to exclude transgender access.
Notes
 1 De Mars (2017).
 2 Kergil (2017, 505).
 3 Hill and Schrag (2016, 150).
 4 Love (2020).
 5 Grimm (2021), referring to the Supreme Court’s refusal to review the Court of Appeals 
decision granting Grimm the right to bathroom access matching his gender identity 
(Liptak 2021).
 6 Carter (2018) criticizes Kogan for not acknowledging the legitimate threat to women’s 
safety, but does not seem to recognize the underlying sexist ideology that informs both 
the threat to women and the protective response.
 7 See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. White 538 A.2d 887 (Pa. Superior Court 1988), 
where the court affirmed a conviction for criminal trespass after a male defendant 
entered the women’s restroom of an athletic club; or In re S.M.S., 196 N.C. A170 
(2009), where a juvenile boy was guilty of second-degree trespass for running through 
the girls’ locker room at a high school while girls were changing clothes.
 8 For example, in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Young 535 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 1988) the 
defendant entered a co-ed dormitory and after entering a women’s restroom, opened 
a toilet stall being used by a woman and said “Hey baby, what you doing?” and subse-
quently was found guilty of disorderly conduct.
 9 It is not entirely clear whether transgender individuals who changed their birth certifi-
cate would be permitted to use the restroom of their choice. The law repeatedly uses the 
phrase “biological sex,” which would imply the gender assigned at birth. However, since 
the law defines “biological sex” as “The physical condition of being male or female, 
which is stated on a person’s birth certificate” (General Assembly 2016), one could envi-
sion a scenario where someone had undergone sex reassignment surgery and obtained a 
change on their North Carolina birth certificate, thereby meeting the law’s requirement.
 10 Philosopher Richard Rorty advocates that we use language with a sense of irony, rec-
ognizing that our linguistic categories are contingent creations open to revision. He 
notes: “The opposite of irony is common sense. For that is the watchword of those 
who unselfconsciously describe everything important in terms of the final vocabulary to 
which they and those around them are habituated” (1989, 74).
 11 Similarly, a study of over 1,000 user comments from 190 online articles about transgen-
der women in women’s restrooms found that the most negative comments were by 
cisgender men who still see transwomen as biological men (Stones 2017).
 12 A Wikipedia page devoted to the Public Facilities Privacy  & Security Act includes a 
detailed section on the Economic Impact of HB2: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Public_Facilities_Privacy_%26_Security_Act
Transgender voices
“I went to Afghanistan. I did all these things. I mean, what does that [Trump’s ban] 
tell me? That tells me I’m not welcome. That tells me that I am not respected as myself.”
Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Brock Stone1
“No matter how much he trained and succeeded in the SEALs—
perhaps one of the manliest professions in the world,
the inner female didn’t entirely disappear.”
Kristen Beck & Anne Speckhard, Warrior Princess2
“When I was working at the Pentagon, I worked for a new boss and I told him that I was 
trans and why it was important. And about 10 months later, he retired and before he 
did, he called me into his office and he said, ‘you know what? You broke my stereotype.
He said, ‘just by coming to work and getting the job done every day, you smashed my 
expectation of who and what a transgender person is’.”
Air Force Lt. Colonel Bree Fram3
“Why must I justify my equality?”
Riley Dosh, West Point graduate; refused a commission by the 
Trump administration in 2017
“All people have dignity and value, as citizens, as servicemembers, as public servants, and 
most importantly as shared stakeholders in a healthy society. Transphobia and its fruits are 
antithetical to both that cherished ideal and our national security today.”
Shawn Skelly, Assistant Secretary of Defense4
DOI: 10.4324/9781003250494-9
When we think of transgender people in the U.S. military, there are two possi-
ble historical narratives. Officially, until 2016, there were no transgender soldiers 
allowed, period. Unofficially, a different and more complicated story involving 
assigned sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity can be told.
For most of U.S. history, military service that includes combat traditionally has 
been restricted to males. Thus, if we describe the eligibility from the standpoint of 
a regulatory definition, the situation was straightforward: Only biological males (X) 
count as potential soldiers (Y) in the U.S military (C).
Nonetheless, there are historic accounts of women serving in combat from the 
very start of U.S. history. In some cases, these women served as women, how-
ever temporarily and unauthorized. One unofficial Revolutionary War narrative 
describes a woman named Mary Hays McCauley who, like other “camp follow-
ers,” provided support and carried water to troops during battle, thus gaining the 
nickname “Molly Pitcher.” At the Battle of Monmouth in June 1778, the story is 
that her husband collapsed, either from the heat or from injury, so she took over 
his position at his artillery piece firing on the oncoming British (Biography.com 
Editors 2020; Diamant 1998, 119–120; Nix 2020). Margaret Cochran Corbin was 
the first woman to receive a military pension for her fighting in the Battle of Fort 
Washington on November 16, 1776. There she dressed as a man and helped her 
husband load his cannon until he was killed, at which time she took over his post 
and fought until she was severely wounded. In 1779, the Continental Congress 
awarded her a pension equivalent to half that of male soldiers (Diamant 1998, 
112–113; Michals 2015b).
There are also stories of women disguising themselves as men in order to fight, 
both in the Revolutionary War and the Civil War. Deborah Sampson disguised 
herself and assumed the name of Robert Shurtleff in order to join the Fourth 




without detection, despite being wounded twice, and was only revealed to be 
a woman when hospitalized during an epidemic and falling unconscious. She 
received an honorable discharge and received a military pension from the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts (Diamant 1998, 35–38; Michals 2015a). Though 
documented cases during the Revolutionary War are rare, the historical consensus 
is that the number of disguised women soldiers during the Civil War ran well into 
the hundreds. One of the most famous examples is Jennie Irene Hodgers, a.k.a. 
Private Albert Cashier. Hodgers emigrated to the United States from Ireland, and 
first assumed the identity of a man to gain employment at a shoe factory. After the 
Civil War broke out, Hodgers became Albert Cashier and volunteered for the 95th 
Infantry, Illinois in August 1862. Cashier took part in 40 engagements, including 
the critical Siege of Vicksburg, and served a full three-year tour of duty. Cashier is 
sometimes called the first transgender soldier because he continued to live as a man 
after the war (O’Dowd 2019). Only late in life was his secret revealed when hospi-
talized for dementia. Nonetheless, he was buried in uniform with full military hon-
ors, and his tombstone lists his name as Albert D. J. Cashier (O’Dowd 2018, 2019).
The extensive physical examinations required for recruits starting in World War 
I made it all but impossible for women to disguise themselves to become combat 
soldiers in the United States military.5 During the war, there are accounts of a 
handful of women in European countries who joined the military disguised as 
men. Russia officially formed combat units called Women’s Battalions made up 
entirely of women in 1917 (Stoff 2006).
In the U.S. military, women participated in World War I primarily as nurses and 
switchboard operators. Female switchboard operators were part of the U.S. Army’s 
Signal Corps and had to be bilingual in English and French. Though they wore 
U.S. Army uniforms and were subject to Army regulations, after the War they were 
not given honorable discharges or veteran benefits, as they were defined, after the 
fact, as “civilians” employed by the military due to the fact that Army Regula-
tions specified the male sex—an injustice not rectified until 1977 under the Carter 
administration (Hanes 2007).
During World War II, the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) was formed and 
reached a peak strength of 100,000 women (Treadwell 1954). The creation of 
WAC altered who was eligible for military service, though in a manner strictly 
segregated by sex and that forbid women from combat roles. Thus the regulatory 
definition that “Only biological males (X) count as potential soldiers (Y) in the U.S 
military (C)” was in effect complemented by the rule “Only biological females (X) 
count as potential servicepeople (Y) in the WACs (C).” The range of noncombat 
roles women fulfilled is described in a booklet in 1944 as follows:
As the tempo of war accelerated, WACs arrived overseas aboard liners and 
cargo boats in ever increasing numbers. They were assigned to ETOUSA 
[European Theater of Operations of the USA] headquarters, to the Air 
Forces, to services mushrooming from SOS, Ordinance,  Quartermaster, 
Transportation, Medical, Chemical Warfare, Engineers. They plotted aircraft 
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and V-1s, teleprinted, operated switchboards, typed, filed, made maps—
from air-sea rescue rooms they “brought home” lost planes and pilots. They 
assessed combat films, cooked, gave inoculations, drove jeeps and trucks, and 
sweated out missions from control towers. These were only a few of the 239 
jobs for which WACs were trained.
(Wilson 1944)
WAC was disbanded in 1978 when women were integrated into the U.S. Army. 
By that time, there were noncombat roles for women in all branches of the U.S. 
military, and the Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Naval Academies all admit-
ted women. It was not until January 2013, however, that the traditional ban on 
women serving in combat roles was finally lifted by Secretary of Defense Leon 
Panetta. Implementation is occurring slowly and not without controversy. None-
theless, from a definitional standpoint, being assigned to the male sex is no longer a 
requirement for any military occupation, combat or noncombat. In 2017, women 
represented 16% of the overall active duty force, and 18% of all commissioned 
officers (Barroso 2019).
Historically, the U.S. military has not only been a bastion of masculinity, but 
heterosexuality as well.6 For most of U.S. history, homosexual acts were forbidden 
by civil anti-sodomy laws and thus were grounds for dishonorable discharge. By 
World War II, the U.S. Army classified homosexual “proclivities” as disqualifying 
inductees from military service, both for men in the Army and women in WAC 
(Bérubé 1990). For women, screening of recruits included judgments about physi-
cal appearance and gender conformity in order to attempt to identify and exclude 
lesbians (Meyer 1996). By 1949, the Defense Department codified anti-homosexual 
regulations across all branches of the military: “Homosexual personnel, irrespective 
of sex, should not be permitted to serve in any branch of the Armed Forces in any 
capacity, and prompt separation of known homosexuals from the Armed Forces 
is mandatory” (quoted in Bérubé 1990, 261). In 1982, the Defense Department 
policy memorandum 1332.14 stated flatly: “Homosexuality is incompatible with 
military service. The presence in the military environment of persons who engage 
in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to 
engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the mili-
tary mission” (GAO 1992, 2).
Thus, even while the biological attribute of “sex” slowly lost relevance as a 
required definitional attribute for military service, heterosexuality has been main-
tained, though it has been defined by negation. That is, to be eligible for military 
service, one must not be non-heterosexual, i.e., homosexual.
Between 1994 and 2011, the Defense Department implemented what became 
known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy toward homosexuality. A Defense 
Department Directive issued December 21, 1993 declared that, “A person’s sexual 
orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and is not a bar to service 
entry or continued service unless manifested by homosexual conduct” (section 
E1.2.8.1). In other words, as long as servicemen and women kept their sex life 
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private, in theory they could continue to serve. The policy took effect on Febru-
ary 28, 1994, and lasted until its repeal in 2011. The policy was controversial, as gay 
rights activists emphasized that the policy was still discriminatory and was used as 
a tool of harassment by anti-gay soldiers and officers, and conservatives still insist-
ing that homosexuality is inconsistent with military service. It is estimated by the 
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network that more than 14,500 service personnel 
were discharged while “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was in effect (McVeigh & Harris 
2011). A University of California Blue Ribbon Commission Report estimated that 
the cost of implementing the policy between 1994–2003 was over $300 million 
(Barrett et al. 2006).
In 2010, Congress passed legislation initiating a process of ending the “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Despite Republican efforts to delay the end of the policy, 
the statute’s required certification that ending the policy would not harm mili-
tary effectiveness progressed, and the policy officially ended September 20, 2011. 
A study that began six months after the policy’s end and completed at the one-year 
mark, and conducted by an impressive list of academic and military scholars, states:
Our conclusion, based on all of the evidence available to us, is that DADT 
repeal has had no overall negative impact on military readiness or its compo-
nent dimensions, including cohesion, recruitment, retention, assaults, harass-
ment, or morale. If anything, DADT repeal appears to have enhanced the 
military’s ability to pursue its mission.
(Belkin et al. 2012, 588)
Gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals who wished to serve in the U.S. military are 
now legally able to do so.
Not so for transgender people.
Though there was not an explicit policy using the term “transgender” until 
relatively recently, transgender military personnel would be excluded either for 
violating proscriptions against homosexuality or because “transvestitism,” “trans-
sexualism,” and “gender identity disorder,” were considered mental afflictions. The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders included “Transvestitism” as a 
sexual deviation in the 1968 edition (DSM-II), and listed “Transsexualism” and 
“Gender identity disorder” in 1980 (DSM-III). In 1984, a team of psychiatrist mili-
tary officers reported on six case studies of requests for sex reassignment surgery, 
noting that, “To the military, transsexualism is a disqualifying medical condition 
in which separation is to be handled through administrative channels, just as are 
homosexuals and those with significant personality disorders” (Jones, Deeken, & 
Eshelman 1984). As recently as 2010, a Defense Department memo on “Medical 
Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Military Services” pre-
cluded those with a “Current or history of psychosexual conditions, including but 
not limited to transsexualism, exhibitionism, transvestism, voyeurism, and other 
paraphilias” (Defense Department 2010, 48).7
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The fact that transgender military service is officially prohibited has not stopped 
transgender individuals from serving, albeit covertly. Information about transgen-
der participants in the U.S. military has emerged slowly and in a piecemeal fash-
ion. A study was published by a military psychiatrist, Captain George R. Brown 
(USAF), in 1988 concerning 11 “male gender-dysphoric patients meeting DSM-
III criteria for transsexualism” who were seen by the doctor over a three-year 
period (Brown 1988). All were requesting hormone treatment and/or sex reas-
signment surgery, after spending years trying to escape their gender dysphoria by 
plunging into what the psychiatrist called “hypermasculinity” in the military. One 
patient said, “I tried to do things to make me feel more masculine, like joining the 
Navy and getting married.” Another said, “I  joined the Air Force as a cover. In 
uniform, my masculinity would not be questioned—I was above reproach” (Brown 
1988, 529). Brown reports that most of those treated were discharged from military 
service prematurely, many within their first year of duty (1988, 533; see also Jones, 
Deeken, & Eshelman 1984). Interestingly, an opinion issued by the Judge Advocate 
General’s Air Force office, quoted by Brown, suggested that a policy of excluding 
“transsexuals” would be hard to defend:
The short of the matter seems to be that if we propose to base the policy of 
discharging members who undergo sex change operations on promotion of 
good order, discipline, morale, or other similar virtues, we must prepare for a 
challenge on the ground that there is no empirical evidence that transsexuals 
have an adverse impact on those values.
(OpJAGAF 1984)
The military experience of transgender veterans has been documented in auto-
biographies, including that by Roberta Cowell, a British racing driver and fighter 
pilot in World War II, who was the first known British transgender woman to 
undergo sex reassignment surgery (Cowell 1954); Christine Jorgensen, who was 
drafted into the U.S. Army during World War II (Jorgensen 1967); Jan Morris, a 
Welsh historian and author who also served in World War II (Morris 1974); and 
Renée Richards, the famed tennis player who served in the U.S. Navy (Richards 
1983).
A recent and visible U.S. example is Kristin Beck. Beck served as a Navy SEAL 
for 20 years, reaching the rank of Senior Chief Petty Officer. She served in 13 
deployments, including seven combat deployments, and at one point was a mem-
ber of the counter-terrorism unit known as SEAL Team Six. She received multiple 
awards and decorations, including a Bronze Star and Purple Heart. Throughout her 
military career, she wanted to live life as a woman. Beck transitioned after retiring, 
and co-authored a book about her life titled Warrior Princess: A U.S. Navy SEAL’s 
Journey to Coming out Transgender (Beck & Speckhard 2013).
The previous examples all concern transgender soldiers who transitioned after 
leaving military service. This is not surprising given that the military has precluded 
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transgender service members until quite recently. A notable exception is Caroline 
Paige’s autobiography, which shares the story of her becoming the first openly 
transgender officer to serve in the UK Armed Forces (2017).
A Whitepaper prepared for the Palm Center and the Transgender Ameri-
can Veterans Association reports the results of a survey completed by over 800 
transgender veterans and active service personnel. Of the 660 participants who 
identified as “transsexual,” 97% reported they were unable to transition before 
leaving the military (Bryant & Schilt 2008, 1). Though the paper cautions that 
the results relied on a convenience sample rather than a random sample, and 
thus cannot claim to be representative of all transgender service members, the 
data provided an important first step toward understanding the experiences of 
transgender soldiers, and the accounts are consistent with the anecdotal research 
reported by Jones, Deeken, and Eshelman (1984), Brown (1988), and published 
autobiographies.
Historical data on how many transgender people are in the military are hard 
to find, though multiple sources estimate that there is a higher proportion of 
transgender people in the military than in the general U.S. population (Yerke & 
Mitchell 2013). Informed by the Defense Department’s first-ever effort to col-
lect data on gender identity in 2016, it was estimated “that the number of cur-
rently serving transgender troops is 14,707, of whom 8,980 are in the Active 
Component, and 5,727 are in the Selected Reserve” (Belkin & Mazur 2018). 
These figures are similar to those estimated by the Williams Institute at the 
UCLA School of Law in 2014 that “approximately 15,500 transgender indi-
viduals are serving on active duty or in the Guard or Reserve forces. We also 
estimate that there are an estimated 134,300 transgender individuals who are 
veterans or are retired from Guard or Reserve service” (Gates & Herman 2014, 
1). A survey conducted by the National Center for Transgender Equality found 
that among current service members, slightly over half (52%) thought no one 
thought or knew they were transgender. Among those who believed their lead-
ership thought or knew they were transgender, approximately one-quarter (23%) 
believed their leadership or commanding officer had taken actions to discharge 
them. On the other hand,
Many reported that their leadership or commanding officer responded to 
their transgender status in a variety of positive ways, including supporting 
their name change (47%) and supporting their transition-related medical 
treatment (36%). Thirty percent (30%) reported that their leadership or com-
manding officer ignored their transgender status or looked the other way.
(James et al. 2016, 169)
Respondents who separated from military service more than 10 years before the 
survey was taken in 2015 were asked about the circumstances of their discharge: 
“19% believed their discharge was either partially related (14%) or completely 
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related (5%) to being transgender” (170). It is also clear that the U.S. military’s anti-
transgender policy resulted in a loss of personnel:
Nearly one in ten (9%) respondents who separated from military service 
more than ten years ago left the service in order to transition, and an addi-
tional 19% said they left the service to avoid being mistreated or harassed as 
a transgender person.
(171)
If the ban was lifted, nearly two-thirds said they “would” or “might” return to 
military service (173).
The Obama and Trump administrations and transgender 
military service
The end to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy involving lesbians, gay men, and 
bisexuals was brought about by substantial pressure upon the Obama administration 
by LGBT advocates (Frank 2013). The next step taken by the administration was 
to reconsider the prohibition on transgender people in the military. In May 2014, 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said that the military should “continually” review 
its prohibition on transgender people serving in the armed forces, declaring, “Every 
qualified American who wants to serve our country should have an opportunity 
if they fit the qualifications and can do it” (Cooper 2014). Ashton B. Carter, who 
succeeded Hagel as Defense Secretary, announced a little more than a year later that 
the Pentagon would move to allow transgender people to serve openly. He noted 
that “We have transgender soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines—real, patriotic 
Americans—who I know are being hurt by an outdated, confusing, inconsistent 
approach that’s contrary to our value of service and individual merit” (Bromwich 
2017). In October  2015, Vice President Joseph Biden repeated a claim he had 
made several years before that transgender rights were “the civil rights issue of our 
time” and argued that transgender people should be allowed to serve in the military 
(Bromwich 2017).
A study by the Rand Corporation commissioned by the Defense Department 
was released in May  2016 and found that allowing transgender people to serve 
openly would cost little and have no significant impact on unit readiness (Schaefer 
et al. 2016). Acknowledging that the data are far from clear, the report estimated the 
number of transgender active and reserve service members is about 3,960, though 
not all would seek to transition medically even if the opportunity was made available 
(16).8 Based on those numbers, the estimated cost of additional health care would 
be in the range of $2.9 to 4.2 million (35). The report also examined the impact of 
allowing transgender people to serve in the military in Australia, Canada, Israel, and 
the United Kingdom, and found “In no case was there any evidence of an effect on 
the operational effectiveness, operational readiness, or cohesion of the force” (xiii).
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In June  2016, Secretary Carter announced an end to the ban on transgen-
der people serving. As quoted in the New York Times, “Effective immediately, 
transgender Americans may serve openly,” Mr. Carter said. “They can no longer 
be discharged or otherwise separated from the military just for being transgender” 
(Rosenberg 2016). The announcement was transmitted to the military through 
what is known as a Directive-type Memorandum (16–005), titled “Military Service 
of Transgender Service Members” and stated explicitly that “transgender individu-
als shall be allowed to serve in the military,” and noted that the policy takes effect 
immediately (Secretary of Defense 2016). The memorandum states it will expire 
effective June 30, 2017, and that it will be converted to a new DoDI (Department 
of Defense Instruction). The key changes in procedures were described as follows:
a Effective immediately, no otherwise qualified Service member may be invol-
untarily separated, discharged or denied reenlistment or continuation of ser-
vice, solely on the basis of their gender identity.
b Transgender Service members will be subject to the same standards as any 
other Service member of the same gender; they may be separated, discharged, 
or denied reenlistment or continuation of service under existing processes 
and basis, but not due solely to their gender identity or an expressed intent to 
transition genders.
c A Service member whose ability to serve is adversely affected by a medi-
cal condition or medical treatment related to their gender identity should be 
treated, for purposes of separation and retention, in a manner consistent with 
a Service member whose ability to serve is similarly affected for reasons unre-
lated to gender identity or gender transition.
(Secretary of Defense 2016)
The new policy clearly stated that those currently serving in the military could 
not be discharged solely to transgender status. It also created a new definitional 
criterion for transgender “accession,” or entry, into the military. Medical stand-
ards still stated that gender dysphoria or a history of medical treatment, including 
sex reassignment surgery, would be “disqualifying” unless the applicant had been 
stable in their gender for 18 months or more. The 18-month requirement could 
be waived, in whole or in part, “in individual cases for applicable reasons” (Secre-
tary of Defense 2016). Specific Department of Defense “Instruction” detailing the 
policy was required to be in place by July 1, 2017.
From a definitional standpoint, the 18-month requirement is similar to the 
requirement of some single-sex colleges that required applicants either to have 
completed their transition or otherwise meet a “durational” definitive attribute: 
Only transgender recruits stable in their gender identity (X) count as potential 
soldiers (Y) in the U.S military (C). The explanation provided by Secretary Carter 
was: “Medical standards for accession into the Military Services help to ensure that 
those entering service are free of medical conditions or physical defects that may 
require excessive time lost from duty.” For practical and political reasons, the policy 
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was not designed to permit transition immediately after enlistment, or in the midst 
of basic training. At the same time, the policy affirmed that transgender Service 
members “may transition gender while serving” (Secretary of Defense 2016). Such 
a policy is consistent with how the military treats a range of medically necessary 
but non-emergency medical treatments (Belkin 2020). The 18-month requirement 
was a compromise between those who wanted a shorter durational criterion and 
those seeking a two-year requirement (Lamothe 2016).
The new policy was greeted as “historic” and a “momentous victory” by various 
advocacy groups, and was met with “jubilation” by transgender service members 
(Lamothe 2016). The National Center for Transgender Equality’s Executive Direc-
tor Mara Keisling said:
Like other institutions, including allied militaries, the Defense Department 
has found straightforward answers for all the questions that have come up. 
This is the right decision for the military and brings much needed certainty 
for thousands of currently serving soldiers who have put their lives on the 
line for their country, as well as for their units.
(Tobin 2016)
President of the LGBT military group SPARTA (Service members, Partners, Allies 
for Respect and Tolerance for All), Sue Fulton, said “The Obama administration 
will go down in history as one of the most significant for LGBT Americans” (Mar-
golin 2016).
In an analysis of how the ban on transgender military service “unraveled” so 
quickly, political scientist and Director of the Palm Center Aaron Belkin suggested 
that a number of recent factors contributed, including the removal of the combat 
exclusion rule against women, the lack of strong “opinion leadership” opposed to 
transgender inclusion, momentum from the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy, and effective advocacy strategies that “humanized the issue for journalists and 
the public at large; proved that transgender service works; and publicly discredited the 
primary justification for the ban” (Belkin 2016, 2). The policy has significant public 
support. A survey in 2015 showed 42.5% disagreeing with the statement “transgen-
der people should not be allowed to serve openly in the military” with 35% neutral. 
A year later, a survey showed 68% agreeing or completely agreeing with the state-
ment “Transgender people should be allowed to serve openly in the military” (Taylor, 
Lewis, & Haider-Markel 2018, 77–79). Six polls took place in the first five months of 
2019 surveying over 14,000 Americans, with an average support of 67% for inclusive 
policies for transgender service members (Palm Center 2019).
The election of Donald Trump as president in November 2016 was an ill omen 
for transgender people for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was Vice 
President Mike Pence’s record of opposition to LGBTQ rights (HRC 2018). The 
nominations of General James Mattis as Secretary of Defense, Heather Wilson 
as Secretary of the Air Force, and Mark Green as Secretary of the Army were 
all viewed by advocates as opponents of LGBTQ rights (Belkin 2020). Green 
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withdrew his name from nomination in light of highly publicized comments about 
LGBT and Muslim people, including the claim that if psychiatrists were polled, 
they would conclude that “transgender is a disease” (Lamothe 2017).
Confirmation of the Trump administration’s lack of support for LGBTQ rights 
or the new Obama policy concerning transgender service emerged in May 2017 
when two transgender cadets—one at the Air Force Academy and one at West 
Point—learned after four years of training to become officers that they were denied 
their commissions. Pentagon officials claimed that the transgender policy covered 
only those on active duty and thus did not apply to new officer “candidates.” It was 
reported by The New York Times that,
Brad Carson, a former acting under secretary of defense who is the architect 
of the transgender policy, said its authors “envisioned that the same rules 
that apply to active-duty service members today would also apply to service 
academy personnel, because they’re already in the military.”
(Stolberg 2017)
Described in the press as a loophole, the Pentagon followed the standard procedure 
that cadets were governed by the policy concerning accession rather than policies 
governing active duty members of the military.
The question is why did the Pentagon decide not to allow either cadet to be 
commissioned? Former Superintendent of the United States Air Force Academy, 
Lt. General Michelle D. Johnson (ret.), confirmed (2020) that the cadet was recom-
mended for commissioning since the cadet had completed “all the military training 
requirements for commissioning as an officer” and “wanted to serve.” Nonetheless, 
commissioning “was denied by the Air Force for the cadet not meeting medical 
qualifications.” Johnson noted:
In early 2017, Department of Defense (DoD) policy development was still 
nascent regarding transgender uniformed military service and medical quali-
fications. With the overarching policy still in development, the DoD medical 
community, including USAFA and headquarters Air Force in the Penta-
gon, also conferred at length on this specific case, especially with respect to 
how the concepts of gender dysphoria and transition might apply. Finalizing 
policy details was further complicated by emerging messages from the newly 
elected President of the United States.
(Lt. Gen. Johnson 2020)
The name and details concerning the Air Force cadet were never revealed, but 
the identity of the West Point cadet became a matter of public record. According 
to the New York Times,
The superintendent of West Point, Lt. Gen. Robert L. Caslen Jr., sought 
a ‘medical waiver’ from the Pentagon to allow Ms. [Riley] Dosh her 
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commission. But the request was denied, a Pentagon spokeswoman said, 
because Defense Department officials ‘did not think it appropriate’ to grant a 
waiver while the accessions policy was still under review.
(Stolberg 2017)
Given the support of Lt. General Caslen and a policy in place that supports transi-
tion for active service personnel, it is hard to understand why such a waiver would 
be inappropriate. Lt. General Caslen, now retired from the military, said he did 
not have direct knowledge of the reasoning of senior Army leadership, though he 
believes that the fact that the Air Force Academy had denied a commission to their 
transgender cadet set a precedent that the Army would be reluctant to break ranks 
from, and it is reasonable to assume that leadership would be “sensitive” to White 
House policies (Caslen 2020). West Point graduate Dosh says she was never given 
an explanation, but was simply informed on May 5, 2017, that the waiver had 
been denied, despite Dosh meeting all requirements and passing the commission-
ing physical. Roughly a third of the graduating class of 2017 were granted medical 
waivers of one sort of another (Caslen 2020). Understandably, Dosh concluded, 
“I suspect no reason other than transphobia” (2020; see also Dosh 2019). Former 
Secretary of the Army Eric Fanning states that he unequivocally and “absolutely” 
would have granted the waiver request had he still been Secretary, and agreed that 
“prejudice is the most significant motivator for denying transgender people the 
right to serve in the military” (2020).
In late June, Defense Secretary Mattis provided the heads of the military branches 
a six-month delay “to determine if allowing transgender individuals to enlist in the 
armed services will affect the ‘readiness or lethality’ of the force.” Mattis claimed 
that the delay “does not presuppose the outcome of the review” (Baldor 2017a).
Less than a month after Secretary Mattis’s announcement, on the morning of 
July 26th, President Trump sent out a series of tweets that were stunning in their 
scope and abruptness:
After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised 
that the United States Government will not accept or allow . . . Transgender 
individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military. Our military must be 
focused on decisive and overwhelming . . . victory and cannot be burdened 
with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the 
military would entail. Thank you.
(Trump 2017)
The announcement was met with immediate criticism, in no small measure because 
the pronouncement was “confusing for its timing, substance, and rationale” (Gra-
ham 2017). The decision was described as blindsiding his military and Republican 
congressional leaders.
One account of the decision claims that Trump was presented on July  26 
with four different options related to the military’s transgender policy that were 
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intended to frame an ongoing discussion. Instead, according to reporter Michael 
Wolff, ten minutes after the briefing Trump announced a wholesale ban via 
Twitter without further consultation with advisors, the Pentagon, or the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (2018, 515). There were different hypotheses about why Trump 
made the decision. According to Wolff, the preceding week had been calamitous 
for Trump, and he was “seething” that day because a speech he had given the day 
before to the Boy Scouts of America prompted the group to apologize for his 
remarks (Stack 2017). An alternative explanation was that the ban was intended 
to resolve
a quietly brewing fight on Capitol Hill over whether taxpayer money should 
pay for gender transition and hormone therapy for transgender service mem-
bers. The dispute had threatened to kill a $790 billion defense and security 
spending package scheduled for a vote this week.
(Davis & Cooper 2017)
The bill included funding for Trump’s so-called “border wall” with Mexico, 
and Republican insiders “feared they might not have the votes to pass the 
legislation because defense hawks wanted a ban on Pentagon-funded sex reas-
signment operations” (Bade & Dawsey 2017).9 Rather than address the specific 
issue of funding medical treatment, Trump opted to announce the sweeping 
policy change.
The “decision was announced with such haste that the White House could not 
answer basic inquiries about how it would be carried out, including what would 
happen to openly transgender people on active duty. Of eight defense officials 
interviewed, none could say” (Davis & Cooper 2017). In contrast with the careful 
formulation and staged announcement of the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and 
the repeal of the ban on transgender military service under the Obama adminis-
tration, Trump’s hurried decision “was not accompanied by a formal order, a fact 
sheet, or any of the other information that typically accompanies such a policy 
shift” (Graham 2017). Press Secretary Sarah Sanders was unable to answer questions 
about the announced policy, and “when reporters kept trying to ask, she threat-
ened to end the briefing” (Graham 2017).
In August 2017, Trump issued a Memorandum to clarify the administration’s 
policy on Military Service by Transgender Individuals. The Memorandum stated:
In my judgment, the previous Administration failed to identify a sufficient 
basis to conclude that terminating the Departments’ longstanding policy and 
practice would not hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit 
cohesion, or tax military resources, and there remain meaningful concerns 
that further study is needed to ensure that continued implementation of last 
year’s policy change would not have those negative effects.
(Presidential Memoranda 2017)
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The specific directives of the Memorandum were as follows:
The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with 
respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, shall:
(a) maintain the currently effective policy regarding accession of 
transgender individuals into military service beyond January 1, 2018, 
until such time as the Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, provides a recommendation to the 
contrary that I find convincing; and
(b) halt all use of DoD or DHS resources to fund sex reassignment surgi-
cal procedures for military personnel, except to the extent necessary 
to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course 
of treatment to reassign his or her sex.
The Memorandum identified three reasons for the ban on transgender military 
service; namely, that transgender troops would hinder military effectiveness and 
lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military resources. Military effectiveness, 
unit cohesion, and cost had been discussed in the Rand Corporation study and 
were found unproblematic by the Obama administration.10 The estimated increase 
in military health care was estimated to require an increase of 0.1%, which crit-
ics pointed out was about a tenth of what the military spends on erectile dys-
function medicines (Ingraham 2017). Two different federal judges soon found the 
Trump administration’s justification wanting and struck down the ban in October 
and November (Philipps 2017a, 2017b). Judge Marvin J. Garbis found the policy 
“capricious, arbitrary, and unqualified” and declared “There is absolutely no sup-
port for the claim that the ongoing service of transgender people would have any 
negative effective on the military at all” (Philipps 2017b). After a third federal 
court ruled against the policy, the Pentagon announced that it would begin to 
allow transgender people to enlist in the military beginning January 1, 2018, using 
accession requirements similar to those planned by the Obama administration (Bal-
dor 2017b). In February 2018, the Pentagon confirmed that the first transgender 
person had signed a contract to join the United States military, “a development 
made possible after a federal judge ruled that the military must accept transgender 
recruits” (Browne 2018).
In March 2018, Defense Secretary Mattis announced a revised policy, criticiz-
ing the Rand Corporation report and the decision by the Obama administration 
(Mattis 2018).11 The policy banned transgender military service except for a very 
narrow set of exceptions. The policy stated that:
• Transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are 
disqualified from military service, except under the following limited cir-
cumstances: (1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their 
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biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria after entering into service may be retained if they do not require 
a change of gender and remain deployable within applicable retention stand-
ards; and (3) currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed 
with gender dysphoria since the previous administration’s policy took effect 
and prior to the effective date of this new policy, may continue to serve in 
their preferred gender and receive medically necessary treatment for gender 
dysphoria.
• Transgender persons who require or have undergone gender transition are 
disqualified from military service.
• Transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria, who 
are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all other Service members, 
in their biological sex.
(Mattis 2018)
The new policy effectively returns the military to the transgender ban prior to 
June 2016. First, in terms of accession, applicants with a history of gender dyspho-
ria may access into the military only if they can demonstrate 36 consecutive months 
immediately prior to their application that they no longer experience gender dys-
phoria, have not transitioned, and are “willing and able to adhere to all standards 
associated with their biological sex” (Mattis 2018, 42). In other words, one can join 
the military only if one is willing not to live life as transgender. Second, in terms of 
retention, only active duty members who were diagnosed with gender dysphoria 
between June 2016 and March 2018 could continue to serve and receive medical 
treatment. Otherwise, transgender service members could remain in the military 
only if they do not transition and are willing to serve in their assigned birth sex. 
Otherwise, as was the case prior to June 2016, a diagnosis of gender dysphoria is 
grounds for separation from military service.
The new policy was soon challenged in the courts. In November 2018, the Trump 
administration petitioned the Supreme Court to overrule the various injunctions 
constraining the new policy. By a vote of 5–4, in January 2019 the Court allowed the 
new policy to be implemented while the matter worked its way through the courts. 
The Court technically took no stance on the legality of the ban.
On April 12, 2019, the policy described by Secretary Mattis a year earlier was 
implemented into policy in a Directive-type Memorandum (19–004) by Acting 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, David L. Norquist. The policy appears to have been 
written to withstand legal challenges, as it begins by stating that it is DoD policy 
that no one, solely based on his or her gender identity, will be denied accession, 
involuntarily discharged, denied reenlistment, or subject to adverse action or mis-
treatment (Norquist 2019, 2). However, the policy also states that all policies that 
are gender-related, such as uniform and grooming standards, bathroom, and shower 
facilities, “all persons will be subject to the standard, requirement, or policy associ-
ated with their biological sex” (2). “Biological sex” is defined in the Memorandum 
as “A person’s biological status as male or female based on chromosomes, gonads, 
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hormones, and genitals” (14). Secretaries of the military departments may grant 
waivers in individual cases (5). Otherwise, the restrictions outlined in the Mattis 
policy from March 2018 apply to new accessions and current active personnel.
Both Trump and DoD claimed that the policy was not a ban on transgender 
individuals. But as critics noted, the policy amounted to saying that one can be 
transgender as long as one does not try to live in a manner consistent with their 
gender identity. As one news story described the contradiction, a Pentagon spokes-
person said “It’s absolutely not,” when asked if it was a ban. “She did say, however, 
that new recruits will be rejected if they’ve undergone a gender transition, that they 
cannot transition while in service, and that they must conform to the uniform and 
fitness standards of their birth sex” (Holden 2019).
On March 28, 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives debated and passed a 
resolution opposing the ban on transgender members of the Armed Forces. The 
resolution critiqued the three reasons offered to justify the policy—military readi-
ness, unit cohesion, and cost—and noted that no evidence had been provided of 
any adverse impacts of the Obama administration’s policy during the two years it 
was in effect. The resolution quoted a statement by 56 retired generals and admirals 
that argued the ban would be harmful to the military:
This proposed ban, if implemented, would cause significant disruptions, 
deprive the military of mission-critical talent, and compromise the integrity 
of transgender troops who would be forced to live a lie, as well as non-
transgender peers who would be forced to choose between reporting their 
comrades or disobeying policy.
(H. Res. 124)
Congressperson Adam Smith, ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services 
Committee, argued that the Trump policy “is based on ignorance and bigotry” 
(2019, H2898).
In 2020, the constitutionality of the Pentagon’s policy was in litigation with 
four suits in progress. A fifth case was filed in March 2020, when a naval officer 
(“Jane Doe”) filed the first new challenge to the policy in Doe v. Esper. In mid-
May, the Navy granted a waiver, as permitted under the Norquist policy, thus 
exempting Jane Doe from the prohibition of living consistently with her gender 
identity (Starr & Kelly 2020). However, in his first week in office as president, Joe 
Biden overturned the Trump ban with an executive order to enable “all qualified 
Americans to serve their country in uniform” (Biden 2021a). The executive order 
revoked the Trump actions of 2017 and, though details are yet to be specified at 
the time of this writing, would seem to revert back to the Obama administration 
regulations. It is noteworthy that in June 2021, the Department of Veteran Affairs 
announced that it would begin to fund surgeries for transgender veterans “seeking 
to alter their physical attributes” (Shane 2021).
***
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The objective of this book is to identify competing definitions at work in different 
contexts challenged by what I have called the Transgender Exigency in order to 
understand the sources of those definitions, the values and interests served by dif-
ferent definitions, and to note who is empowered by institutional arrangements to 
decide what definitions shall prevail. While such an analytical framework was useful 
in understanding the contexts of single-sex schools and so-called bathroom bills, 
the situation with transgender service members is more complicated.
As noted previously, the regulatory definition at work initially in the U.S. mil-
itary was that Only biological males (X) count as potential soldiers (Y) in the 
U.S military (C), later complemented by Only biological females (X) count as 
potential servicepeople (Y) in the WACs (C). Implicit in these definitions, until 
the final repeal of regulations prohibiting gay and lesbian soldiers, was that males 
and females must not engage in homosexual conduct. Once “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” was repealed, and women were no longer excluded from combat roles, there 
was no longer a policy of exclusion based on sex or sexual orientation. The ban 
on transgender people was lifted in 2016 by the Obama administration, with the 
requirement that for accession, Only transgender recruits stable in their gender 
identity (X) count as potential soldiers (Y) in the U.S military (C).
The framework of the Trump administration clearly prohibited certain catego-
ries of people who would normally be described as transgender from military ser-
vice, despite the claim that it is not a ban. But denotative conformity concerning 
who “counts” as a qualifying or disqualifying individual is complicated when ad 
hoc waivers may be granted. Thus, the Jane Doe in Doe v. Esper was considered 
disqualified one moment and granted a waiver the next. And the language that a 
soldier can “be” transgender as long as they do not try to live as one is positively 
Orwellian.
The Trump administration policy was incoherent because it was motivated 
apparently by animus toward transgender people rather than concern for the mili-
tary or for those in military service. The ban took place in a legal and political 
environment when identity-based discrimination is unlikely to succeed; accord-
ingly, the policy is framed as a regulation on a medical condition. However, with 
any other medical condition, active duty personnel would either receive treatment 
and have an opportunity to prove their fitness to serve, or would receive a medical 
discharge. Perhaps precisely because transgender service members typically would 
be able to demonstrate fitness, the retention policy was written in such a way as to 
require an administrative separation, which cannot be challenged in the same way. 
As Belkin explains, “DoD tries to fit a square peg through a round hole by running 
discharges for a medical condition (the need to transition) through the administra-
tive separation process. The other big reason for the policy’s incoherence is that it is 
driven by animus but can’t admit that. Hence, DoD had to make up phony reasons 
for the policy” (2020, see also Arthur et al. 2018).
The influence of biological determinism is clear, both in the texts of the DoD 
policies and in the source of political pressure leading to the transgender ban. 
Despite claiming to be an ally to “LGBT people” during the 2016 presidential 
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campaign (Diamond 2016), after his election it became clear that Trump was far 
more invested in bolstering political support from social conservatives. The day 
before Trump’s declaration, Foreign Policy ran an article noting that Vice President 
Pence was working with members of Congress to reverse the Defense Depart-
ment’s policy to cover medical procedures for transitioning service members, 
and conservative groups like the Family Research Council, Heritage Action for 
America, and Alliance Defending Freedom were working to convince members to 
support the measure (McLeary 2017). Tony Perkins, head of the Family Research 
Council—which condemns homosexuality and was designated a hate group by 
the Southern Poverty Law Center—lobbied Trump for months to repeal Obama’s 
policy (Peters 2017).
In October 2018, a memo obtained by The New York Times revealed that the 
“Trump administration is considering narrowly defining gender as a biological, 
immutable condition determined by genitalia at birth,” leading to the headline 
“ ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under Trump Administra-
tion” (Green, Brenner, & Pear 2018). The Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices memo was drafted to guide interpretation of Title IX, the federal civil rights 
law that bans discrimination in education programs, and it is consistent with the 
rollback of the “Dear Colleague” instructions issued during the Obama administra-
tion concerning bathroom access (discussed in the previous chapter). According to 
the Times,
The Department of Health and Human Services has called on the “Big Four” 
agencies that enforce some part of Title IX—the Departments of Education, 
Justice, Health and Human Services, and Labor—to adopt its definition in 
regulations that will establish uniformity in the government and increase the 
likelihood that courts will accept it.
(Green, Brenner, & Pear 2018).
The memo’s definition was formalized in an announcement on June 12, 2020: 
“HHS will enforce Section 1557 by returning to the government’s interpretation 
of sex discrimination according to the plain meaning of the word ‘sex’ as male or 
female and as determined by biology” (HHS Press Office 2020). The memo’s and 
policy’s definition of sex and its erasure of transgender people began to appear in 
other policy statements of the Trump administration, as well, including a letter of 
“Impending Enforcement Action” from the Department of Education that posits a 
definition of sex for the purposes of Title IX that would exclude transgender ath-
letes (Blanchard 2020). In short, the definition is the extreme version of biological 
determinism described at the outset of this book, which is consistent with those 
who see transgenderism as a fiction.
***
It is noteworthy that the Trump ban was not particularly popular even with Repub-
licans, with support among Republicans for transgender service increasing by 10% 
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between 2017 and 2019 (Blake 2019). A  study, funded by the Pentagon, found 
“broad support” for transgender military service across all four branches of the mili-
tary ranks, and contradicted the belief that transgender service members degrade 
unit readiness (Dunlap et al. 2021). Given that the restoration of something like the 
Obama policies under the Biden administration are starting at the outset of Biden’s 
term, as opposed to the end of Obama’s, it would seem likely to have a better 
chance to survive as the long-term policy of the U.S. military.
Notes
 1 Quoted in Dwyer (2021).
 2 Beck and Speckhard (2013, 125).
 3 Quoted in Dwyer (2021).
 4 Skelly (2020). As of July 2021, Skelly is the highest ranking trans defense official in U.S. 
history (Yurcaba 2021).
 5 Historical film footage archived on YouTube shows group showers and a physical exami-
nation process that took place with the recruits totally nude. See CriticalPast (2014).
 6 Belkin (2012) provides a fascinating historical account of military masculinity in the 
20th century that complicates military stereotypes.
 7 For a more detailed account of military policies that function to exclude transgender 
people from service, see Yerke and Mitchell (2013).
 8 The figure of 3,960 is an estimate based on studies done in California and Massachusetts, 
which yielded a rate of 0.1% in California to 0.5% in Massachusetts. Extrapolating those 
rates to the over 2 million active and reserve members yields a minimum of 2,140 and a 
possible maximum of 10,790. The estimate of 3,960 is based on an averaging of the two 
rates, adjusted for the male/female distribution in the military and is described in the 
report as a “midrange estimate” (Schaefer et al. 2016, xi).
 9 Some weeks earlier, moderate Republicans and Democrats defeated a proposed amend-
ment to the budget bill that would have denied funding for gender reassignment surger-
ies and treatments for transgender active-duty personnel. As a result, conservative groups 
and Republicans began to lobby the White House directly (Bade & Dawsey 2017).
 10 “Lethality” was a new criterion introduced by Mattis, one that is ill-defined and largely 
redundant with military effectiveness (Krapfl 2019). Belkin suggests that, similar to the 
way “unit cohesion” was used as an excuse to exclude military service by gay and lesbian 
people (Frank 2009), Mattis added “lethality” as an attempt to reframe the discussion by 
putting the onus on proving inclusion of transgender troops would not decrease “lethal-
ity” rather than a fair comparison of the various costs and benefits of an inclusive policy 
and costs and benefits of a ban (Belkin 2020, see Arthur et al. 2018).
 11 A report by a group of former chiefs of military medicine, responding to Mattis, was 
published with the title, DoD’s Rationale for Reinstating the Transgender Ban is Contradicted 
by Evidence (see Arthur et al. 2018).

Transgender voices
“I have found it is nearly impossible to be both trans and an athlete. Being an athlete 
and being trans are both a part of my identity. I wish I didn’t feel like I have to choose 
one or the other.”
—Keelin Godsey, Bates College1
“To deny us the opportunity to participate and to compete and to potentially excel is to 
take away part of ourselves that we cherish.”
—Donna Rose, Transgender Activist, Wrestler2
“I’ve been on the cross country and track teams since before I started to transition. At first, 
I had to be on the boys’ team. I always felt terrible, out of place, and like I was living a lie. 
When I first started to transition, I was able to be on the girls’ team. I was so excited to be 
with the girls, but I was not allowed to ‘officially’ compete and that was hard.”
—Anonymous High School Student Athlete3
“Cis, trans, and intersex women are women and must be included in women’s sport with-
out restriction. This is my life’s goal.”
Dr. Veronica Ivy4
When you think about the impact that sport has on a society, you think about the support 
structure that’s afforded through coaches, teachers, discipline, role models, belonging, and 
community. To deny someone the opportunity to benefit from those things, it goes beyond 
just policy and rules. It’s a complete violation of a person’s human rights. What scrutiny 
and inhumane hoops are you going to put the trans community through to access something 
that is rightfully everyone’s? Trans people belong in sport, and anything less than full 
access is unjust and degrading.”
JayCee5
“I would  never would have competed against girls or women without suppressing my 
testosterone. There’s no way it would have been fair. My testosterone levels were so much 
higher than any of the girls I would’ve been running against.”
Juniper Eastwood6
“I believe that you need to look at the issue of transgender women in sport on a case-by-
case basis with attention to the sporting context (level of competition, the particular sport) 
and the transgender individual’s situation (medical factors and past sporting history). At 
the end of the day, I don’t want to see transgender women discriminated against but I also 
don’t want to see sporting opportunities unfairly taken from other women. Should the rules 
be more restrictive for some high contact high risk sports like boxing? Probably. Should 
Olympic competition have more scrutiny than Sunday morning soccer league? Sure. That 
does not mean that you deny all transgender women the ability to play but it also means 
that maybe some cannot. We also need to be open to reviewing the evidence as it develops.”
Jami K. Taylor7
DOI: 10.4324/9781003250494-10
Organized sports have been segregated by sex throughout most of its history in the 
United States, with much more limited opportunities for women than for men. If 
one takes a longer historical view, there certainly have been cultures that encour-
aged women’s sports, dating back to the ancient Greeks. As Mary Ann Case notes, 
“In ancient Greece and Africa as well as in medieval and early modern Europe, 
women’s sports often formed part of mating rituals, and a successful female com-
petitor was seen as a desirable mate” (2017, 26). In some of those cultures, men and 
women competed directly (Guttman 1991). In the United States by the late 19th 
century, however, not only was competition segregated, girls’ and women’s athletics 
were typically discouraged:
In the nineteenth century, however, athletic and other sporting competition 
often was seen as doubly debilitating to a woman’s chances for heterosexual 
success: not only would sweating and the development of muscles make her 
unattractive, but strenuous physical exercise was thought to risk physiologi-
cally compromising her reproductive capacity.
(Case 2017, 26–27)
Sandra Bem, discussed in Chapter 2, describes the three core beliefs that per-
petuate gender discrimination as biological essentialism, androcentrism, and gen-
der polarization (1993). All three are evident in last 150 years of sports history.8 It 
required over a century and a federal law to dismantle the beliefs and practices that 
prevented women from having the opportunities to compete in organized sports 
that are available today.
I begin with biological essentialism: For much of human history, women 
often—but not always—have been considered weaker and more fragile than 




menstruation was considered particularly hazardous (Bell 2008). In the 19th cen-
tury, some physicians were influenced by a theory that each person possesses a 
finite amount of vital energy, and energy spent in some parts of the brain or body 
was at the expense of others:
It is in the power of the individual to throw, as it were, the whole vigor of the 
constitution into any one part, and, by giving to this part exclusive or exces-
sive attention, to develop it at the expense, and to the neglect, of the others.
(Clarke 1875, 43; see also Bem 1993, 9–11)
Athletic competition theoretically drained this energy from reproductive capabili-
ties (Schultz 2014; McCrone 1988). As Dr. Edward Hammond Clarke opined in 
Sex in Education: A Fair Chance for Girls, nature requires a young woman’s body to 
dedicate its energy to develop the reproductive system properly:
Both muscular and brain labor must be remitted enough to yield sufficient 
force for the work. If the reproductive machinery is not manufactured then, 
it will not be later. If it is imperfectly made then, it can only be patched up, 
not made perfect, afterwards. To be well made, it must be carefully managed. 
Force must be allowed to flow thither in an ample stream, and not diverted 
to the brain by the school, or to the arms by the factory, or to the feet by 
dancing.
(1875, 42)
Kathleen Hall Jamieson notes that 19th-century theorists “focused on the claim that 
intellectual activity damaged a woman’s reproductive and sexual capacity,” while 
20th-century writers perpetuated the belief that “biology disqualified women for 
leadership” based on “raging hormones” (1995, 58). As Bem documents, biology-
based arguments for limiting the roles for women have ancient roots yet continue 
to this day (1993, chapter 2). And, as will be shown in this chapter, biology-based 
arguments continue to play a central role in sex segregation in sports, albeit in a 
more sophisticated and scientific manner.
Androcentrism refers to defining the male as normal and the female as less than 
or different from the norm. Sociologist Eric Dunning described sports as a “male 
preserve,” especially “combat sports” such as rugby, soccer, hockey, boxing, and 
football (1986). Until relatively recently, for many the word “athlete” conjures a 
male figure, while “cheerleader” conjures a female figure. Even in competitive 
sports, it is still common for sports competitions involving men to be called simply 
sports, while athletic teams featuring women are called “women’s sports.” Thus 
the National Basketball Association (NBA) is understood in the United States as 
men’s basketball, and the WNBA refers to the Women’s NBA. Similarly, at many 
high schools and universities, one will hear reference to the basketball team (denot-
ing the men’s team) and the women’s team described in other terms, such as the 
University of Tennessee’s phenomenally successful team called the Tennessee Lady 
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Volunteers basketball team or simply the Lady Vols. One study estimates that more 
than half of U.S. colleges and universities “had some form of sexism in the sym-
bolic representation of their women’s athletic teams” (Eitzen & Zinn 1993, 35).
Gender polarization refers to the mental habit of defining men and women in 
opposing terms. Here, the fact that the adjective “athletic” was coded as masculine 
in the Bem Sex Role Inventory and was not considered gender neutral is tell-
ing. In Mahalik et al.’s Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory, a number of 
the norms are attributes associated with athletic competition, including Winning, 
Risk Taker, Dominance, and Pursues Status (2003), while such Feminine Norms 
as Values Thinness and Modest (2005) are not qualities we typically associate with 
athletic competitors. Gender polarization in sports has a long history. As sociolo-
gist of sport David Rowe observes, “Sport is historically a male-dominated sphere 
of popular culture, and during the late-19th century it came to define masculinity 
itself ” (2016). Particularly since “the institutional establishment of sport as a regu-
lated, professionalized form of physical activity in the nineteenth century, sport 
has been a major focus of sex/gender division and hierarchy” (Rowe 2014, 395). 
Baron Pierre de Coubertin, who revived the modern Olympics in 1894, opposed 
adding women’s competition, claiming that doing so was “impractical, uninterest-
ing, ungainly, and, I do not hesitate to add, improper.” He declared the concept of 
the Olympic Games to be “the solemn and periodic exaltation of male athleticism, 
based on internationalism, by means of fairness, in an athletic setting, with the 
applause of women as the reward” (1912, 713).
The three concepts of biological essentialism, androcentrism, and gender polar-
ization coalesced in the manner most sports took place. As Jennifer Hargreaves 
notes concerning late 19th-century sports,
Because organized sports for women were for the most part separated from 
men’s sports, it was easy to define them as qualitatively different, in tune 
with conventional ideas about “femininity” and “masculinity”. In order to 
survive, organized female sports tended to accommodate to traditional bio-
logical assumptions, rather than openly challenging them.
(1994, 30)
Such social norms did not keep women from such activities as horseback riding, 
archery, golf, tennis, skiing, and skating. However, women must be dressed appro-
priately and compete in a lady-like manner. Assumptions about the biological 
and temperamental differences between the sexes “provided the historical basis 
for the idea that there should be ‘feminine-appropriate’ sports and ‘masculine- 
appropriate’ sports, and a pattern of sex-role stereotyping was established” (Har-
greaves 1994, 30).
In the final two decades of the 19th century, women competed in an increasing 
number of organized sports’ competitions, including badminton, skating, tennis, 
lacrosse, and even hockey. We were still a long way from the status of women’s 
sports in the 21st century, however. Imagine hockey players wearing wool gloves 
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and hats, high-necked blouses along with skirts and petticoats (Hargreaves 1994, 
93). And men were banned from attending the first intercollegiate basketball game 
in 1896 between Stanford and the University of California (Stanford125 2016). 
Not long after, Stanford ended their women’s basketball team along with all of its 
women’s intercollegiate sports. According to Stanford’s 125th anniversary history, 
“In December 1899, Stanford put an end to women’s intercollegiate team sports, 
according to the faculty, ‘for the good of the students’ health’ and, according to 
the Daily, for ‘the unpleasant publicity accompanying the contests’ ” (Stanford125 
2016).
The perceived incompatibility of being a woman and being an athlete contin-
ued for decades. A number of historical accounts document the struggle to advance 
women’s sports in the United States (see, for example, Cain 2001; Cohen 2014; 
Gerber et al. 1974; Guttmann 1991; Hargreaves 1994; Lucas & Smith 1982). Two 
brief quotations may help illumine the types of beliefs that needed to be overcome. 
A male doctor asserted in 1931 that “[Females in a] combative game like basketball 
develop ugly muscles and scowling faces and the competitive spirit.” Eventually, he 
argued, women athletes would “find it more difficult to attract the most worthy 
father for their children” (quoted in Reft 2014). Four decades later, a Connecticut 
judge decided against a girl who was suing for the right to participate on an all-boy 
high school track team. The judge claimed “Athletic competition builds character 
in our boys. We do not need that kind of character in our girls, the women of 
tomorrow” (quoted by Dunkle 1975, 291).
One way the slow progress of women’s sports can be quantified is by looking at 
the Olympics. In the first modern Olympics in 1896, there were no female com-
petitors at all. By the 1972 Olympics, only 17.6% of the competitors were female 
(Hargreaves 1994, 219–220).
The imbalance is evident if one focuses only on U.S. interscholastic competi-
tion. In the 1971–1972 academic year, at the high school level, girls made up 7.5% 
of all sport competitors—less than 300,000 out of 4 million total (National Fed-
eration 2011). That same year at the college level there were nearly 30,000 female 
athletes compared to over 170,000 males, or about 15% (National Coalition for 
Women and Girls in Education 2012, 9).
The turning point in the United States, as is well known, was the passage of 
Public Law No. 92-318 in 1972. Formalized in 20 U.S. Code §§ 1681–1688, 
the most relevant part of this legislation is better known simply as Title IX. Sec-
tion 1681 declared that, with certain exceptions, “No person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”
“Title IX” is typically used as shorthand to refer both to the statute (which 
consists of the above “sex-blind non-discrimination rule”) and regulations subse-
quently enacted to permit “sex-affirmative exceptions” (Coleman, Joyner, & Lopi-
ano 2020, 69). The exceptions permit schools to take sex into account “to address 
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imbalances in admissions, academic programing, and sport” (Coleman, Joyner, & 
Lopiano 2020, 69).
Such a regulatory approach “was designed to and has yielded extraordinary 
results for women and girls, and for society more generally” (Coleman, Joyner, & 
Lopiano 2020, 70).
Indeed, the impact of Title IX was rapid and substantial. Participation of high 
school girls in competitive sports quadrupled from 7% of all high school athletes in 
1970–1971 to 28% in 1976–1977. The National Federation of State High School 
Associations reports that in 2018–2019, they recorded 4,534,758 male athletes to 
3,402,733 female athletes, thus female athletes made up 42.9% of high school ath-
letes (NFSHSA 2019). The total number of high school girls competing in sports 
has increased ten-fold since before Title IX (NCWGE 2017).
At the collegiate level, schools offering athletic scholarships for women rose 
nine-fold from 60 in 1974 to 500 in 1978 (Holland & Oglesby 1979, 81). Accord-
ing to the NCAA, in 2017–2018 there were 98,021 male athletes and 86,465 
female athletes, thus female athletes made up 46.9% of all intercollegiate athletes 
(NCAA 2018). In 1972, the average number of teams offered for female athletes 
were 2.50 per university; by 2004, the number increased to 8.32 (Bell 2008). The 
total number of women competing in intercollegiate sports has increased seven-
fold since the passage of Title IX (NCWGE 2017).
The numbers have improved at the Olympics as well. In 2018, 41% of the win-
ter games competitors were women. By 2016, 45% of participants in the Olym-
pics summer games were women and the Tokyo 2020 summer Olympics were 
described as the first ever gender-balanced games in history, with 49% of the ath-
letes being women (Olympics.com 2021).
Competitive sports have proven to benefit high school girls in various ways. The 
National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education (NCWGE) summarizes 
the benefits as follows: “Female athletes are less likely to develop health problems, 
less likely to engage in risky behavior, and more likely to do well in school than 
their non-athlete peers. They also develop leadership skills that can help them suc-
ceed professionally” (2017, 38). Research suggests that athletic participation cor-
relates with lower obesity (decreasing the risk of high blood pressure and diabetes), 
decreased unplanned pregnancy, and reduced odds of cigarette smoking (Kaest-
ner & Xu 2010; NCWGE 2017). Furthermore, “Regular physical activity also 
decreases a young woman’s chance of developing a range of other diseases, includ-
ing heart disease, osteoporosis, and breast cancer” (NCWGE 2017, 41).
Girls who compete in sports in high school are more likely to graduate, have 
higher standardized test scores, and higher grades in general (NCWGE 2017). As 
NCWGE notes, “A whopping 94% of female business executives played sports, 
with the majority saying that lessons learned on the playing field contributed to 
their success” (2017, 42). A survey of high level female business executives showed 
that 86% credited sports for their self-discipline, 81% for their teamwork, 69% for 
their leadership skills, and 59% for their competitiveness (Claussen 2007).
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Economist Betsey Stevenson noted that many studies in economics and soci-
ology have documented “a positive relationship between participation in high 
school athletics and educational aspirations, educational attainment, and wages 
later in life” (2010, 284). Her study looked specifically at the time period after 
Title IX to examine the effects of increased female student participation and 
economic indicators over time. Consistent with previous research regarding male 
athletes, Stevenson found that a rise in state-level female sports participation gen-
erates an increase in college attendance and an increase of females in the labor 
force. She also found an impact on higher wages and that the “effect of athletics 
on women’s wages is as large as that for men” (286). She concludes: “Athletic par-
ticipation has important causal effects on women’s educational and labor market 
outcomes” (2010, 300).
Title IX dramatically changed the lives of literally millions of U.S. girls and 
young women.9 The law was an important step toward redressing that historic 
inequality in education in general, and athletics in particular. Title IX has been 
described by law professor Deborah L. Brake as “pragmatic feminism” (2007). That 
is, though the goal of complete equality has not yet been achieved due to various 
compromises made in its implementation over its history, Title IX nonetheless 
has achieved “remarkable success in encouraging and facilitating creative oppor-
tunities for resisting traditional gender norms that constrain female athleticism” 
(2007, 513). Brake’s conclusion may prove to be valuable advice concerning the 
definitional issues now facing sports: “Rather than picking a theoretical approach 
for its consistency and abstract purity, feminist scholars should treat legal theory as 
contingent and context-specific, while continually evaluating it for how it serves 
our feminist agendas” (2007, 545).10
Why sex segregation in sports continues
Competitive sports remain, for the most part, segregated by sex. In the process of 
explaining why this is the case, I use the words male and female to refer to ath-
letes by their biological sex as assigned at birth. For the moment, my focus is on 
cisgender athletes for reasons that will be apparent. Transgender athletes will be 
discussed later.
After the passage of Title IX, females’ athletic performances steadily improved 
by all objective measures. Centuries of cultural norms and gender socialization 
that had discouraged women from competing in athletics meant that the avail-
ability of training and competition yielded rapid improvement (Sandbakk, Solli, & 
Holmberg 2018). The sex differences between world record holders declined in 
the 1970s and 1980s. In 1992, a letter to Nature analyzed the rate of improvement 
in running events and (wrongly) predicted that the gap would continue to decline 
with women matching men in the marathon in 1998 and in all running events 
within the first half of the 21st century (Whipp & Ward 1992).11
Since the 1990s, research has shown relatively stable sex differences in perfor-
mances, and most experts agree that a portion of the difference is due to anatomical 
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and physiological differences between adult females and males that give males an 
advantage in certain forms of athletic competition. These differences are evident 
both between average males and females as well as between elite athletes. On 
average, adult males have a larger body size with more muscle mass, more mus-
cle strength (grip strength, e.g.), greater tendon force and stiffness, larger bone 
structure, a lower percentage of body fat, stronger cardiovascular function, higher 
blood hemoglobin, and a greater maximal delivery of anaerobic and aerobic energy 
(Sandbakk, Solli, & Holmberg 2018, see also Green, Fraser, & Ranney 1984; Lep-
ley et al. 2018; Ransdell & Wells 1999). I say “adults” because the most relevant sex 
differences in body size, composition, and testosterone level begin to develop at 
the onset of puberty (Handelsman 2017). Prior to puberty, the difference between 
males and females is less pronounced and may be due more to socialization than 
physical differences. For example, female swimmers under the age of 10 outper-
form males (Knechtle et al. 2020), and “top running speed is almost identical in 
ten-year-old boys and girls” (Epstein 2013, 67).
With the onset of puberty, stark differences emerge: “At fourteen, the throw-
ing gap, already wide, becomes a chasm. Boys develop stronger arms and wider 
shoulders, and by eighteen the average boy can throw three times as far as the 
average girl” (Epstein 2013, 67). Testosterone increases muscle mass and strength, 
and stimulates the production of red blood cells, so those with higher testosterone 
levels can use more oxygen than those with less (Hirschberg 2020). “World age-
group records in sprinting are nearly identical for boys and girls at age nine, before 
puberty, when there is little biological reason for gender segregation in sports. By 
fourteen, however, the records are no longer in the same athletic universe” (Epstein 
2013, 68). By that age, 15-year-old adolescent males already outperformed the 
contemporary female world records (Hilton & Lundberg 2021, 204). The available 
evidence
makes it highly likely that the sex difference in circulating testosterone 
of adults explains most, if not all, the sex differences in sporting perfor-
mance. This is based on the dose-response effects of circulating testoster-
one to increase muscle mass and strength, bone size and strength (density), 
and circulating hemoglobin, each of which alone increases athletic capacity, 
as well as other possible sex dichotomous, androgen-sensitive contributors 
such as mental effects (mood, motivation, aggression) and muscle myoglobin 
content.
(Handelsman, Hirschberg, & Bermon 2018, 823)
Accordingly, most researchers conclude that the peak performance gap between 
females and males will persist in many forms of athletic competition. Samuel N. 
Cheuvront et al., note with respect to running events that,
Women’s times have now reached a plateau similar to that observed for men 
at comparative performance milestones in the marathon. Sex differences at 
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distances from 100 to 10,000m show similar trends. The remaining sex gaps 
in performance appear biological in origin.
(2005, 1017)
Specifically, Cheuvront and his colleagues conclude that, “Men possess greater 
muscular strength and a larger aerobic capacity. As a result, the gap in running per-
formances between men and women is unlikely to narrow naturally” (2005, 1022).
A team of researchers, led by Valérie Thibault, conducted an analysis of best 
performances and world records in 82 events since the beginning of the modern 
Olympic era: “each event in swimming, athletics, track cycling, weightlifting and 
speed skating” to compare male and female records. Their study concluded that 
the gender gap ranges from 5.5% (800m freestyle, swimming) to 36.8% (weightlift-
ing). “The mean gap is 10.7% for running performances, 17.5% for jumps, 8.9% 
for swimming races, 7.0% for speed skating and 8.7% in cycling” (Thibault et al. 
2010, 214).
Similarly, a review by Øyvind Sandbakk, Guro Strøm Solli, and Hans-Christer 
Holmberg documents, after rapid improvement in the 1970s and 1980s, sex dif-
ferences between the world’s elite athletes in most events “have remained relatively 
stable at approximately 8–12%” (2018, 2). The gap between world record hold-
ers is apparent in all running events, speed skating, cycling events, and shorter 
swimming competitions. The difference becomes smaller in swimming competi-
tions of longer distances, which has been attributed to females’ superior hydro-
dynamic properties. In fact, females have outperformed males in open-water 
“ultra-distance” swimming competitions (Knechtle et al. 2020; Sandbakk, Solli, & 
Holmberg 2018). On the other hand, in competitive events in which upper-body 
strength is particularly helpful, such as kayaking, canoeing, and throwing events, 
the difference between males and females is more than 12%, sometimes consider-
ably more. Hilton and Lundberg’s (2021) review of the literature concerning elite 
athletes notes an 18% gap in jumping events, 20% between fastest recorded tennis 
serves, and “the gaps between fastest recorded baseball pitches and field hockey 
drag flicks exceed 50%” (203).
Research is ongoing to identify the specific physiological factors that give one 
sex or another an advantage in any particular athletic competition, including meta-
bolic differences. In swimming, other than ultra-distance events, Knechtle et al. 
argue that anatomical and physiological differences contribute to the performance 
gap, “longer limbs, larger muscle mass, greater aerobic capacity and lower fat mass” 
on race time. They conclude: “Current evidence indicates that women will not 
swim as fast as men in Olympic events, which justifies sex segregation in these 
individual sport disciplines” (2020, 3651).12
Though physical differences between males and females play a major role in 
many athletic competitions, social-cultural factors are still relevant to performance 
outcomes. Further research is needed to prove which differences in competitive 
achievement are due to gender socialization versus physical differences (Roth & 
Basow 2004). Laura Capranica et al. argue that “The gender gap in sport, although 
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closing, remains, due to biological differences affecting performance, but it is also 
influenced by reduced opportunity and sociopolitical factors that influence full 
female participation across a range of sports around the world” (2013, 99). Such 
factors include reduced opportunity, significantly less media coverage, and lower 
financial incentives (Claussen 2007). In rowing, for example, male rowers out-
performed female rowers between 1997 and 2016; however, women consistently 
improved more than men every year, which was paralleled by “an increase in par-
ticipation of the women relative to the men in collegiate rowing. Overall, our 
work suggests that decreased opportunities and participation are major contributors 
explaining at least part of the observed sex differences in elite athletic performance” 
(Keenan, Senefeld, & Hunter 2018, 12). The key word here is “part.” Though the 
gap may be decreased through an improvement in social-cultural factors, there is 
no doubt that anatomical and physiological differences will persist.
***
Before considering the definitional controversies evinced by the Transgender Exi-
gency, four points about sex segregation in sports are worth emphasizing: First, 
competitive athletics is a context in which females have been discriminated against 
for most of its history. Second, in the United States, Title IX improved the situa-
tion markedly, resulting in a dramatic increase in the quantity and quality of ath-
letic participation by females. Third, since 1972, young females in particular have 
benefitted directly and significantly by the increased opportunity to compete in 
sports. And fourth, while the sheer variety of athletic events complicates effort to 
generalize about differences between female and male athletic performances, there 
are certain anatomical and physiological differences between the sexes that advan-
tage males and have justified dividing competition by sex in many athletic events.
Enter Renée Richards
Most narratives about transgender athletics begin with the story of Renée Rich-
ards, and this one is no exception. As told by Lindsay Parks Pieper, the tale begins 
with Richards’ outing as a “transsexual” (the term used at the time):
In 1976, an inquisitive reporter covering a California tennis tournament 
watched with awe as the impressive six-foot-two-inch rookie Renée Clarke 
effortlessly defeated her opponents. Dick Carlson, a journalist from San 
Diego, was amazed by the ease of her volleys and the precision of her baseline 
shots. Intrigued by the sudden emergence of this unknown star, he searched 
for background information. At first Carlson had simply wanted to create a 
light-hearted piece about a local standout. Instead, he produced a revealing 
exposé that forced the national spotlight onto the California tennis tourna-
ment and its new star. Carlson identified Renée Clarke as Renée Richards, 
the former male professional tennis player Richard Raskind.
(Pieper 2012, 675)
116 Definitional contexts
Long before transitioning, Richards competed in high school on the football, base-
ball, and swimming team (Abrams 2010, 54). Later, Richards was a solid collegiate 
tennis player, was named captain of the Yale University men’s team in 1955, and 
had modest professional success between 1953 and 1960. Richards graduated from 
medical school in 1959 and practiced as an ophthalmologist in the Navy and in 
private practice, all the while continuing to play competitive tennis. In 1975, after 
a lifetime of dealing with what we now call gender dysphoria, Dr. Raskin transi-
tioned and became Dr. Renée Richards.
Richards moved into the national spotlight when she announced her inten-
tion to compete in the 1976 U.S. Open Tennis tournament. Seeing Richards as a 
“menace” to the newly popular women’s tennis tour, the U.S. Tennis Association 
and Women’s Tennis Association barred her participation “by instituting a chro-
mosomal check for all female participants” (Pieper 2017, 13). Richards sued for the 
right to compete and won a victory in the New York Supreme Court.
Justice Alfred M. Ascione wrote the court’s opinion. He quoted Richards as stat-
ing, after her sex reassignment operation, “’for all intents and purposes, I became 
a female, psychologically, socially and physically, as has been attested to by my 
doctors.”13 He further quotes Richards as noting, “I underwent this operation after 
many years of being a transsexual, a woman trapped inside the body of a man.”
At stake in the case were two competing approaches to defining who “counts” 
as male or female in the context of USTA competition. The USTA defines male 
and female according to the results of the sex-chromatin test, which looks for the 
presence of a Y chromosome (also known as the Barr Body test). In fact, this was 
the sole regulatory definition set forth by the USTA, which they instituted spe-
cifically in response to Richards’ efforts to compete at the U.S. Open. Richards’ 
attorney offered a series of alternative definitional criteria: External genitalia, based 
on the reassignment surgery, was now female. Furthermore, “prior to and after the 
sex reassignment operation, Dr. Richards underwent endocrinological testing and 
administration of female hormones so as to change Dr. Richards’ endocrinologi-
cal hormonal balance to that of a woman.” Richards also presented as female. One 
expert witness, Dr. Leo Wollman, was quoted by Ascione as arguing that “if she 
has the external genital appearance, the internal organ appearance, gonadal identity, 
endocrinological makeup and psychological and social development of a female, 
she would be considered a female by any reasonable test of sexuality.” John Money, 
the psychologist quoted in Chapter 2 who introduced the notion of “gender role,” 
also argued that aside from the Barr test,
Dr. Richards is a female, i.e., external genital appearance is that of a female; 
her internal sex is that of a female who has been hysterectomized and ova-
riectomized; Dr. Richards is psychologically a woman; endocrinologi-
cally female; somatically (muscular tone, height, weight, breasts, physique). 
Dr. Richards is female and her muscular and fat composition has been trans-
formed to that of a female; socially Dr. Richards is female; Dr. Richards’ 
gonadal status is that of an ovariectomized female.
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The court did not strike down the use of the Barr test, per se, but contended 
it should not be the sole defining criterion. Furthermore, Ascione noted that the 
purpose of the test is to prevent fraud, “i.e., men masquerading as women.” The 
court “rejects any such suggestion as applied” to Richards:
When an individual such as plaintiff, a successful physician, a husband and 
father, finds it necessary for his own mental sanity to undergo a sex reassign-
ment, the unfounded fears and misconceptions of defendants must give way 
to the overwhelming medical evidence that this person is now female.
The case was specific to the state of New York, which had on the books a 
Human Rights Law forbidding discrimination based on sex. The court “ruled 
her legally a woman” (Pieper 2017, 20). Richards competed for five years, never 
achieving success in singles but reaching the finals of women’s doubles in 1977 and 
the semi-finals in mixed doubles with partner Ilie Nastase in 1979.
The rise of transgender visibility and rights that have taken place in the 21st 
century has brought renewed attention to Renée Richards, though not in the 
manner one might expect. Not surprisingly, Richards has embraced her feminin-
ity and applauds the traditional gender binary. Somewhat more surprising is that 
she came out opposed to the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) 2004 
“Stockholm Consensus,” which granted transgender athletes eligibility if they had 
undergone surgical reassignment and hormone therapy, despite the fact that such 
a policy would have allowed her to compete (Pieper 2017, 20). Furthermore, she 
has said she would not have competed had she transitioned in her 20s because 
it would have been unfair to female competitors (Eccleshare 2019).14 Nonethe-
less, her story illustrates how transgender athletes challenge definitional practices 
used to segregate athletic competitions by sex, and highlights the specific con-
cern that male-to-female transgender athletes threaten the fairness of women’s 
competitions.
The Transgender Exigency in sports
Sex verification in elite athletics appears to have historical roots not so much 
as a result of cheating by men dressed as women, but as a response to athletes 
we would now call “intersex” or people with a Difference in Sex Development 
(DSD). Such concerns can be traced back to the 1930s (Eger 2017; Heggie 2017; 
Skirstad 2000).15 In 1946 the International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF) 
implemented a rule requiring female athletes to have a medical document certify-
ing their female sex; in 1948 the British Women’s Amateur Athletic Association 
and the IOC followed suit (Eger 2017). Such a rule sometimes required female 
athletes to participate in a “nude parade” in front of female doctors. Beginning 
in 1966, the IAAF began requiring the Barr test—the one the USTA required of 
Renée Richards—which was in effect until 1992. The IAAF then briefly moved 
to an ad hoc approach “on the basis of suspicion” informed by athletes’ phenotypic 
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appearance as male, based on secondary sex characteristics such as deeper voice or 
facial hair (Harper 2020, 73). The IOC also required gender verification by genetic 
tests between 1968 and 1998. There was a period of time after 1999 when the IOC 
ended compulsory sex testing and verification, though it reserved the right to test 
selected individuals based on individualized suspicion (Harper 2020, 76; Vilain 
et al. 2017).16
By the dawn of the 21st century, sports’ governing organizations moved away 
from using chromosomes as the sole definitional attribute for sex. Not all chromo-
somal “abnormalities” necessarily impact athletic performance, and some athletes 
with relevant DSD had a gonadectomy in childhood. The dichotomy of XX or 
XY came to be seen as overly simplistic. Awareness of the biological—let alone 
the social—complexities of defining sex and gender compelled sports organiza-
tions to refine their thinking about the purpose behind the regulatory definitions 
used to determine who “counts” as female or male for the purposes of athletic 
competition.
Wrestling with defining “male” and “female” for the purposes of eligibil-
ity became more exigent with growing recognition of transgender rights. The 
Olympics, as mentioned previously, altered their policy regarding eligibility of 
transgender athletes in 2004. An ad hoc committee convened by the IOC Medical 
Commission met and approved a statement regarding sex reassignment in sports in 
October 2003. In light of the research on the importance of circulating testoster-
one, the IOC’s approach moved away from chromosomes and genitalia and to the 
hormone most often credited for the male athlete’s advantage. Thus: “Early crude 
genital checks or ‘nude parades’ were replaced first by chromosome checks, then 
by checks of external phenotype—i.e., secondary sex characteristics—and finally 
by a testosterone rule” (Coleman 2021). The statement was adopted by the IOC’s 
Executive Board in May 2004. The requirements were not solely concerned with 
testosterone, as they included durational, legal, anatomical (surgical) and hormonal 
definitional criteria:
• Surgical anatomical changes have been completed, including external genitalia 
changes and gonadectomy
• Legal recognition of their assigned sex has been conferred by the appropriate 
official authorities
• Hormonal therapy appropriate for the assigned sex has been administered in 
a verifiable manner and for a sufficient length of time to minimise gender-
related advantages in sport competitions.
(Statement 2003)
The group recommended that eligibility should begin no sooner than two years 
after gonadectomy, presumably to minimize the advantage of male-to-female tran-
sitioning athletes from benefiting from higher testosterone levels. Such strict defi-
nitional criteria represented IOC’s effort to maintain fairness in competition while 
also providing transgender athletes the possibility to compete. The IOC’s eligibility 
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policies subsequently were adopted by a number of athletic regulatory organiza-
tions throughout the world (Jones et al. 2017).
Balancing the competing values of fairness and inclusion continued to be a chal-
lenge for the IOC, and in 2015 the organization revised their requirements. The 
November 2015 IOC Consensus Meeting on Sex Reassignment and Hyperandro-
genism was an effort to address issues raised by emerging knowledge of transgender 
and DSD athletes. The statement produced by the group is noteworthy in several 
respects. First, it acknowledged the changing social and legal status of transgender 
athletes, and the “growing recognition of the importance of autonomy of gender 
identity in society.” The IOC reiterated that that the two values it was trying to 
advance were first, the “overriding” objective of fair competition, and second, to 
ensure “insofar as possible” that transgender athletes “are not excluded from the 
opportunity to participate in sporting competition” (IOC 2015, 2).
To advance the twin goals of fairness and inclusion, the new policy focused on 
two definitional criteria: duration and testosterone levels. Those transitioning from 
female to male are eligible to compete as males “without restriction,” the presump-
tion being that such athletes do not have an anatomical or physiological advantage 
over other male competitors.17 Those who transition from male to female were 
deemed eligible only if they have declared her gender identity is female and that 
the declaration “cannot be changed, for sporting purposes, for a minimum of four 
years.” Furthermore, transgender female athletes must demonstrate “that her total 
testosterone level in serum has been below 10 nmol/L [nanomoles per liter] for 
at least 12 months prior to her first competition.” Such a number reflects the fact 
that 95% of males have between 7.7 to 29.4 nmol/L, and 95% of females having 
much lower levels, normally between 0 and 1.7 nmol/L (Handelsman, Hirsch-
berg, & Bermon 2018, 807; see also Travison et al. 2017; Mayo Clinic 2020).18 The 
10 nmol/L limit was seen as progressive and inclusive: “While 99 percent of cis-
gender women fall between the 1–3 nmol/L figure, a limit of 10 nmol/L became 
known as the hyperandrogenism rule, and provided a buffer for women born with 
unnaturally high testosterone” (Connell 2018). These new guidelines were in effect 
for the 2016 Rio Olympics and 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics, though no openly 
transgender athletes competed in either.
The new policy recommendations, despite eliminating the requirement of sur-
gical reassignment, were not without critics from all sides, with some arguing that 
the science behind the policy was weak (Lee 2019), some arguing that “the advan-
tage to transwomen afforded by the IOC guidelines is an intolerable unfairness” 
(Knox, Anderson, & Heather 2019), and others arguing that anything short of 
gender self-identification is unacceptable (Connell 2018). A year later, in a paper 
that counted among its authors three members of the IOC group, an ad hoc group 
noted the need for additional research:
Given the paucity of relevant research and the likely impact of decisions 
relating to transgender and intersex athletes, there is now an urgent need to 
determine not only what physical advantages transgender women carry after 
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HRT [Hormone Replacement Therapy] but also what effect these advan-
tages may have on transgender women competing against cisgender women 
in a variety of different sports. Properly designed intervention studies are 
required to investigate the effect of the transition (both MTF and FTM tran-
sitions) on trainability and performance as well as the effects of HRT on 
performance in intersex individuals.
(Pitsiladis et al. 2016, 387)
Acknowledging the need for additional research and consultation, the IOC has 
delayed issuing new transgender guidelines until after the 2020 [2021] Tokyo 
Olympics (Pavitt 2020). Some scientists felt that the 10 nmol/L testosterone limit 
was too high and should be cut in half. For example, Handelsman, Hirschberg, and 
Bermon (2018) recommend an eligibility requirement for female athletic events be 
set at < 5.0 nmol/L based on mass spectrometry measurements like all anti-doping 
tests. Others have argued that testosterone suppression for transgender women “has 
little effect on reducing muscle strength even after a year of treatment. That indi-
cates that at least some of the physical advantages of those who have gone through 
male puberty are maintained even after transitioning” (Ingle 2019). An important 
paper by scientists Emma N. Hilton and Tommy R. Lundberg reports that longitu-
dinal studies of transgender athletes suggests that “the biological advantage enjoyed 
by transgender women is only minimally reduced when testosterone is suppressed” 
(2021). Similarly, Roberts et al. studied 49 trans women who started gender affirm-
ing hormones while in the U.S. Air Force. They concluded:
The 15–31% athletic advantage that transwomen displayed over their female 
counterparts prior to starting gender affirming hormones declined with fem-
inising therapy. However, transwomen still had a 9% faster mean run speed 
after the 1 year period of testosterone suppression that is recommended by 
World Athletics for inclusion in women’s events.
(2021, 577)
A recent systematic review of the literature by Joanna Harper et al. concluded that 
hormone therapy rapidly reduces hemoglobin to levels comparable to cisgender 
women, and reduces muscle strength significantly but not to the same degree: 
“These findings suggest that strength may be well preserved in transwomen during 
the first 3 years of hormone therapy” (2021).
Harper, a Canadian transgender marathon who also published a study compar-
ing race times for transgender and cisgender runners (2015), noted the need for 
additional research on how transitioning impacts athletic competition. Interviewed 
in 2021, she said that while trans women maintain some strength advantage over 
cis women, it’s unclear by how much, especially for elite athletes (Hollingsworth 
2021). Harper, Martinez-Patino et  al. nonetheless contend that at elite levels, 
such as the Olympics, “it is necessary to use an evolving evidence-based scientific 
method to separate athletes into male and female categories. Although imperfect, 
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the best currently available scientific approach is the use of serum testosterone lev-
els” (2018, 43–44). Harper, Lima et al. (2018) propose therefore that segregation, 
where necessary, be based on what they describe as “athlete/athletic gender” based 
on serum testosterone levels as opposed to legal categories of female/male—an idea 
that was strongly supported in a survey the authors conducted. Harper’s current 
position is that
at recreational levels of sport, we should just let people play in the male or 
female or some other category as they see fit. However, in high level sport, it 
is perfectly reasonable to require trans women to reduce their testosterone to 
female-typical levels before competing in the women’s category.
(2021)
Controversy over who is eligible to compete as a woman at the Olympics will 
surely continue. In July 2021, weightlifter Laurel Hubbard qualified as the “first 
openly transgender athlete ever to compete at the Olympics,” and her entry “gen-
erated a fierce debate on gender, sexism and sport”—celebrated by some, con-
demned by others (Hollingsworth 2021; see also Jones 2021). Hubbard’s case brings 
into sharp relief the question of what are the appropriate definitional requirements, 
given that weightlifting is a sport where males have an especially large performance 
advantage over females—36.8%, according to Thibault and her colleagues (2010; 
see also Hilton & Lundberg 2021, 203). In any case, the Tokyo Olympics featured 
more “out” transgender women athletes than any previous Olympics, and their 
visibility elicited, predictably, both cheers and jeers (Ingle 2021; Ivy 2021; Mitchell 
2021). A survey taken shortly before the Olympics in Tokyo found a majority of 
respondents opposed to or undecided about allowing transgender athletes to com-
pete (Gonzales 2021).
Though Caster Semenya is not transgender as defined in this project, her chal-
lenges with elite athletic competition illustrate the complexity of balancing fairness 
and inclusivity. Semenya is a highly successful South African middle-distance run-
ner who has twice won an Olympic gold medal in the women’s 800m. She was 
assigned female at birth. Though she has XY chromosomes and testes, she also 
has 5-alpha reductase deficiency, which leads to “intersex” or Difference in Sex 
Development (DSD) status (Johnson 2019).19 As a result, her circulating testoster-
one level is in a range more characteristic of males than females. The International 
Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) ruled in 2018 that Semenya and other 
women with similar DSD cannot compete in middle-distance races (400m, 800m, 
and 1500m) unless they take medication to reduce their testosterone level (Court 
of Arbitration for Sport 2019). Semenya has decried the ruling and accused the 
IAAF as using her body “as a human guinea pig experiment”: “Even though the 
hormonal drugs made me feel constantly sick, the IAAF now wants to enforce even 
stricter thresholds with unknown health consequences” (in Ingle 2019). Semenya 
has challenged the Court’s rulings, but so far her appeals have been unsuccessful 
(Longman 2020; Ramsay & Martin 2020).
122 Definitional contexts
Semenya’s situation underscores the fact that some athletes with a DSD face a defi-
nitional rupture when it comes to competing regulatory definitions; that is, Semenya is 
both female and not-female, male and not-male, depending on the definitional criteria 
and context. Semenya “counts” as female based on her birth certificate (a standard legal 
context) and the fact that she has lived as a woman (the durational criterion). Semenya 
“counts” as male chromosomally (XY), gonads (testes), and based on testosterone level 
(hormonal criteria). As I have argued throughout this project, which attribute is defini-
tive depends on the purpose of the defining authority and context. The IAAF “Eli-
gibility Requirements for the Female Classification” emphasizes the testosterone level 
criterion in light of the research suggesting the importance of testosterone in athletic 
performance.20 Accordingly, to “count” as female for the purposes of IAAF competi-
tions, athletes with DSDs that result in circulating testosterone levels above 5 nmol/L 
must be recognized at law either as female or having a DSD, reduce her blood testoster-
one level to below 5 nmol/L for at least six months prior to competition, and maintain 
such a level to maintain eligibility to compete. The IAAF describes their eligibility 
requirement as an effort to balance inclusivity and fairness:
The IAAF respects the dignity of all individuals, including individuals with 
DSDs. It also wishes the sport of athletics to be as inclusive as possible, and to 
encourage and provide a clear path to participation in the sport for all. The 
IAAF therefore seeks to place conditions on such participation only to the 
extent necessary to ensure fair and meaningful competition.
(2018)
On the collegiate level in the United States, the largest ruling athletic organi-
zation is the NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association), with over 1,200 
member institutions and conferences. In 2011, the NCAA’s Office of Inclusion 
published a handbook titled NCAA Inclusion of Transgender Student-Athletes that 
included guidelines for eligibility policies for sex-segregated sports. Again, the twin 
values of inclusivity and fairness emerge as key factors in the document. And again, 
the key definitional attribute involves testosterone. The NCAA policy is as follows:
1 A trans male (FTM) student-athlete who has received a medical exception for 
treatment with testosterone for diagnosed Gender Identity Disorder or gender 
dysphoria and/or Transsexualism, for purposes of NCAA competition may 
compete on a men’s team, but is no longer eligible to compete on a women’s 
team without changing that team status to a mixed team.
2 A trans female (MTF) student-athlete being treated with testosterone sup-
pression medication for Gender Identity Disorder or gender dysphoria and/
or Transsexualism, for the purposes of NCAA competition may continue to 
compete on a men’s team but may not compete on a women’s team without 




A second edition of the handbook is in the works, according to a recent “Inclusion 
Forum” (Carroll, Griffin, & Mosier 2018). The NCAA has clarified the policy 
to state that female-to-male transgender athletes not undergoing hormone treat-
ment may participate either on a men’s or women’s team, while male-to-female 
transgender athletes may not compete on a woman’s team. Furthermore, students 
who identify as gender fluid, genderqueer, nonbinary, or “another gender outside 
the gender binary not taking hormones may participate in sex-separated sports 
activities in accordance with the individual’s assigned birth sex” (Carroll, Griffin, & 
Mosier 2018).
Policies at the high school level vary widely,21 but can be grouped into five cat-
egories. First, there are states such as Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas that can 
be described as having biological essentialist regulations, meaning that one can 
only compete on sex-segregated teams that match one’s assigned gender at birth as 
recorded on one’s birth certificate. Second, there are states, such as Delaware, Indi-
ana, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, with poli-
cies similar to the NCAA’s or the 2004 IOC’s, that is, that require either surgery or 
hormone therapy for at least a year. Third, there are states, such as Arizona, Florida, 
Illinois, and Iowa, that require some level of documentation that a student’s gender 
identity is and will continue to be different than their assigned sex at birth (similar 
to the durational requirement of some single-sex schools discussed in Chapter 4), 
but otherwise permits transgender athletes to participate in the team consistent 
with their gender identity. Fourth, there are states that simply state that students 
are allowed to participate on teams consistent with their gender identity. This can 
be described as self-identification, pure and simple. Such states include California, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Washington. Fifth and finally, some states have no explicit policy at all, such as 
South Carolina and West Virginia. It should be noted that this summary describes 
a quickly evolving situation. As of May 2021, legislators in more than 30 states 
have introduced over 100 bills to limit transgender rights, and more than half are 
about limiting sports participation (Loffman 2021). It is clear the issue has become 
highly politicized.
At the high school level in particular we have the classic sign of a definitional 
rupture: A given individual would “count” as female in some states for the pur-
poses of sports eligibility but not others. The tension between the values of 
fairness and inclusion is especially acute at this age. On one hand, transgender 
youth are especially vulnerable to discrimination and stress when they come out 
as trans; as a result, some advocates argue that there should be no requirement 
for hormone therapy or surgery at the high school level (Carroll 2017), and 
that denying transgender athletes the chance to compete deprives them of the 
valuable benefits of athletic competition (Goldberg 2021). On the other hand, 
the physical advantages of male puberty create a challenge to fair competition 
at precisely the age when females (as assigned at birth) are most benefitted by 
competing in sports.
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The Women’s Sports Policy Working Group is a bipartisan group of former elite 
athletes including Donna De Varona, Martina Navratilova, Donna Lopiano, and 
Nancy Hogshead-Makar. Supporters include such noteworthy athletes as Chris 
Evert, Wendy Hilliard, Edwin Moses, Benita Fitzgerald Mosley, Renée Richards, 
Sanya Richards-Ross, and Pam Shriver. Their stated mission is to try to balance 
the competing values:
Our mission is to affirm the legal permissibility of separate girls’ and wom-
en’s competitive sport teams while including all trans girls and trans women 
under the girls’ and women’s sports umbrella. We reject both the effort to 
exclude trans girls and trans women from girls’ and women’s sport and the 
effort to disadvantage females by forcing them to compete against some trans 
athletes with male sex-linked physical advantages. There is a middle way.
(Women’s Sports Policy Working Group 2021a)
The Working Group advocates eligibility restrictions similar to the NCAA and 
IAAF regulations described previously. Transgender athletes assigned male at birth 
who have not experienced puberty should be included on girls’/women’s teams 
without condition. Those who have experienced puberty should be allowed to 
be on teams to “to participate fully in the camaraderie and socialization associated 
with team membership,” but not compete head-to-head against females (as assigned 
at birth) in competitive (as opposed to recreational) events, unless they have “miti-
gated their male sex-linked advantages through surgery and/or gender affirming 
hormones” (Women’s Sports Policy Working Group 2021b). The Group’s goal is 
to foster opportunities for all students to gain the benefits of athletic participation, 
while balancing the issue of fairness in contexts where male anatomy and physiol-
ogy provides a distinct advantage. Not surprisingly, the Group’s efforts to forge a 
“middle way” means there are critics on both sides (Schultz 2021).
No doubt, the eligibility rules concerning transgender athletes will continue to 
be controversial and highly politicized. Predictably, the matter is now in the courts. 
On February 7, 2019, two transgender girls won first and second in the final of 
the 55-meter dash in the Connecticut girls Class S indoor track meet at Hill-
house High School in New Haven, Connecticut (AP 2019). Their success at this 
and other meets led to a lawsuit brought by the parents of three female (assigned 
at birth) Connecticut high school students in February, 2020, known as Soule v. 
Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc. According to the complaint, two transgender 
athletes
have taken 15 girls’ state championship titles formerly held by nine different 
Connecticut female athletes—often setting records far faster than the best 
times ever achieved in Connecticut by a girl. They have displaced girls from 
at least 40 separate opportunities to advance to participate in higher level 
competitions in the 2017, 2018, and 2019 seasons.
(Memorandum 2020, 6–7)
Sports 125
The petitioner argued that the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference 
policy of permitting eligibility based on self-identification violates Title IX and 
thus discriminates on the basis of sex. In addition to being denied the opportunity 
to compete fairly, the complaint alleges that the plaintiffs incur psychological harms 
as well: “Plaintiffs suffer emotional distress, anxiety, and even depression and nau-
sea on an ongoing basis, race after race” (Memorandum 2020, 28). The complaint 
refers to the transgender athletes simply as males, explaining in a footnote that they 
are referring to competitors who are “biologically male” (Memorandum 2020, 1, 
note 1). This particular example is often cited by legislators in other states propos-
ing a ban on transgender athlete competition, and sometimes is the sole evidence 
offered for the need for such legislation (Crary & Whitehurst 2021).
In April 2021, the Connecticut suit was dismissed on procedural grounds by 
U.S. District Judge Robert Chatigny since the two transgender athletes had gradu-
ated and the plaintiffs could not identify other transgender athletes (AP 2021a). 
The ruling did not address the constitutional aspects of the complaint, so it is likely 
that the matter will return to the court system in the future.
Not long after the Connecticut suit was filed, the Trump administration’s Office 
for Civil Rights in the Department of Education issued a Letter of Impending 
Enforcement Action indicating their support for the claim that Connecticut’s 
policy violates Title IX (Blanchard 2020). As discussed in previous chapters, the 
Trump administration consistently advocated a biological essentialist approach to 
defining sex, meaning that one’s assigned sex at birth is the sole criterion used to 
define sex/gender for the purposes of Title IX. With the election of Joe Biden as 
president, the direction of the policies of the Departments of Education and Justice 
have been reversed with an executive order issued on literally the first day of the 
Biden administration. That executive order directs the head of each relevant Fed-
eral agency to review policies and action and to consider whether to “revise, sus-
pend, or rescind” actions that discriminate on the basis of gender identity or sexual 
orientation (Biden 2021b). On June 16, 2021, the U.S. Department of Education 
announced that Title IX protects students from discrimination based on gender 
identity (2021). It remains to be seen whether self-identification will be treated as 
legally presumptive. While we can be certain that the subsequent Federal policy 
toward transgender athletes will not be based on biological determinism, it will 
take time for details to be formulated.
The question of K-12 student athletes competing in sex-segregated sports has 
become a contentious issue in multiple states. As just mentioned, some 30 states 
are considering legislation to require student-athletes to compete only as indicated 
by the sex assigned at birth (McCarthy 2020; Sharrow 2020). Such a law passed 
in Idaho in March 2020 and is being challenged in federal District Court in the 
case of Hecox et al. v. Little et al. for excluding transgender and DSD students from 
competition, thereby violating the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
The issue promises to be contentious, as some conservatives are doing their best to 
ridicule the new administration’s policies. Fox News commentator Tucker Carlson, 
for example, proclaimed “Now, for the first time in history, men will be allowed 
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to compete in, for example, girls’ field hockey, and then change in the girls’ locker 
room afterward. Joe Biden has signed an executive order requiring it” (2021).
Meanwhile a study reports that nationally, and specifically in self-identifica-
tion states such as Connecticut and California, participation by girls in sports has 
not declined, and a recent report suggests that “Evidence from states that already 
have transgender-inclusive policies suggests that girls’ sports participation may even 
increase alongside inclusive policies” (Goldberg 2021, 15). Of course, participation 
is not the only measure of impact, and only time will tell what sort of regulatory 
definitions strike the optimal balance between inclusiveness and fairness.
It is possible that the question of how transgender individuals’ sex/gender 
should be defined for the purposes of Title IX, and in particular for the purposes 
of determining sports team eligibility, will end up in the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
sole Supreme Court case concerning transgender rights is Bostock v. Clayton County 
(2020), which the U.S. Department of Education cited when they announced 
gender identity would be protected under Title IX. The Court was able to reach 
a 6–3 decision favorable to transgender employees because the liberal and some 
conservative justices agreed that the case violated the “plain meaning” of the word 
“sex” in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the context of employment. It 
is, of course, the meaning of “sex” in Title IX that is complicated by the Transgen-
der Exigency, especially with respect to the context and “institutional mission” of 
competitive sports (Coleman 2017). One can hope that by the time such a case is 
considered by the Supreme Court that there will be a stronger consensus among 
scientists and sports organizations about how to strike the difficult balance between 
fairness and inclusion.22
Whither sex segregation in sports?
Some have argued that traditional sex segregation in sports should be eliminated. 
Transgender scholar-activist Heath Fogg Davis, for example, argues that such segre-
gation perpetuates binary norms concerning masculinity and femininity, problem-
atically policing female masculinity, and unintentionally perpetuates androcentrism 
(2017, Chapter  4). For Davis, sex segregation is sexist, plain and simple. Simi-
larly, Lindsay Parks Pieper, an expert on the history of gender verification in the 
Olympics, worries that “the various iterations of sex/gender testing all suggested 
that athleticism and femaleness were antithetical.” Quoting Canadian sports policy 
advisor Bruce Kidd, “It’s still the old patriarchal fear, or doubt, that women can do 
outstanding athletic performances. If they do, they can’t be real women” (Pieper 
2016, 187).
Are there alternatives to segregating sports strictly by sex? There are a number 
of interesting ideas now being discussed. If the IOC maintains a policy based on 
testosterone levels, then Davis suggests low testosterone men should be able to 
compete in women’s events (2017, 138). Davis and others suggest creating new and 
different competition categories: “policy makers should consider using physiologi-
cal features such as height, weight, and, in the case of elite athletes over the age of 
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eighteen, androgen levels as sorting measures” (2017, 138). For example, interscho-
lastic wrestling is already divided by weight, and in some states high school girls 
already compete with boys and have, in fact, won state championships.23
Michelle Sutherland, Wassersug, and Rosenberg (2017), draw attention to the 
advantages the male bone structure provides and note that this advantage cannot be 
negated by sex reassignment surgery or hormone therapy. They suggest one par-
simonious solution would be to offer a separate category of competition for trans 
women athletes, though they recognize there are too few athletes at this point to 
fill such a category. They also suggest that an Osteological Index could be created 
that would quantify specific osteological parameters (such as height and relative hip 
width to height ratio) by their influence on one’s “ability to succeed in a specific 
sport” (2017, 186).
Eric Vilain et al. suggest the possibility of different competition categories that 
select criteria and impose handicaps “that would place athletes in categories other 
than sex and compensate for a range of natural performance advantages relating to 
weight and height” (2017, 157). The authors admit it might be difficult to design 
a fair system with such characteristics, though a number of individual sports do so 
successfully. For example, both boys and girls gymnastics feature competition at 
specified skill levels and it is normally the coach who determines eligibility at each 
level. Similarly, almost all team sports have junior varsity and varsity levels. In other 
words, at the amateur level—which would include K-12 competition—athletic 
events have long “sorted” competitors. Vilain argues that “higher levels of the male 
hormone testosterone are associated with better performance only in a very small 
number of athletic disciplines,” and suggests that any regulation of transgender ath-
letes at the non-elite levels (interscholastic) of competition should favor the goal of 
inclusivity (Ermyas & Wakeam 2021).
Bioethicists Taryn Knox and Lynley Anderson, along with Physiologist Alison 
Heather (2019), have set forth alternatives to current methods of sex segregation, 
including the creation of multiple divisions that could be guided by “An algorithm 
that accounts for (a) Social parameters including gender identity and socioeco-
nomic status. (b) Physiological parameters” (401). Physiological parameters could 
include:
• Size, for example, height and weight.
• Haemoglobin levels.
• Maximal oxygen uptake (VO
2
 max).
• Whether the athlete transitioned before, during or well after puberty.
• Past and present testosterone levels, and the presence of testes.
• Previous characteristics of physiology that are not changed via hormone ther-
apy, that is, bone strength or structure, lung capacity and heart size. (401)
At the current time, such a radical overhaul of organized sports to replace wom-
en’s and men’s competitions completely is implausible and most likely a practical 
impossibility. As noted earlier, the history of Title IX is a feminist success story; 
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young cisgender females have benefitted directly and significantly by the increased 
opportunity to compete in sports after centuries of discrimination. The impor-
tance of maintaining the value of equitable and fair opportunity should not be 
minimized. Even Davis does not contend that there is never a need for sex seg-
regation in sports: “It depends on factors such as age, level of play, and specific 
policy goals” (2017, 135). The key is that sex classification must relate to legitimate 
organizational goals.
At the same time, the value of inclusion and nondiscrimination for transgen-
der athletes is also worthy of pursuit, and it is important not to limit transgender 
athletes for the wrong reasons. One such wrong reason is simple anti-transgender 
animus. Flores and O’Neill (2020) found in a survey of over 1,000 people that 
self-identified sports fans are generally opposed to transgender athletes competing, 
especially if such sports fans believe in traditional gender roles.
Finding the right balance between these competing histories and sets of values 
promises to be one of the most difficult challenges of the Transgender Exigency.
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unreliable with respect to measuring low levels of testosterone (2018, 806).
 19 Most news outlets do not mention Semenya’s XY status, but as Johnson (2019) points 
out, the ruling by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) specifies that individuals 
with XX chromosomes are “not subject to any restrictions or eligibility conditions 
under the DSD Regulations” and are limited to those with “46 XY DSD” (2019). The 
lengthy document in which the CAS made their ruling suggests that Semenya is 46XY 
with 5-ARD or 5-alpha reductase deficiency (Court of Arbitration for Sport 2018).
 20 The IAAF requirement is not without its critics. See, for example, Vilain and Martinez-
Patiño (2019).
 21 The website transathlete.com includes information on each state’s regulations concern-
ing high school students. My approach to categorizing these regulations differs from 
theirs.
 22 For an introductory discussion of the constitutionality of different state policies toward 
transgender athletes, see Lenzi (2018).
 23 In 2006, Michaela Hutchinson became the nation’s first female state wrestling champion 
(Abbott 2016). Others have followed, including Heaven Fitch in 2020 (McCarriston 
2020).
Transgender voices
“They don’t care if you got a beautiful face.
Beautiful breasts, beautiful hips, beautiful legs, beautiful voice, feminine personality.
If you got [a penis]. . . . You’re going to a men’s prison.”
Taylor1
“The guards were just cruel. As soon as our hair would grow out they would take us down 
and strap us in a chair and put crazy haircuts on our heads or shave one side off and leave 
the other side. It was cruel.”
Cora2
“They really don’t want to give [hormones].
They’re too afraid we might blossom into beautiful women.”
Cassandra3
“We are not demons. We are not Anti-Christ. We are human just like you, we just hap-
pen to love who we love. And identify how we identify. That’s why we are LGBTQ, we 
have different identities, we have different preferences. We have diversity. We’re not the 
same people, and that’s what people don’t understand. We are people too. We are human. 
I bleed just like you. I cry just like you. I smile just like you. I do all of these things that 
say that I am human.
And me personally, I demand that I be treated as human.”
Dana4
DOI: 10.4324/9781003250494-11
The historical legacy of sex segregation in prisons5 is unlike the contexts examined thus 
far in this book. The establishment of prisons for women separate from men was not the 
sort of feminist achievement that women’s colleges were, nor was it an effort to correct 
centuries of discrimination, as was the case in U.S. athletic competitions. Nonetheless, 
how sex segregation developed in U.S. prisons was and remains a function of beliefs 
about gender and about the role of incarceration (Owen, Wells, & Pollock 2017).
According to Nicole Hahn Rafter’s influential account, Partial Justice: Women in State 
Prisons, 1800–1935, sex segregation of U.S. prisons in the 19th century was carried out 
in three stages. First, women were confined in separate rooms or individual cells, but 
remained part of the general prison population; second, women were put in separate 
spaces in or near the men’s section, such as an attic or annex; and finally, women were 
relocated to a separate building altogether (1985). Prison facilities for women were typ-
ically inferior to those of male prisoners, with less access to fresh air and exercise yards. 
A chronic lack of supervision in female prisons led, in some states, to exploitation, rape, 
and forced prostitution. Rafter attributes these differences and exploitations to
Gender-based perceptions—that female prisoners were the source of sexual mis-
chief; that they could not earn as much as men [through forced prison labor]; 
that they had gone beyond the pale redemption—combined with the problem 
of smaller numbers to create a situation in which women’s needs were slighted.
(1985, 13)
For nearly the first century of U.S. history, prisoners in general were seen as 
irredeemable; women in particular were described as “fallen,” marked by “a stigma 
that once attached could never be removed” (Banks 2003 2).
Because women were viewed as being more pure and moral by nature than 
men, the woman who dared to stray or fell from her elevated pedestal was 
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regarded as having fallen a greater distance than a male, and hence as being 
beyond any possibility of reformation.
(Dodge 1999, 908)
Not surprisingly, one stated reason for sex segregation in prisons was that such 
fallen women exerted a “pernicious” influence on the “good order and discipline” 
of male inmates. In the mid-19th century, a consistent theme within non-seg-
regated prisons was that “female convicts were more trouble than male” (Dodge 
1999, 912). This is a manifestation, albeit an unusual one, of androcentrism:
[M]asculine criminality has always been deemed more ‘normal’ than femi-
nine criminality. There has always been a tendency to regard those women 
who have been publicly punished by the state for their misbehaviors as signif-
icantly more aberrant and far more threatening to society than their numer-
ous male counterparts.
(Davis 2003, 66)
Beginning in the mid-19th century, prison reform began to shift its focus from 
punishment to differing forms of rehabilitation. In women’s prisons, architectural 
changes included the creation of the “cottage plan” with “homes,” serving to promote 
a more domestic setting. In some prisons, women were allowed to keep their babies 
with them to encourage the motherly and nurturing instincts. Domestic training was 
seen as “the key to women’s salvation” (Banks 2003, 7). Not all prisons were so ide-
alistic, of course, and in some states the situation for prisoners, women included, was 
abysmal. The aftermath of the Civil War, for example, saw the emergence of south-
ern prison farms for men and women that “adopted techniques of slavery such as the 
overseer with his lash and the practice of working bands of subjects on farms” (Rafter 
1985, 88). Even into the Progressive Era of the early 20th century, practices that can 
be described only as torture were used to discipline inmates (Rothman 2017).
The history of the U.S. penal system is complex and riddled with systemic 
failures that extend far beyond the scope of this book.6 Understanding that beliefs 
about sex and gender have always informed prison design and practices is, how-
ever, essential to our understanding of more recent developments, with a direct 
relevance to the Transgender Exigency.
The United States is the largest incarcerator in the world. Despite having its 
lowest incarceration rate in 20 years, the United States accounts for about 25% of 
the world’s prison population, with over 2.1 million people in U.S. prisons as of 
2018 (ICPR 2021). The prison population in 1972 was under 200,000, almost 
2 million less than it is today (Langan et al. 1988). The United States incarcerates 
629 people per 100,000, the highest rate in the world (ICPR 2021). According to 
research done by Peter Wagner and Wendy Sawyer at the Prison Policy Initiative,
The American criminal justice system holds almost 2.3 million people in 
1,833 state prisons, 110 federal prisons, 1,772 juvenile correctional facilities, 
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3,134 local jails, 218 immigration detention facilities, and 80 Indian Country 
jails as well as in military prisons, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric 
hospitals, and prisons in the U.S. territories.
(2020)
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, during the Reagan administration 
the number of state and federal prisoners increased by over 90% between 1980 
and 1988 (Bessette 1989). In Texas, for example, the state incarcerated 182 people 
for every 100,000 residents in 1978; by 2003, that figure increased to 710 (Cullen 
2018).
Historically, far fewer women have been incarcerated than men. In 2015, men 
made up 92.8% of state prison populations, down from 96.3% in 1978 (Sawyer 
2018). In federal prisons, as of July 25, 2020, 93.2% of inmates are identified as 
male with the remaining 6.8% being female (Federal Bureau of Prisons 2020). 
While the rate of incarceration in the U.S. began to climb dramatically in the 1980s 
with the War on Drugs, the increased rate for women significantly outpaced those 
for men: “Nationwide, women’s state prison populations grew 834% over nearly 
40 years—more than double the pace of the growth among men” (Sawyer 2018).
The status of incarcerated women is especially relevant here, as will be discussed 
in the following sections. Fearing assault in men’s prisons, transgender men rarely 
request to be housed with male prisoners and typically prefer to be housed with 
women (Sosin 2020).
Historically, conditions for women inmates have been far worse than for men. 
In In Search of Safety, criminologist Barbara Owen and her colleagues describe 
“features of the physical plant and the prison environment that threaten women’s 
safety, among them crowding, unsanitary conditions, and unconstitutional health 
care” (Owen, Wells, & Pollock 2107, 43). Most jurisdictions have fewer facilities 
for women than for men; this restricts women’s “ability to be placed in commu-
nity programs or other programs requiring a low-custody designation” (Owen, 
Wells, & Pollock 2017, 52). Because there are fewer facilities for women, they 
are often isolated and a significant distance not only from the families of women 
inmates, but also from legal and community resources. Women tend to be housed 
all in one facility, regardless of the severity of their crimes.
Men, in contrast, generally are assigned to prisons based on a variety of 
factors, including their criminal offense, prior criminal history, and psycho-
logical profile. Also, because of the greater number of male institutions, men 
stand a much better chance of being housed near their place of residence, 
thus making it easier for family, friends, and attorneys to visit.
(HRW 1996)
As physician/anthropologist Carolyn Sufrin’s important work documents, the 
U.S. prison system treats males as the “default” prisoners, and institutions of incar-
ceration “are designed with men in mind” (2017, 10). One especially problematic 
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effect of such androcentrism is that women’s reproductive health is routinely 
neglected:
Research and public narratives document a systematic lack of reproduc-
tive health care for incarcerated women on a national scale, from absent 
or substandard prenatal care, to forced withdrawal from opiates in preg-
nancy (despite the known pregnancy risks), to lack of access to abortion and 
contraception.
(Sufrin 2017, 10)
Women’s institutions often have more rules about conduct, and they are some-
times described as “pettier”: “even when the rules in both prisons are broadly 
identical, women seem to be subject to stricter supervision than men and are 
often punished for behavior that would not be sanctioned in men’s prisons, such 
as cursing, failing to eat all the food on one’s plate, and sharing shampoo” (Banks 
2003, 67).
A two-and-a-half-year study by Human Rights Watch found widespread sexual 
assault against women prisoners by male guards (HRW 1996). Though the report 
found that all groups suffer sexual misconduct, it also reported that lesbian and 
transgender prisoners are sometimes singled out for misconduct by officers. While 
assault between inmates occurs, a significant amount of assault is perpetrated by 
male prison staff (Davis 2003, 60–83). The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
noted that while
men and women in prison report similar rates of staff-on-inmate misconduct 
(2.4 percent vs 2.3 percent), nearly 82 percent of the female victims in prison 
said they were pressured by staff to engage in sexual activity, compared to 
55 percent of male victims in prison. For both male and female inmates, the 
perpetrator of staff sexual misconduct was most often of the opposite sex.
(2020, 109)
According to Brenda V. Smith, Professor of the American University Wash-
ington College of Law and Former Commissioner of the National Prison Rape 
Commission, despite the passage of the Prison Rape Elimination Act in 2003 
(discussed later), “It is evident that sexual abuse is still a serious contemporary 
issue facing women in custody. Sexual victimization of women in custody is an 
enduring theme in the history of women in custody” (U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights 2020, 111). For example, in a survey of 18,000 former state prisoners by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 9.6% reported one or more incidents of sexual victimi-
zation during their most recent period of incarceration. The rate of inmate-on-
inmate sexual victimization for women reported was 13.7%—three times higher 
than for men at 4.2% (Beck & Johnson 2012, 5).
In recent years, while progress has been made to reduce the national rate of 
incarceration, progress has been slower for women. According to Wendy Sawyer of 
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the Prison Policy Initiative, this slower progress is due to three reasons: Incarcerated 
women are more likely to receive disciplinary action and more severe sanctions for 
similar behavior compared to men; Women have less access to alternative programs 
for first-time offenders than men; and states continue to “widen the net” through 
various efforts to criminalize women’s behavior, including (for example) school-
aged girls’ misbehavior (2018).
As we turn to the implications of the Transgender Exigency, it is worth noting 
that while incarceration is no doubt an awful experience for men and women, in 
certain respects women have the worst of it and have been subjected to a dispro-
portionate share of abuse and sexual assault.
The Transgender Exigency
The proportion of transgender people who are incarcerated is estimated to be 
larger than the proportion of transgender people in the general U.S. population. 
Contrary to the impression we may have from high profile transgender celebri-
ties such as Caitlyn Jenner, many transgender people struggle financially: “Dis-
crimination by potential employers and landlords and rejection by family force 
many transgender people into the underground economy” (Schwartzapfel 2020). 
According to the U.S. Transgender Survey of 2015, one in five transgender people 
have participated in the underground economy for income at some point in their 
lives, including 12% who have been involved in sex work (James et al. 2016, 12). 
Moreover, the survey suggests that transgender people were more than twice as 
likely to live in poverty than the general population, and are more likely to face 
prison time (James et al. 2016). In some cases, transgender women are arrested for 
prostitution just walking down the street, a crime that activists describe as “walking 
while trans.” Two percent of transgender people interviewed said they had been 
arrested in the previous year; 58% of transgender respondents reported experienc-
ing mistreatments from the police or law enforcement officers in the past year. 
Such mistreatments involved verbal harassment, references to a wrong gender, and 
physical or sexual assault; 57% claimed that “they would feel uncomfortable asking 
the police for help if they needed it” (James et al. 2016, 12).
Transgender people who are incarcerated do not fare any better. In the same 
survey, 23% of transgender inmates reported experiencing physical assault from 
prison staff or other prisoners in the previous year, and one in five (20%) were 
sexually assaulted. Compared with the general U.S. prison population, transgen-
der prisoners are five times more likely to be sexually abused by prison staff and 
nine times more likely to be sexually assaulted by other inmates (James et al. 2016, 
211–212). Accordingly, the segregation of prisoners by sex has put transgender 
prisoners, a group expanding in number and estimated as at least 4,890 individuals 
today—1,097 people self-reported as transgender among 141,500 prisoners (0.7%) 
in Texas alone—in an awkward and often unsafe situation (Sosin 2020).
The fact that transgender prisoners fall prey to sexual violence behind bars has 
been documented for decades. In 1989, Dee Farmer, a Black trans woman housed 
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in a maximum-security male prison in Indiana, was raped by another male inmate. 
She then sued prison officials who had transferred her from her previous cell in 
Wisconsin to the cell in Indiana. She demanded compensation for her “mental 
anguish, psychological damage, humiliation, swollen face, cuts and bruises to her 
mouth and lips and a cut on her back, as well as some bleeding” resulting from the 
rape (Strangio 2014; Flowers 2014). The case made it to the Supreme Court after 
five years. On June 6, 1994, the Court unanimously ruled in Farmer v. Brennan that 
the prison officials’ “deliberate indifference” to inmate health and safety violated 
Farmer’s Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments, 
and thus the officials should be held liable for damages (Strangio 2014).
Farmer v. Brennan marks an early effort by the Supreme Court to address the issue 
of prison rape (Flowers 2014). It was followed by the passage of the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act (PREA) by Congress in 2003 (Stahl 2018). Though the act did 
not explicitly refer to transgender prisoners, it referred to Farmer v. Brennan when 
stating that “the high incidence of sexual assault within prisons involves actual and 
potential violations of the United States Constitution.” Setting a zero-tolerance 
goal for prison rape, the PREA established a “National Prison Rape Elimination 
Commission” (NPREC), mandated the Department of Justice to “make the pre-
vention of prison rape a top priority in each prison system,” and instructed national 
standards to be developed and instituted through research and data collection to 
“prevent, detect, and reduce sexual violence in prisons” (National Institute of Jus-
tice Staff 2006; Kaufman 2008).
As required by the PREA, the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics 
and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) collected data and conducted research 
on prison rape. A survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that in 
2006, 1.3 million prisoners reported 60,500 cases of sexual violence ranging from 
unwanted touching to rape, a rate of 4.6% (Kaufman 2008). In 2007, a study of 
California prisons conducted by the University of California, Irvine’s Center for 
Evidence-Based Corrections found that transgender women housed in male pris-
ons were 13 times (59%) more likely to experience sexual offenses than cisgender 
inmates (4.4%) (Jenness et al. 2007). Data from multiple years by the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics found that nearly 40% of transgender prisoners experienced sexual 
abuse in federal and state prisons, as opposed to 4% of the general incarcerated 
population (Beck 2014).
In 2012, after a decade of research and review, the guidelines and standards for 
eliminating prison rape drafted by NPREC, commonly referred to as the PREA 
Standards, were finalized and implemented. In the standards, whether a prisoner 
is transgender, gender nonconforming, or DSD is officially listed as a required 
factor for screening for risk of victimization and abuse. The information gathered 
concerning gender identity, along with other factors such as prior acts of sexual 
abuse, body shape, age, and criminal history, are to be used to inform “housing, 
bed, work, education, and program assignments with the goal of keeping separate 
those inmates at high risks of being sexually victimized from those at high risk of 
being sexually abusive” (PREA Standards 2012, 20).
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The standards require a case-by-case evaluation for housing and programming 
assignments. They also state that assignments for “each transgender or intersex 
inmate shall be reassessed at least twice each year to review any threats to safety 
experienced by the inmate” (115.42[d]) and that transgender and DSD inmates’ 
“own views with respect to his or her own safety shall be given serious considera-
tion” (115.42[e]). By making it clear that a person’s gender as assigned at birth no 
longer stands as the sole factor for housing assignments, the new set of standards 
brought an end to strict sex segregation in prisons based purely on a biological 
definition of sex. The standards applied to all federal prisons starting in 2012 and 
required state compliance beginning in 2013.
Implementation of the new transgender policies has been slow. It was reported 
that even under the Obama administration, “a high level of prison facilities were 
ignoring PREA standards” (Moreau 2018a). The very first transfer of a transgen-
der female prisoner from a male prison to a female prison took place in Septem-
ber 2018, six years after the PREA standards were in place (Levenson 2019).
The PREA standards formulated in 2012 did not incorporate details on the 
criteria and procedures for the decision-making. In 2016, the Bureau of Justice Assis-
tance published a more specific interpretation of the PREA standards through 
the National PREA Resource Center website. It notes that “Any written policy 
or actual practice that assigns transgender or intersex inmates to gender-specific 
facilities, housing units, or programs based solely on their external genital anatomy 
violates the standard. A PREA-compliant policy must require an individualized 
assessment. A policy must give ‘serious consideration’ to transgender or intersex 
inmates’ own views with respect to safety.” In terms of the criteria to include in 
the “serious consideration,” the notice states that the “assessment, therefore, must 
consider the transgender or intersex inmate’s gender identity.” A policy
may also consider an inmate’s security threat level, criminal and disciplinary 
history, current gender expression, medical and mental health information, 
vulnerability to sexual victimization, and likelihood of perpetrating abuse. 
The policy will likely consider facility-specific factors as well, including 
inmate populations, staffing patterns, and physical layouts.
(National PREA Resource Center 2016)
Prison policy was complicated by the case of Rhames v. United States in 2017. 
Female inmates Brenda Rhames, Rhonda Fleming, Charlsa Little, and Jeanettte 
Driever were housed in the Federal Medical Center, Carswell, a federal women’s 
prison. They sued the federal government in Texas District Court, arguing that 
their rights to personal privacy and dignity had been violated by being housed with 
men who claim to be transgender women in the prison. The amended complaint 
filed in May 2017 stated:
Housing male inmates in facilities otherwise housing only female inmates 
creates a situation that incessantly violates the privacy of female inmates; 
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endangers the physical and mental health of the female Plaintiffs and others, 
including prison staff; increases the potential for rape; increases the potential 
for consensual sex which is nonetheless prohibited by prison regulations; 
increases the risk for other forms of physical assault, violates the Plaintiffs’ 
right to freely exercise their religion; and causes mental and emotional dis-
tress that must be promptly mitigated by preliminary and permanent injunc-
tive relief.
(Fleming, Little, Driever, & Rhames v. U.S. 2017)
The case was dismissed in 2019, in part because the plaintiffs lost standing 
(Rhames left prison, for example), and in part because of changes in policy made 
by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The Trump administration—in part because of 
this case—revised the language of the BOP’s Transgender Offender Manual one year 
after its initial publication in 2017. Before the revision, the manual recommended 
the housing of transgender inmates to be consistent with their “gender identity”; 
the modified version in 2018 strikes through the original recommendation and 
requires officials to “use biological sex as the initial determination” for designa-
tion and placement. The revised manual makes clear that the placement decision 
shall not only consider the health and safety of the transgender inmate, but also 
“the management and security of the institution” and “risk to other inmates in the 
institution.” In light of these criteria, the manual stipulates that “the designation to 
a facility of the inmate’s identified gender would be appropriate only in rare cases” 
(Inch 2018). The revision restores “biological sex” as the presumptive criterion for 
housing inmates, which creates a very unfavorable situation in light of the increas-
ing prominence of self-identification among the transgender community. In fact, 
research suggests that more than 80% of transwomen in the United States retain 
their male genitalia (James et  al. 2016, 102). The regulatory definition at work 
introduced by the Trump administration’s revision assumes the following form: 
A prisoner whose biological sex is male/female (X) counts as a man/woman (Y) in 
the context of U.S. prisons (C).
The policy shift was met with considerable disapproval from transgender advo-
cacy groups. Mara Keisling, the executive director of the National Center for 
Transgender Equality, called the revision an “inhumane agenda,” saying that “the 
extreme rates of physical and sexual violence faced by transgender people in our 
nation’s prisons is a stain on the entire criminal justice system”; Aryah Lester, the 
founder of Trans Miami, remarked that the new policy will “lead to increased 
violence against transgender individuals” and that the policy proves that to Trump, 
“trans people’s lives don’t matter” (Moreau 2018a).
A specific criticism made of the revised policy is that “biological sex” is not 
defined by the BOP and, according to the ALCU’s Staff Attorney Chase Strangio, 
until recently “the term appeared nowhere in federal or state law” (2018). Strangio 
calls “biological sex” a dog whistle for “trans exclusion.” Furthermore, the new 
rule violates the PREA, which requires federal and state prisons to give inmates’ 
own sense of safety and identity serious and careful considerations before making 
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the final placement decision (Strangio & Fettig 2018). Nancy Ayers, a spokesper-
son for the Bureau of Prisons, said that she believes the revised policy does con-
sider individual needs in accordance with the PREA: “The manual now addresses 
and articulates the balance of safety needs of transgender inmates as well as other 
inmates, including those with histories of trauma, privacy concerns, etc., on a case-
by-case basis” (Gathright 2018).
Despite the Trump administration’s rollback of transgender protections, some 
state and local jurisdictions have implemented policies similar to those advanced 
in PREA.
In 2014, a specialized Transgender Housing Unit for transgender women was 
opened in Rikers Island in New York City. Correction Commissioner Joseph Ponte 
stated, “Providing [transgender women] with specialized housing and services is 
good policy and meaningful reform and is expected to reduce incidents involving 
these individuals while also leading to better long-term outcomes, including pos-
sible reductions in recidivism” (Mathias 2014).
In May, 2018, Connecticut was the first state to enact a policy requiring the 
state Department of Correction to house prisoners according to their gender iden-
tity. The law only applies to those who are “diagnosed with gender dysphoria 
or had their gender marker legally changed” (Riley 2018).7 The key definitive 
attribute informing Connecticut’s regulation of housing transgender prisoners is 
documentation: A prisoner who is legally or diagnostically documented gender as 
male/female (X) counts presumptively as a man/woman (Y) in the context of 
Connecticut prisons (C).
Massachusetts General Laws c.127 § 32A amended by the Criminal Justice 
Reform Act of 2018 stipulates that transgender inmates “with or without a diag-
nosis of gender dysphoria or any other physical or mental health diagnosis” shall 
be addressed and if requested, housed in a manner consistent with their gender 
identity, unless the commissioner certifies that such placement would not ensure 
prisoners’ safety or would present management or security concerns (MassGov 
2018). Such an approach empowers inmates’ own sense of identity as the presump-
tive criterion for inmate placement decisions. Only when inmates’ own preferences 
pose security risks would the default decision based on identity be challenged. 
Similarly, California passed legislation, signed into law in September 2020, requir-
ing that transgender inmates “Be housed at a correctional facility designated for 
men or women based on the individual’s preference” in all situations unless there 
are “management or security concerns” (SB-132 2020, sec. 4).8
In July 2021, the New Jersey Department of Corrections adopted a new policy 
to make it customary for prisoners who identify as transgender to be assigned 
a prison stay in line with their gender identity (Diaz 2021). The policy was an 
outcome of a settlement in a case brought by a transgender woman after she spent 
18 months in four different men’s prisons, during which she “faced humiliating 
strip searches in front of male guards. Male prisoners exposed themselves to her. 
She faced sexual harassment, discrimination and physical threats from corrections 
officers and inmates alike” (Diaz 2021).
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In any case, the regulatory definition reflected by such policies therefore would 
be: A  prisoner whose self-identified gender identity is male/female (X) counts 
presumptively as a man/woman (Y) in the context of the relevant jail or prison (C).
Other states have moved in the more conservative direction. State prisons in 
Texas house transgender inmates based on their “sex at birth” (McGaughy 2018). 
Thus: A prisoner whose assigned birth is male/female (X) counts as a man/woman 
(Y) in the context of the state prison (C).
Justice Louis Brandeis famously said that states may “serve as a laboratory” to 
“try novel social and economic experiments” (1932, 311). As states experiment 
with different definitional policies with regard to transgender inmates, undoubt-
edly data will emerge to show the relative strengths and weaknesses of different 
definitional approaches. For example, there have been allegations that a policy of 
placement based on self-identification is being abused in one county facility in 
the state of Washington, and that at least one inmate incarcerated for a sex offense 
arrived “from a male facility” and raped a female in the women’s prison soon after 
(Monson 2021). The Los Angeles Times reports that “A transgender woman at a 
men’s prison, who asked not to be identified for fear of retaliation, said that she 
knows at least five inmates who have applied to transfer under false pretenses and 
that staffers have asked her to help identify such inmates” (Miller 2021). True or 
not, such allegations raise fears of cisgender male inmates trying to game the system 
to get placed in women’s facilities (see, for example, Shrier 2021).
Overall, prisons have been slow to house transgender inmates based on their 
gender identity, even after new laws such as California’s is enacted (Ferrannini 
2021). The ALCU’s Chase Strangio claims that “Placement of transgender women 
in women’s facilities is exceedingly rare and where it does happen, it is often the 
result of years of advocacy by the individual prisoners and detainees” (in Stahl 
2018). Data collected by NBC News showed that out of 4,890 transgender inmates 
in U.S. state prisons, only 15 cases of prisoners housed according to their lived 
gender could be confirmed, or 0.3% (Sosin 2020). Among the 15 cases, 13 were 
transgender women housed in women’s facilities, and two were transgender men 
housed in men’s facilities. In Texas, none of the 980 transgender prisoners (891 
transgender women and 89 transgender men) lived in gender-consistent housing. 
The consequences can be significant. PREA Data Collection Activities in 2015 
reported that in the previous year, “An estimated 35% of transgender inmates held 
in prisons and 34% held in local jails reported experiencing one or more incidents 
of sexual victimization by another inmate or facility staff in the past 12 months” 
(U.S. Justice Department 2015).
Opposition to policies designed to assist transgender inmates, particularly 
transgender women, has brought together unlikely allies. When New York City 
announced efforts to respect transgender women’s gender identity, the decision 
was denounced on the conservative website Breitbart.com. The news story began, 
“The mayor of New York is offering male criminals the chance to move into 
women’s jails, providing the men say they have a ‘female gender identity’ ” (Munro 
2018). The Christian legal advocacy group Alliance Defending Freedom (who 
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also advanced the “bathroom bills” agenda elsewhere) intervened in the Rhames 
v. United States lawsuit in support of the cisgender female plaintiffs, claiming that 
American prisons’ actions to alleviate the risks for incarcerated transgender people 
are a response to crisis “contrived” by transgender people and the prisons that adapt 
to their gender identity. According to the Alliance, cisgender women in prison are 
harmed by prisons accepting what the ADF calls “gender identity ideology” (Stahl 
2018).
From a very different political starting point, a group opposing California’s 
SB-132 identifies itself as “unapologetically radical feminists,” and describes SB-132 
as “a stunning act of female erasure and elevation of men’s feelings over women’s 
physical and psychological safety” (WoLF 2019). As a result, the bill would
harm one of the most vulnerable groups in society: incarcerated women. 
It would allow any male at any time to self-declare that he has a woman 
“gender identity,” and on that basis allow him to demand to be housed in a 
women’s correctional facility.
(WoLF 2019)9
In sum, the transgender situation in U.S. prisons is ill-defined, no pun intended. 
Both extremes of presumptive self-identification and biological essentialism can be 
found at work, as well as efforts to find a middle ground. The differences among 
states’ requirements illustrate a definitional rupture in the context of the U.S. prison 
system—a transgender inmate can count as male in one state and as female in 
another. The values that the competing definitions represent are nominally the 
same; that is, the desire to protect vulnerable groups of inmates.
Regarding future directions, a brief account of the experience with transgender 
inmates in the United Kingdom provides worthwhile insights. UK law dealing 
with gender identity in general and regulations concerning transgender prisoners 
in particular are significantly more developed than in the United States.
The UK experience
The roots of transgender legal rights in the UK can be traced back to a resolution 
by the European Parliament in 1989 to protect the rights of “transsexuals” known 
as Recommendation 1117 (Parliamentary Assembly 1989). The Recommendation 
included a call for legal protections in cases of “irreversible transsexualism,” includ-
ing changing birth certificates, identity papers, and in general prohibiting “all dis-
crimination in the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms” (Parliamentary 
Assembly 1989).
In 2002, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Goodwin & I v. United 
Kingdom that the English law that denied the plaintiff Christine Goodwin, a 
65-year-old transgender woman, from changing her gender marker on her birth 
certificate breached respect for privacy and right to marry under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (BBC News 2002b). Around the same time, a 
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different transgender woman lost a bid to change her birth certificate; the judge 
ruling that “The register of births is a historical register of fact” (BBC News 2002a). 
Resolution to these conflicting rulings came in the form of a new law, the Gender 
Recognition Act of 2004. At the heart of the Act was the creation of a Gender 
Recognition Certificate (GRC) that would function as legal affirmation of what 
was called an acquired gender.
To receive a GRC, an applicant must be 18 years old or more, and under stand-
ard circumstances must meet three criteria:
• They have, or have had, gender dysphoria
• They have lived fully for the last two years in their acquired gender and con-
tinue to do so
• They intend to live permanently in their acquired gender until death
(Government Equalities Office 2018)
The United States lacks a comparable process, with each state having different 
rules and processes for changing names and legal documents of transgender people, 
and yet another set of procedures for changing one’s sex on a U.S. passport or in 
Social Security’s records. The UK also has, by law, added gender reassignment as 
a “protected characteristic” protected against discrimination in the 2010 Equal-
ity Act. Thus, the legislative status of transgender protection at a national level is 
quite different in the UK than in the U.S., and this national approach is reflected 
in national prison policies.
The Ministry of Justice issued The Care and Management of Transsexual Prisoners 
as the first policy directive to address procedures for transgender prisoners (2011). 
The directive, referred to as PSI 07/2011, defined “transsexual” as
someone who lives or proposes to live in the gender opposite to the one 
assigned at birth. The gender in which the transsexual person lives or pro-
poses to live is known as that person’s acquired gender. A transsexual person 
may or may not have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria.
(2011, 2)
Despite the statement that a diagnosis of gender dysphoria is not required, it should 
be noted that to receive a GRC, such a diagnosis is required, and having a GRC 
certainly made it much simpler to request and receive a prison housing assignment 
consistent with one’s gender identity. Otherwise, decisions are made on a case-by-
case basis.10 With a GRC in hand, the policy states that “A male to female trans-
sexual person with a gender recognition certificate may be refused location in the 
female estate only on security grounds” (2011, 5). Even if the inmate is guilty of 
violent crimes against other women, including attempted rape, the presumption is 
that the inmate would be housed in the female “estate” (facility). Transgender men 
with GRCs “may not be refused” location in the male estate. The policy can be 
summarized as advancing a regulatory definition that only legally documentable 
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(GRC or GRC-in-progress) or biologically males/females (X) count as a man/
woman (Y) in the context of UK prisons (C).
An example of a relocation of a trans inmate under the 2011 policy was Tara 
Hudson. Hudson was a transgender woman who had gone through reconstructive 
surgery but had not yet obtained a GRC by the time she was sentenced to a 12-week 
jail term for headbutting a barman. Lacking a GRC, she was placed in a male prison 
but appealed to transfer to a female prison. The news of her appeal then became viral 
on the internet and led 140,000 people to sign a petition rooting for her transfer. She 
was successfully transferred to a female jail in 2015, despite her “worrying criminal 
record” of eight previous convictions, including battery. The prison officer explained 
their decision by saying although the longstanding policy is to place offenders accord-
ing to their legally recognized gender (as per PSI 07/2011),
our guidelines allow room for discretion and in such cases, medical experts 
will review the circumstances in order to protect the emotional wellbeing of 
the person concerned. Our top priority is the safety and welfare of those in 
our custody and decisions relating to the location of transgender prisoners 
are taken by a range of people including psychologists, healthcare profession-
als and prison staff.
(BBC News 2015b)
Nonetheless, two high profile deaths in 2015 of transgender women placed in 
men’s prisons, Vikki Thompson and Joanne Latham—both of whom also lacked 
GRCs—raised questions about the adequacy of PSI 07/2011 procedures (Alison & 
Pidd 2015; Pidd 2017). In 2016, the Ministry of Justice issued a new version of 
The Care and Management of Transgender Offenders (PSI 17/2016) to replace the for-
mer PSI 07/2011. Not only did the title change from “transsexual” to the more 
inclusive “transgender,” the policy document loosened the requirement for a GRC 
to qualify for gender identity-consistent housing. The policy is described at some 
length here for reasons that will be explained later on.
The new policy requires transgender offenders to be asked their view of “the 
part of the prison estate (i.e. male or female) that reflects the gender with which 
they identify” (Ministry of Justice 2016, 9). If they do not have a GRC, then the 
request must be made by a Transgender Case Board. The offender is then asked to 
provide “evidence of living in the gender with which they identify.” The policy 
continues,
The strength of this evidence must be considered within the context of a 
Transgender Case Board together with all known risk factors before a deci-
sion is made. Each offender must be assessed on a case by case basis and 
discretion may be applied following a Transgender Case Board. Transgender 




Figure 8.1 describes the types of evidence that can be provided and ranks their 
relative strength (Ministry of Justice 2016, 28). In the evidence description, docu-
mented evidence such as the GRC and birth certificates still counts as the strong-
est evidence (“full confirmation”), second to which are “strong confirmation” 
including health care information and “actual life” traces of living consistently in 
one’s acquired gender. The absence of actual lifestyle evidence, along with covert 
attempts to use gender role to sway judicial decisions function as counterevidence. 
All of these made it more likely in theory for transgender inmates without GRCs 
FIGURE 8.1  UK Evidence of Living in the Gender with which the Offender Identifies
Prisons 145
to be housed based on their gender identity if they can provide “strong confirma-
tion” evidence.
The new policy reduces the dependence on documentation or surgical require-
ments and instead commits to a “durational” attribute, seeking to testify from one’s 
everyday lifestyle that the inmate has been living consistently in their “acquired” 
gender. Thus, the regulatory definition can be written as: Transgender prison-
ers who can provide adequate evidence of living consistently and permanently in 
a specific gender category (X) count as women/men (Y) in the context of UK 
prisons (C).
Just as the new policy took effect, a notorious incident took place that further 
complicated the policy situation in the UK. Karen White, a transgender woman, 
was incarcerated on remand for “for grievous bodily harm, burglary, multiple rapes 
and other sexual offences against women” in 2017, just as PSI 17/2016 took effect 
(Parveen 2018a). Although she neither had a GRC nor had gone through recon-
structive surgery, White was placed in a female prison under the new policy. In 
the female facility, she sexually assaulted two female inmates within her first three 
months of imprisonment. The incident caused a media storm across the nation as 
an illustration of the potential danger associated with placing transgender women 
in women’s prisons. White was sentenced to life in prison in October, 2018, for 
two counts of rape, two sexual assaults and one count of “wounding.” She had 
previous convictions for indecent assault, indecent exposure and gross indecency 
involving children, animal cruelty and dishonesty (Parveen 2018b). The Ministry 
of Justice apologized for placing her into a women’s prison, noting that her previ-
ous criminal history had not been taken into account when the housing assign-
ment was made by the “Local Transgender Case Board” and that the case was not 
reviewed by a second board (a “Complex Transgender Case Board”) that should 
have assessed the particulars (Parveen 2018a, 2018b). As noted by reporter Nazia 
Parveen, “both sides of the transgender rights debate are united in the belief mis-
takes were made” in the case (2018a).
The Ministry of Justice’s count of transgender prisoners between March and 
April 2017 gave an estimate of 125 transgender inmates in England and Wales.11 
This number grew to 139 in 2018 and 163 in 2019. Among these 163 individu-
als, 129 reported their legal gender as male, 32 as female and two did not state 
their legal gender. When asked about the gender with which the prisoner iden-
tified, 130 identified as female, 20 as male and 13 did not provide a response 
(Ministry of Justice 2019b, 14–15). The number of trans inmates identifying as 
female is further complicated by allegations of a high percentage of sexual offend-
ers among the trans prison population. The controversial advocacy group Fair Play 
for Women examined individual prison inspection reports in 2017 and concluded 
that at least 41% of transgender women (whom they refer to as “transgender-
identifying males”) in prisons in England and Wales were convicted sex offenders 
(2017). This figure is twice as high as the 19% of all prison populations convicted 
of sexual offenses calculated by the Ministry of Justice in 2018, and becomes even 
more salient when compared to 3.2%, the estimated percentage of sexual offenders 
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among the entire female-estate population (The Ministry of Justice 2018; Fair Play 
For Women 2017). Fair Play’s numbers were criticized in a fact check article by 
the BBC, which suggested the percentages were skewed because many transgender 
inmates were not included in the count (Reality Check Team 2018). Nonethe-
less, adding to concerns about proper placement of transgender inmates is the fact 
that the number of inmates claiming to be transgender rose dramatically, with one 
watchdog survey suggesting “there are up to 1,500 transgender inmates among the 
90,000 prisoners in England and Wales, more than ten times previous estimates, 
and at least four times the number in the general population” (Hymas 2019). Offi-
cials representing the Prison Officers Association and the Victim Rights Campaign 
expressed the concern that the inmates were merely trying to obtain “prison perks” 
such as separate showers, separate cells, and access to women’s housing facilities 
(Hymas 2019). Consequently, the challenge confronting the UK government after 
the Karen White incident was to improve their ability to assess and control the 
potential risks of abuse associated with transgender prisoners and at the same time 
to hold the ground for transgender prisoners’ basic rights.
In 2019, another revision of The Care and Management of Individuals who are 
Transgender was introduced to replace PSI 17/2016. The new policy categorizes its 
primarily concerned subjects into the following two groups: (1) individuals who 
express a consistent desire to live permanently in the gender with which they iden-
tify, and which is opposite to the biological sex assigned to them at birth, regardless 
of the intent to pursue a new legal gender recognition; (2) individuals who identify 
as transgender but do not seek to acquire a new gender, including Intersex, nonbi-
nary, gender fluid, and transvestite individuals.
Substituting for PSI 17/2016, the new policy builds on the previous version 
in ways that include requiring the initial location of all prisoners to match their 
legal gender until the CCB (Complex Case Board) has approved a transfer, and 
changing the convening time of Initial Local Transgender Case Board to “within 
14 days,” not three days as per PSI 17/2016, to allow for a suitable amount of time 
for disclosure and informed risk assessments. The key addition is in the area of 
“risk assessment.” While the policy retains the “evidence list” from PSI 17/2016, 
it stipulates that “a balanced approach must be adopted where the safety and well-
being of the individual who is transgender is balanced by an informed assessment 
of any risks that the individual presents to other people” (Ministry of Justice 2019a, 
11). The risk assessment procedure considers two kinds of risk: (1) potential risk 
to the transgender individual from others, and (2) potential risk to others from the 
transgender individual.
The examination of the first type of risk, risk of abuse committed by cisgender 
inmates upon a transgender inmate, considers the following factors (* indicates 
critical factors):
*Mental health and personality disorder; *History of self-harm; *Anatomy, 
including risk of sexual or violent assault; *Testimony from the individual 
about a sense of vulnerability, e.g. in a male environment, in a particular 
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prison, or from a particular prisoner or group of other prisoners; *Risk of 
suicide; *Medication including the absence of medication and the impact of 
known side effects; *History of being attacked, bullied or victimised; *Intel-
ligence including evidence of coercion, manipulation, or threats towards the 
individual; Family circumstances/relationship; Age; Physical health; Learn-
ing disabilities or difficulties.
(Ministry of Justice 2019a, 12)
The assessment of the second type of risk, risk of harm committed by transgen-
der inmates, considers the following factors (* indicates critical factors):
*Offending history, including index offence, past convictions and intelli-
gence of potential criminal activity- e.g. credible accusations; *Anatomy, 
including considerations of physical strength and genitalia; *Sexual behav-
iours and relationships within custodial/residential settings; *Use of medica-
tion relating to gender reassignment; and use of medication generally; *Past 
behavior in custody, the community, in the care of the police, or in the 
care of prisoner escort services; *Intelligence reports; *Evidence of threats 
towards others; *Mental health and personality disorder; Learning disabilities 
or difficulties; Substance misuse.
(Ministry of Justice 2019a, 12–13)
The regulatory definition of gender in the UK prison context has evolved to 
assume the following form: Only prisoners who can provide sufficient evidence of 
living consistently and permanently in a gender identity and whose associated risks 
posed by and to other inmates are not particularly high (X) are eligible to count as 
women/men (Y) in the context of UK prisons (C). Under very specific circum-
stances, inmates can be placed in a manner consistent with their gender identity or 
housed separately in facilities limited to transgender inmates. The UK opened the 
first transgender cell at HMP Downview in Sutton, Surrey in 2019. The cell unit 
now houses three transgender women inmates, all of whom have attained GRCs 
(Anonymous [The Economist] 2019; Hymas 2019).
What might the U.S. learn from the UK experience?
The procedures put into place by UK in 2019 may seem complicated, but they 
appear to be a sincere effort to balance competing values involving the rights of 
transgender inmates and the safety of cisgender women inmates. As noted in the 
2019 UK policy, the management of individuals who are transgender “must seek 
to protect both the welfare and rights of the individual, and the welfare and rights 
of others in custody around them” (Ministry of Justice 2019a, 5). A recent legal 
challenge to the 2019 policy was refused, while the court noted that the govern-
ment has to “consider competing interests and to balance competing rights,” and 
acknowledged that “this is a sensitive area, in which it is unlikely that any policy 
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could be devised which would be to the satisfaction of all persons affected by it” 
(Regina [FDJ] v Secretary of State for Justice 2021). The extreme approaches found in 
the United States, ranging from presumptive self-identification to a strict biological 
definition that effectively defines transgender women out of existence, privilege 
one set of values and, arguably, neglect the other.
The UK experience also suggests that policies may be drafted with the best of 
intentions, but implementation is another matter. The expression “culture eats 
policy for breakfast” suggests that no matter how well designed an institution’s 
new policies are, if they run counter to the habitual practices and values of that 
institution, they are likely to fail. Thus, accusations remain that the vast majority 
of transgender inmates are in the “wrong” prison facility (R. Smith 2019; Ministry 
of Justice 2019b). And despite the creation of separate facilities for trans inmates at 
institutions like Riker’s Island in the U.S., trans women continue to die unneces-
sarily, as in the tragic case of Layleen Polanco.12
Valerie Jenness, Distinguished Professor of Criminology, Law, and Society at 
the University of California, Irvine, has observed state officials charged with the 
placement of transgender inmates. She notes that a “case-by-case” approach to 
placement is shrouded in layers of ambiguity about how best to apply abstract cri-
teria. This, in turn, creates a situation in which the same set of “facts” about the 
person and the context in which they are incarcerated can create a double-bind. 
For example,  if a trans person who is incarcerated in a facility for men makes a 
request to move to a facility consistent with their gender identify, their disciplinary 
record is likely to be discussed by the team in charge of responding to the request. 
If the person has a disciplinary record the request might be denied in order to avoid 
“rewarding” negative behavior and out of concern for the women with whom 
the person would be housed if the request were approved. On the other hand, if 
the person does not have a disciplinary record, then their case file can be read as 
evidence that they have acclimated successfully into their current facility and thus 
should remain in it (Jenness 2020; see also Sumner & Jenness 2014).
Of course, institutional inertia is no reason not to improve policies, and as all 
parts of the criminal justice system gain more experience with transgender popula-
tions, one can hope that implementation practices will improve on both sides of 
the Atlantic. In any case, compared to the rampant inconsistency of U.S. federal 
and state policies, the UK approach should be considered a model worthy of careful 
study and consideration.
Notes
 1 Quoted in Hughto et al. (2018, 75).
 2 Quoted in Kilty (2020, 11).
 3 Quoted in Hughto et al. (2018, 76).
 4 Quoted in Kilty (2020, 18).
 5 Unless otherwise noted, the word “prison” in this chapter refers to federal and state 
prisons and penitentiaries. Other places of incarceration will be identified specifically 
where relevant.
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 6 Hinton (2016) traces the politics and policy decisions since the War on Poverty that 
have led to the reliance on mass incarceration in the U.S. See also Davis (2003), 
Gottschalk (2006).
 7 It should be noted that it is challenging to change one’s legal ID to reflect a gen-
der change. According to the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, only 11% of respondents 
reported that all of their IDs had the name and gender they preferred, while more than 
two-thirds (68%) reported that none of their IDs had the name and gender they pre-
ferred (James et al. 2016).
 8 Transgender women inmates have different individual preferences for housing place-
ment. In a study of 315 transgender women incarcerated in 27 California men’s prisons, 
64.9% preferred to be housed in a men’s prison, while the rest (35.1%) preferred to be 
housed in a women’s prison. One prisoner explained her preference to stay in a men’s 
prison by saying, “Women are more vicious. They scare me. Around men, I have my 
fan base. I’m more pretty than most of the girls here. Plus, I have my boyfriend—my 
husband—and he will take care of things” (Jenness, Sexton, & Sumner 2019, 622).
 9 Proving that politics makes strange bedfellows, WoLF sometimes partners with con-
servative groups and think tanks such as the Family Policy Alliance and the Heritage 
Foundation (Ring 2019).
 10 PSI 7/2011 states: “Some transsexual people will be sufficiently advanced in the gen-
der reassignment process that it may be appropriate to place them in the estate of their 
acquired gender, even if the law does not yet recognise they are of their acquired gender” 
(Ministry of Justice 2011, 16).
 11 The Ministry of Justice’s counts of transgender prisoners excluded those who have 
GRCs and the figures are likely to underestimate the true transgender population in 
prisons because some of the transgender inmates may not declare their gender identity 
or have a local case board conference (Ministry of Justice 2019b, p. 14).
 12 Because Polanco could not afford $500 bail for a misdemeanor charge, she was jailed 
in Riker’s Island. After an altercation, she was put in solitary confinement and died of 
an epileptic seizure after guards failed to follow correct observation and intervention 
procedures. Had she been housed with cisgender women inmates, or had the facility 
followed correct procedure, it is unlikely she would have died in custody. Her family was 
awarded a $5.9 million settlement (Simko-Bednarski 2020). Trans activists point to her 
case as symptomatic of mistreatment of transgender inmates (Burns 2020; Gajanan 2020; 
Gold & Piccoli 2019).
Transgender voices
“My gender is not up for debate. I am a woman.”
t philosopher1
“Women who have struggled against patriarchal ideals of what makes a ‘real’ woman 
think nothing of turning around and using the word ‘real’ against trans women.”
Julia2
“Are trans women women or aren’t they? Here too the urge to over-simplify gets us into 
trouble. We imagine we have to line up in two discrete sides, behind an unqualified Yes 
and an unqualified No. I don’t think that’s right at all.
Here as in so many other places, the right answer is more like ‘In some ways yes, in other 
ways no’.”
Sophie Grace Chappell3
“The other hesitation I now have with the gender pluralism notion is that we lose the 
ability to recognize asymmetry in the workings of gender as a technology to distribute rights 




There are no specific institutions that function under the rubric of feminism(s)5 
with the authority to enforce specific regulatory definitions of male/female, or 
woman/man, such as those described in previous chapters. Nonetheless, there are 
heated debates among feminist activists and academics about the scope of the word 
“woman” and under what circumstances transgender women should be included. 
For that reason, a chapter exploring those debates seems worthwhile.
To understand why the question of defining “woman” is contentious, it is first 
important to understand what is at stake. Feminists wrote about and theorized 
“woman” as a category because the term denotes a group that historically has been 
oppressed and discriminated against. As the second section of this chapter illus-
trates, feminists wrestled with the need to make claims about an oppressed group 
while not reducing all women to a particular definitive attribute, such as the ability 
to bear children. For the moment, for the purposes of clarity we can stipulate that 
“woman” in this account most often refers to cisgender humans denoted by their 
specific cultures as women and set aside more specific definitive attributes and 
controversies.
A thorough account of the history of women’s oppression goes far beyond the 
scope of this book, but there are five overlapping areas that should be highlighted: 
legal rights, safety from violence, economic security, health care, and gender 
stereotypes.
In the United States, women lacked fundamental legal rights we now take for 
granted until surprisingly recently. For example:
• In most of the antebellum period of U.S. history, women were commonly 
regarded as under the authority of men—fathers, then husbands—under a 




control their earnings except under limited circumstances. As recently as 1971, 
banks could refuse women credit cards issued in their own names (Hill 2020).
• Of the 4.4 million African Americans in the United States in 1860, 4 million 
were enslaved, and slightly more than half were women (O’Neill 2019).
• As described in Chapter  4, higher education was largely closed to women 
through the mid-19th century. At that time, in most states married women 
were allowed to own but not control property unless their husband became 
incapacitated and even then they might be governed by a trustee.
• There was no national right to vote for women in the United States until the 
19th Amendment was passed in 1920. Women did not have an equal right to 
men to serve on juries until 1966.
Violence against women includes domestic abuse, rape, human trafficking, assault, 
and murder. Men’s control over women’s bodies, enforced by violence, can be 
regarded as a defining element of patriarchy (Whisnant 2007).
• Enslaved women could be beaten and raped legally by their owners or forced 
into sexual relations with enslaved men, and in both cases their children were 
enslaved (Marable 2018, 63–64).
• Women are 43% more likely than men to experience “severe physical violence 
by an intimate partner (e.g., hit with a fist or something hard, beaten, slammed 
against something) at some point in their lifetime” (Black et al. 2011, 2).
• According to the 2010 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Sur-
vey, nearly one in five women in the United States have experienced rape or 
attempted rape at some time in their lives; over 90% of the attackers were an 
acquaintance or intimate partner (Black et al. 2011, 1).
• A 2015 update to the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey 
reported that “43.6% of women (nearly 52.2 million) experienced some form 
of contact sexual violence in their lifetime” (Smith et al. 2018, 2).
• More than four in five American Indian and Alaska Native women (84.3%), 
or more than 1.5 million women, have experienced violence in their lifetime, 
most by intimate partners (Rosay 2016).
• Until the second half of the 20th century, married men could not be pros-
ecuted for raping their wives (Connerton 1997).
• In all areas of violent crime, women are three times more likely to be victims 
than offenders, and twice as likely to be murder victims than offenders (Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation 2019).
• The United Nations estimates that in North America 85% of victims of human 
trafficking and slavery are women and girls, 71% of whom are trafficked for 
sexual exploitation (UNODC 2018, 71).
Until well into the 20th century, women were excluded from various careers and, 
as described in Chapter 5, women were encouraged generally to limit themselves 
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to the private sphere of the home. Legal and cultural practices continue to disad-
vantage women’s economic security.
• Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, there was almost no 
protection against employment discrimination based on sex. Indeed, women 
routinely and legally were excluded from prestigious careers such as lawyers 
and doctors.
• Women continue to be paid less than men, earning about 81 cents for every 
dollar a man earns (Institute for Women’s Policy Research 2018). According to 
the Center for American Progress, “women have higher rates of poverty than 
men across almost all races and ethnicities” (Bleiweis, Boesch, & Gaines 2020). 
A report by the World Economic Forum found that the coronavirus pandemic 
has made matters even worse for women, setting back progress toward gender 
parity by decades (2021).
• A recent study of women in the U.S. workplace reports that while women 
represent 48% of entry level hires in corporations, they make up only 34% 
of senior managers and 21% of C-suite (executive) positions (Thomas et al. 
2019).
More than half of the world’s countries treat citizens’ right to health care as a basic 
human right (Mull 2019). The United States is not one of them. Health care for 
women in the United States lags behind that for women in other countries in a 
number of respects.
• Epidemiologic research documents that women’s lower income is correlated 
with worse health: “women suffer more than men from a host of nonfatal, 
disabling physical and mental illnesses and are generally expected to live fewer 
years in good health,” despite living longer than men on average (Borrell et al. 
2014, 31).
• The majority of health research has been androcentric, focusing mostly or 
only on men. As a result, scientific knowledge on how to prevent and treat 
many illnesses in women lags behind that for men, including in important 
areas such as cardiovascular disease prevention and diagnosis (Bird & Rieker 
2008, 9).
• Longer parental leaves contribute to better mental and physical health out-
comes for mothers and infants (Borrell et al. 2014). Prior to the passage of 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978, women could be fired for becom-
ing pregnant and there was no national policy for parental leave until 1993’s 
Family and Medical Leave Act. The United States is the only major industrial 
country that lacks a legal mandate for paid parental leave (OECD 2019).
• Reproductive health care includes access to birth control and safe abortions. In 
the United States, states could outlaw the sale of contraceptives until 1965 and 
abortions until 1973. Conservative state legislatures have advanced multiple 
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policies designed to limit women’s access to reproductive health care, includ-
ing efforts to overturn Roe v. Wade (Stein & Green 2019).
As described in Chapter 2, a major focus of the women’s movement in the United 
States in the 1970s was to challenge the rigid gender norms historically imposed 
on women and men. Many of the effects of sexist beliefs and practices have been 
identified in the preceding paragraphs. While many sexist practices have been rem-
edied, there is ample evidence of the continuing harms to women of sexist stereo-
types. For example, women in leadership roles continue to have to navigate what 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1995) describes as double binds that have been confront-
ing women for centuries:
• Women can conceive children or ideas, but not both.
• Women who speak their minds are immodest and will be described negatively, 
while women who are silent are ignored.
• Women are judged against an androcentric standard, and by that standard they 
lose, whether they claim difference (they fail to measure up) or similarity (they 
are no longer considered women).
• Women cannot be both feminine and competent.
• As men age they are perceived as gaining wisdom and power, but not so for 
women (more of a double standard than a double bind).
Though progress has been made toward feminism’s primary goal of equality and an 
end to discrimination, the core tenets of sexism—summarized by Bem as andro-
centrism, biological essentialism, and gender polarization—persist. Feminists such 
as Beatrix Campbell argue that we live in an era of “neoliberal neopatriarchy” in 
which violence against women continues, body anxiety and self-hatred flourishes, 
rape is committed with impunity, sex trafficking thrives, and the struggle for equal 
pay continues (2014).
Clearly, much work remains for feminists and feminism(s) to address the sexism 
and oppression women face in the United States and across the world.6 But whom, 
exactly, do we mean by “women”?
Feminists theorize “woman”
French feminist Simone de Beauvoir famously proclaimed in Le Deuxième Sexe 
(The Second Sex): “On ne naît pas femme: on le devient” (1949, vol. 2, 13), which can 
be translated as “One is not born a woman; one becomes one.”7 She continues, 
“No biological, psychic, or economic destiny defines the figure that the human 
female takes on in society; it is civilization as a whole that elaborates this interme-
diary product between the male and the eunuch that is called feminine” (Beauvoir 
2011, 283).8
Beauvoir’s point is a cultural and political one; namely, that women as a group 
have been defined, socialized, and subjugated as the Other, the “second” sex under 
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patriarchy. In the 70-plus years since The Second Sex, many feminist thinkers have 
explored competing ways to theorize, categorize, or define “women.” I  cannot 
pretend to do justice to all the important work published on this topic, and I would 
refer readers to summaries by Toril Moi (1999), Mari Mikkola (2019), and Sally 
Haslanger and Ásta (2018). It is important to acknowledge that feminist philoso-
phers approach the topic from different methodological and theoretical perspec-
tives. Some want to answer to advance a theory of what it is to be a woman, per se, 
metaphysically speaking; others are interested in the conceptual work performed by 
the word “woman” as an analytical category, including its various social, theoreti-
cal, and political uses; while others want to produce what is known as a real defini-
tion, which is to give a theory of what X (woman) is—to explicate its nature.9 Thus 
my narrative oversimplifies matters by implying more commonality in purpose 
than is the case. I nonetheless hope that the following narrative assists the reader to 
understand enough of the theoretical controversies to comprehend why efforts to 
include (or exclude) transgender women have become so challenging.10
The Women’s Liberation Movement began in earnest in the late 1960s in the 
United States and, from the start, wrestled with questions of who the “women” 
were that the movement represented. Did it include non-heterosexual females, 
for example? Betty Friedan, founding president of the National Organization for 
Women, famously described lesbians as a “lavender menace” in 1969 and feared 
that lesbian visibility in the movement would hinder its efforts to gain mainstream 
respectability (Jay 1999; Samek 2015). The breakthrough year for the movement 
in terms of national news coverage was 1970. As media scholar Bonnie J. Dow 
documents (2014), that coverage described a movement almost exclusively white 
and heterosexual.
Efforts to exclude lesbians from the Women’s Movement did not last long. 
Friedan’s term “lavender menace” was embraced by a group of lesbian feminists 
who protested at the 1970 Second Congress to Unite Women and presented a 
manifesto titled “The Woman-Identified Woman” (Radicalesbians 1970). The 
manifesto noted that for men, a lesbian is not considered a “real woman” since she 
is not sexually available to men, and called for a “revolution to end the imposition 
of all coercive identifications” (1970, 4). Meanwhile, as the manifesto title implies, 
if anyone counts as a woman, it would be woman-identified women, including 
lesbians.
While lesbians generally were welcomed into the movement in the 1970s, in 
1978 Monique Wittig concluded a presentation at the Modern Language Associa-
tion with the statement, “lesbians are not women” (Wittig 1992). Wittig’s argu-
ment was that there is no “natural group ‘women’ ” and, in a 1981 essay invoking 
Beauvoir, suggests the category “woman” is a myth (1992, 10). Echoing the “The 
Woman-Identified Woman,” Wittig points out that lesbians are treated as “unnatu-
ral” and hence not “real” women (12). But she claims the subject position of lesbian 
as liberating for that very reason: “Lesbian is the only concept I know of which 
is beyond the categories of sex (woman and man), because the designated sub-
ject (lesbian) is not a woman, either economically, or politically, or ideologically” 
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(20). Jacob Hale returned to the question “Are Lesbians Women?” in 1996. He 
describes 13 defining characteristics described as “the dominant culture’s concept 
of woman” (1996, 107). These include physical characteristics, such as “absence of a 
penis,” social roles such as “having an occupation considered to be acceptable for a 
woman,” “behaving” in a way people recognize as a woman, and self-identification: 
“having a gender identity as a woman.” Hale thus answers his question: “Are les-
bians women? Some are, some are not, and in many cases there is no fact of the 
matter” (1996, 115).
Discussion of the intersection of concerns of feminists with groups oppressed 
based on race and class also began in the 1970s (Hancock 2016). Members of 
the Combahee River Collective, for example, called attention to “interlocking” 
sources of oppression: “We are actively committed to struggling against racial, 
sexual, heterosexual and class oppression and see as our particular task the devel-
opment of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major 
systems of oppression are interlocking” (Combahee River Collective 1977). The 
concept of intersectionality, as it is now most commonly called, highlights the fact 
that oppression experienced by heterosexual white middle-class women is different 
from oppression experienced by non-heterosexual, black, or poor women (Cren-
shaw 1989). Accordingly, feminists were challenged to understand how such fac-
tors as race, gender, and class affect the status of women (hooks 2014). As Mikkola 
puts it, “Feminists must be able to address cultural and social differences in gender 
construction if feminism is to be a genuinely inclusive movement and be careful 
not to posit commonalities that mask important ways in which women qua women 
differ” (2019).
As various positions on how to define “woman” emerged and were debated in 
feminist theory in the 1970s and 1980s, Linda Martín Alcoff provided a summary 
and analysis that was and continues to be influential. Alcoff described the debate 
between “cultural feminists” and “poststructuralist feminists” over the question of 
essentialism as presenting an identity crisis for feminist theory (1988, 2006). She 
describes feminist authors Mary Daly and Adrienne Rich, among others, as exam-
ples of cultural feminists, and concludes that the virtue of cultural feminism—
the desire to valorize traditionally marginalized or neglected attributes of women, 
especially as caregivers—nonetheless reproduces an essentialist gender binary:
To the extent cultural feminism merely valorized genuinely positive attrib-
utes developed under oppression, it cannot map our long-range course. To 
the extent that it reinforces essentialist explanations of these attributes, it is 
in danger of solidifying an important bulwark for sexist oppression: the belief 
in an innate “womanhood” to which we must all adhere lest we be deemed 
either inferior or not “ ‘true’ women.”
(2006, 139)11
Poststructuralist feminism, for Alcoff, overcorrects by embracing a philosophy 
of language that deems the category of “woman” a fiction that feminists should 
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dismantle. In a poststructuralist framework, linguistic categories that construct 
and constrain our understanding of our identity and our “self ” are wholly an 
effect of the dominant discourse. Thus there is no self, or autonomous subject, 
to be freed from oppression. Alcoff counts Michel Foucault, Jacque Derrida, and 
Julia Kristeva as the most influential writers in this vein (2006, 139–142). Alcoff’s 
argument, put most simply, is that such a position amounts to feminism self-
destructing: “Poststructuralism thus threatens to deconstruct the feminist subject 
as well as the female subject, and thus threatens to wipe out feminism itself ” 
(2006, 142).
As an alternative, Alcoff offers what she describes as positionality. Reproductive 
roles are especially visible phenomena that “positions” women and men quite dif-
ferently. However: “Gender identity is not exhaustively determined by biology; 
it is not ahistorical or universally the same. Thus there is no gender essence all 
women share. But gender is, among other things, a position one occupies and from 
which one can act politically” (2006, 147–148, emphasis added).
Alcoff’s account was published initially in 1988. Since that time, feminists have 
continued to debate over definitions or other ways to characterize “woman.” Mik-
kola provides a recent summary of feminists who believe that “the articulation of 
an inclusive category of women to be the prerequisite for effective feminist politics” 
(2019). She suggests the various positions can be grouped as either “gender nomi-
nalist—positions that deny there is something women qua women share and that 
seek to unify women’s social kind by appealing to something external to women,” 
or “gender realist—positions that take there to be something women qua women 
share” (2019).
Nominalism as a philosophical approach eschews belief in universals or 
abstract entities such as Plato’s Ideal Forms. With respect to the practice of 
definitions, a nominalist approach posits that we use words to group particular 
objects into meaningful categories. Thus, “woman” does not refer to a timeless 
essence of womanhood or womanness, but is a word we use to group together 
individual human beings in a meaningful way based on perceived similarity. 
Mikkola describes this category of feminist nominalists as sharing a belief in 
“resemblance nominalism” (2019). Such a position is consistent with the phi-
losophy of language found in the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958), 
who argued that we learn to use certain words by being taught to perceive a 
“family resemblance” among particular instances of the category the word rep-
resents, though there may well be no attributes shared by all and only members 
of the category.
An example of a gender nominalist approach is provided by Natalie Stoljar 
(1995, 2011), who argues that the concept of gender is a cluster concept:
that is, there is a cluster of different features in our concept of woman and in 
order for an individual to satisfy the concept, it is sufficient (and necessary) to 
satisfy enough of, rather than all and only, the features in the cluster.
(2011, 42; see also 1995, 288)
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Similar to Wittgenstein’s description of family resemblance, Stoljar notes that 
“Women constitute a type on the basis of the (natural and social) similarities among 
the members of the type” (2011, 42).
Gender realists (generally) seek to identify real-world attributes to define 
members of a category. It might be useful here to revisit philosopher William 
James’ comments about essentialism. As noted earlier, James argues that claims of 
“essence” are guided by human purposes that change over time, and “there is no 
property absolutely essential to any one thing”; rather, “the same property which 
figures as the essence of a thing on one occasion becomes a very inessential feature 
on another” (1981, 959). James’s point is that which particular attribute is deemed 
“essential” is a matter of relative, not absolute, choice. For example:
A substance like oil has as many different essences as it has uses to differ-
ent individuals. One man (sic) conceives it as a combustible, another as a 
lubricator, another as a food; the chemist thinks of it as a hydro-carbon; 
the furniture-maker as a darkener of wood; the speculator as a commodity 
whose market price today is this and tomorrow that. The soap-boiler, the 
physicist, the clothes-scourer severally ascribe to it other essences in relation 
to their needs.
(1981, 962n)
Thus, whether one embraces the term “essentialism” or not, how one defines 
“woman” depends on the definitive attribute(s) one considers most important. 
Earlier I quoted a developmental biologist who, for her purposes, defined females 
and males as “organisms producing sperm/eggs” since for her purposes the pro-
duction of sperm or eggs (gametes) is “the key feature of biological sex” (Helm 
2020). By contrast, feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger’s approach is, in her 
terms, ameliorative; that is, her aim is to elucidate which gender concepts best 
help feminists achieve their purposes (Haslanger 2000). Accordingly, Haslanger 
emphasizes political status along with perceived biological role as the key defini-
tive attributes:
S  is a woman  iff
df
 [if and only if, by definition] S  is systematically subordi-
nated along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is 
“marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily fea-
tures presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.
(2003, 6)
Haslanger’s approach is distinctive because it explicitly acknowledges the purpose 
of generating the definition, which is consistent with the pragmatic approach to 
definition I advocate. And she puts her cards on the table by identifying the attrib-
utes that she sees as most valuable and important for feminists to consider. More 
recently, Haslanger has taken what can be called a context-sensitive approach when 
she notes that “sex differentiation occurs within a framework of social meaning” 
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and “because there are different frameworks of social meaning, different ways of 
drawing sex differences will be adequate to those frameworks” (2016, 134).12
Approaching the question of what counts as a “woman” from the standpoint of 
philosophy of language, Jennifer Saul describes a somewhat similar (pragmatic and 
context-sensitive) linguistic approach:
X is a woman is true in a context C iff [if and only if] X is human and rel-
evantly similar (according to the standards at work in C) to most of those 
possessing all of the biological markers of female sex.
(2012, 201, notes omitted)
Saul clarifies that by “biological markers” she is
referring to those traits commonly taken to be biological which are commonly 
associated with female sex. Which traits are actually biological, which traits are 
in fact associated with female sex, and what the terms “biological” and “sex” 
mean are matters of significant controversy.
(2012, 214)
To anticipate the next section of the chapter, I  should note that Saul ultimately 
rejects this definition because it does not do justice to the “womanhood claims of 
trans women” (208).
Esa Díaz-León replied to Saul to advocate a contextualist approach that reso-
nates with the pragmatic approach to definition taken in this book and my earlier 
work (Schiappa 2003):
My proposal, then, is that we should understand the relevant standards at 
issue in a context as those that are relevant for practical purposes (where 
these are broadly conceived to include theoretical, prudential, moral, politi-
cal, and even aesthetic values). On this view, then, when someone utters a 
sentence of the form “X is a woman,” that utterance will be true if and only 
if X is similar to most females with respect to the standards that are relevant 
in X’s context, given the practical purposes that are relevant in this con-
text, where this should be determined by our best theoretical and normative 
considerations.
(2016, 249)13
Ásta (formerly published as Ásta Sveinsdóttir) offers a contextual account of 
gender in which gender is a conferred social status. Sex and gender are social catego-
ries and in different contexts different attributes serve as possible base features for 
the conferral of gender (role in biological reproduction, sexual role, self-identifi-
cation, etc.). Thus, for Ásta, “disputes over what it is to be a woman are disputes 
over what feature should be the base property for the conferral of the institutional 
or communal status woman in a particular context” (2018, 90). Ásta concludes that 
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the question “what is a woman?” must be replaced with a context-specific question 
“who should be a woman?” (2018, 90).
Iris Marion Young tries to avoid the problems of essentialism by describing 
gender as seriality (1994). Because women are marked as women within their daily 
lives (a “milieu of action”), they form a social series or collective, conceptually 
independent of their intersectional particularities:
Each person’s identity is unique—the history and meaning she makes and 
develops from her dealings with other people, her communicative interac-
tions through media, and her manner of taking up the particular serialized 
structures whose prior history position her. No individual woman’s identity, 
then, will escape the markings of gender, but how gender marks her life is 
her own.
(1994, 734)
Theodore Bach advocates an approach he describes as historical essentialism: 
“The essential property of women, in virtue of which an individual is a member 
of the kind ‘women,’ is participation in a lineage of women” (2012, 271). That 
is to say, for Bach, the most important attribute that should be used to delineate 
“woman” is that a particular example “must be a reproduction of ancestral women, 
in which case she must have undergone the ontogenetic [socialization] processes 
through which a historical gender system replicates women” (2012, 271).
Charlotte Witt suggests that gender is a “mega social role” that unifies and 
determines an individual’s various social roles (2011). Because gender identity is 
“essential” to individuals’ sense of normative unity, she describes her version of 
essentialism “uniessentialism” to distinguish it from other forms, including biologi-
cal essentialism. She concludes: “gender is essential to social individuals because 
gender normatively unifies social role occupiers so that an individual social agent 
exists” (2011, 80).
Not all feminists agree that a shared definition or understanding of “woman” is 
necessary. Notably, Judith Butler (whose work is discussed in Chapter 2) suggests 
that feminists should understand “woman” as open-ended and “a term in process, 
a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end. As an 
ongoing discursive practice, it is open to intervention and resignification” (1999, 
43). She warns that the construction of the category of women “as a coherent and 
stable subject” could unwittingly reify gender relations in a manner “contrary to 
feminist aims” (1999, 9, see also 19–20).
As abbreviated at the preceding summary is, there are two aspects of the debate 
over “women” in feminist writing I wish to address before turning to the Transgen-
der Exigency. First, the debate continues in part because that is what philosophers 
and theorists do. That is not meant as a criticism, but simply an acknowledg-
ment that a) though superficially the scholarship is about the conceptualization of 
“woman,” in some cases authors are asking somewhat distinct, refined questions 
that require different approaches to answer, and b) early feminist efforts to define 
Feminisms 161
“woman” were written without always considering transgender and DSD people, 
and feminists now are sincerely trying to enhance their accounts accordingly.
Scholars identify an important question and identify weaknesses with current 
answers in order to provide their own answer. So, for example, Lena Gunnarsson 
offers a defense of the category “women” from the standpoint of the philosophy 
of “Critical Realism” (2011) while Katharine Jenkins seeks to amend Haslanger’s 
ameliorative approach (2016) and Ásta’s conferralist approach (2020a). That is how 
scholarly knowledge grows and improves, and how academics become members of 
what John Frow calls the “knowledge class” (1995).
Second, there is no way to settle the matter once and for all. Definitions serve 
different interests and values and it is simply not the case that being a feminist guar-
antees complete alignment of those interests and values, especially when some of 
those interests are specific to academic subfields such as metaphysics, epistemology, 
or ethics. Furthermore, unlike the previous contexts described in chapters 4–8, 
there is no institution with the authority to impose a singular regulatory defini-
tion. Colleges and K-12 schools have the power to define who they will count as 
a woman for the purposes of admission. The NCAA has the power to define who 
counts as a woman or man for the purposes of competition. But no one is in a posi-
tion of power to declare one feminist philosopher’s definition to be “correct” and 
others wrong. In fact, philosophy thrives by keeping the argument open, which is 
the opposite of the sort of closure one seeks with a regulatory definition.
The Transgender Exigency
Talia Mae Bettcher begins her entry “Feminist Perspectives on Trans Issues” in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy with considerable understatement: “The relation-
ship between feminism and transgender theory and politics is surprisingly fraught” 
(2020). Indeed. The debates described in the previous section were, for the most 
part, limited to scholarly books and articles that went through peer review and are 
written mostly in a decorous academic style. The debate concerning transgender 
women’s place in feminism has becomes visible, messy, and arguably indecorous 
in the past decade as it spread to blogs and online forums, as well into popular, 
nonacademic, venues.14
Some of the earliest feminist reactions to transgender women (then referred to 
as transsexuals) were openly hostile. The primary objection was that transgender 
women did not count as real women—thus an implicit regulatory definition of 
“Only those born as female count as women for the purposes of the women’s 
movement.” This sentiment can be found in the Women’s Movement of the 1970s. 
At a 1973 conference, Robin Morgan denounced a transgender woman (Beth 
Elliot) who was one of the conference organizers and unsuccessfully called for 
Elliot’s expulsion: “If transvestite or transsexual males are oppressed, then let them 
band together and organize against that oppression, instead of leeching off women 
who have spent entire lives as women in women’s bodies” (1973, 32; reprinted in 
Morgan 1977). She described Elliot as an “opportunist, an infiltrator,” with the 
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mentality of a rapist who operates by deception (1973, 32). Not long after, Mary 
Daly wrote in her influential Gyn/Ecology that, “Transsexualism is an example of 
male surgical siring which invades the female world with substitutes” (1978, 71).
Perhaps the best-known critique is found in Janice Raymond’s The Transsexual 
Empire: The Making of the She-Male  (1979). To make a long story short, the key 
definitional argument of the book is that sex is a matter of biology and biology-
motivated socialization: “Maleness and femaleness are governed by certain chro-
mosomes, and the subsequent history of being a chromosomal male or female” 
(Raymond 1979, 4). In Bettcher’s assessment: “Raymond maintains that MTF 
transsexuals are really men and FTM transsexuals are really women” (2020). The 
key political argument of the book is that “transsexuals” reinforce “the foundation 
of sex-role oppression” (Raymond 1979, 18). The key to liberation is to transcend 
masculinity and femininity rather than replicate them (Raymond 1979, 164).
A preface added to Raymond’s 1994 edition of the book updates her terminol-
ogy with the word “transgender,” but repeats her core criticism of those seeking to 
transition from male to female; namely, that the practice reinforces traditional gender 
stereotypes that perpetuate sexism:
if the outcome of such a sex reassignment is to endorse a femininity which, in 
many transsexuals, becomes a caricature of much that feminists have rejected 
about man-made femininity, then where is the challenge, the transgression, 
and the breaking of any real boundaries?
(1994, xiii–xix)
Raymond makes a point to try to avoid the charge of biological essentialism by 
stressing the distinctive history that cisgender women experience. As this is a point 
that other feminists share, it is worth quoting at length:
Affirming that transsexual surgery cannot change the basic biology of chro-
mosomal sex is not to say that chromosomal sex defines gender. But in some 
very real senses, female biology shapes female history—a history that men 
don’t have because of their sex—including the history of menstruation, the 
history of pregnancy or the capacity to become pregnant, the history of 
childbirth and abortion, the history of certain bodily cycles and life changes, 
and the history of female subordination in a male-dominant society.
(1994, xx)
There were occasional contexts where a regulatory definition was in place and 
enforced, such as the Michigan’s Womyn’s Music Festival. The festival was held 
annually from 1976 to 2015 and was restricted to “womyn-born womyn.” The 
festival’s founder, Lisa Vogel, explained that
The Festival, for a single precious week, is intended for womyn who at 
birth were deemed female, who were raised as girls, and who identify as 
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womyn. I believe that womyn-born womyn (WBW) is a lived experience 
that constitutes its own distinct gender identity.
(Vogel 2013)
She rejected the idea that excluding transgender women was “transphobic” and 
suggested that other groups, including transgender women, could organize their 
own spaces: “I believe in the integrity of autonomous space used to gather and cel-
ebrate for any group, whether that autonomous space is defined by age, race, eth-
nicity, sexual orientation, ability, gender, class or any other identity” (2013). Thus, 
in addition to on-going philosophical and political debates taking place, there were 
physical contexts where transgender women were excluded.
In contrast to those who would exclude transgender women from the cate-
gory of “women,” some feminists offered definitions or frameworks that explicitly 
include transgender women. In the previous section I mentioned several examples, 
and to those examples I wish to add two more. The first is philosopher Naomi 
Scheman, who compares one’s status as being a woman with the status of being a 
secular Jew (1997, 2016). Just as there are people born into the category “Jew,” so 
are there people born into the category “woman” (1997, 144). Accordingly, just 
as one can convert to Judaism as a religion, Scheman believes one can analogically 
consider transgender women as converting to womanhood. Both subject positions 
have historically been the object of prejudice—misogyny for women, anti-Semi-
tism for Jews. Transgender women are women not by some sort of strict definition, 
but from their family resemblance and their willingness to be in solidarity with 
cisgender women in the face of oppression: “The issue, then, is not who is or is 
not really whatever, but who can be counted on when they come for any one of 
us: The solid ground is not identity but loyalty and solidarity” (1997, 152–153).
The second example is Talia Mae Bettcher, perhaps the most prolific transgen-
der philosopher writing today. Bettcher argues against the prevalent models for 
understanding transgender individuals, such as the “born in the wrong body” 
model, and wants to make room for transgender people who do, or do not, accept 
the traditional gender binary, as well as those who do or do not seek to transition 
surgically (2013, 2014). Self-identification as women by transgender individuals 
ought to be taken as the presumptive valid starting place for transgender theory 
and politics (2013, 245–246). Prioritizing “First-Person Authority” for transgender 
people (2009), Bettcher argues for a two-step definitional process. First, that “trans 
woman” applies “unproblematically and without qualification to all trans women,” if she 
states she is a woman, regardless of whether there are surgical or hormonal changes 
in her body (2013, 241, emphasis in original). Second, “being a trans woman is a 
sufficient condition for being a woman” (241). Recognizing that there are institu-
tions (such as jail) that segregate sex in a biological essentialist manner, Bettcher 
describes a “multiple meaning” approach that distinguishes between woman-R 
(“women” in the resistant sense) and woman-D (“woman” in the dominant sense). 
Transgender oppression stems from a denial of the authenticity of self-identification 
and what she describes as “reality enforcement” when specific physical criteria 
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(such as surgery) are used to “verify” one’s status (2007). As long as reality enforce-
ment takes place (and arguably, all regulatory definitions discussed in this book are 
types of reality enforcement), transgender people are typically viewed as deceivers 
and make-believers, a status that fuels transphobia and its attendant violence (2007, 
2020).
Though most feminist theorists now support the inclusion of transgender 
women, there are exceptions. Susan Stryker and Bettcher describe a wave of back-
lash to the emergence of transgender rights within the last decade, in part fueled 
by feminists (2016). Some have come to be described as TERFs or Gender Critical 
Feminists. The term TERF stands for Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminists and 
was (apparently) coined by feminist writer Viv Smythe in 2008 (Smythe 2018). 
Smythe simply wanted an abbreviated way to refer to what she considered trans-
hostile rhetoric from some feminists, especially in the UK. Since that time, the 
TERF label took on sufficiently negative connotations that it has largely been 
replaced by those so identified with the phrase “gender critical feminists.” For 
some, TERF is a “slur” that has been used as “hate speech,” especially on social 
media (Dyess 2018).15 For others, gender critical feminists are a transphobic “cult” 
(Parsons 2020). The typically staid prose of academic philosophers has spilled into 
public debate and the arguments have grown quite heated at times.
A self-described group of “gender-critical and radical feminist academic phi-
losophers,” including Sophie Allen, Jane Clare Jones, Holly Lawford-Smith, Mary 
Leng, Rebecca Reilly-Cooper, and Kathleen Stock contend that women, “by 
definition, are adult human females” and thus, “no trans woman is correctly cat-
egorised as a woman” (2019). Philosopher Alex Byrne has published a series of 
articles titled by questions, which he answers in a manner consistent with “gender 
critical” theorists: “Is sex socially constructed?” No (2018). “What is gender iden-
tity?” The answer remains elusive (2019). “Are women adult human females?” Yes. 
Since “trans women are not female,” they cannot be defined as women, simpliciter 
(2020).16
Sheila Jeffreys published the most critical of the critical gender positions since 
Janice Raymond’s The Transsexual Empire in her book, Gender Hurts: A Feminist 
Analysis of the Politics of Transgenderism (2014). Jeffreys argues that transgender 
women perpetuate the sort of gender-based stereotypes that second wave feminism 
sought to end:
Transgenderism depends for its very existence on the idea that there is an 
‘essence’ of gender, a psychology and pattern of behaviour, which is suited 
to persons with particular bodies and identities. This is the opposite of the 
feminist view, which is that the idea of gender is the foundation of the politi-
cal system of male domination.
(2014, 1)
Jeffreys further argues that surgical transition and long-term hormone use are 
harmful to transgender people’s bodies, and transition treatment for children and 
Feminisms 165
young adults, such as puberty blockers and hormone therapy, are akin to eugenics. 
Most salient to this project, Jeffreys joins other “gender-critical” feminists in criti-
cizing efforts to open up women-only contexts to transgender women:
If women’s services and spaces, which are fundamental to the possibilities of 
feminist revival in the present, are to continue or be created anew, then the 
right of women to gather without men, whether those are men who have 
transgendered or not, has to be promoted and respected.
(2014, 181–182)17
The debate has become so acrimonious that the critics sometimes have called 
for denying “gender critical” scholars a public platform, describing their speech 
as offensive and unacceptable (Goldberg 2014). There have been protests for 
providing a public platform for such philosophers as Kathleen Stock (Conkerton-
Darby et al. 2019) and one graduate student in philosophy announced that she 
was leaving academic philosophy because of its “transphobia problem” (t phi-
losopher 2019).
One’s standing as an icon of feminism has not prevented “no-platform” 
efforts. Germaine Greer, a major figure in Second-Wave Feminism and author 
of The Female Eunuch (1970), has expressed on occasion what she describes 
as an “opinion” that “M-to-F transgender people are [not] women.” Going 
through surgery, she said, “does not make them a woman” (BBC News 2015a). 
Her views resulted in an unsuccessful Change.org petition to prevent her from 
speaking at Cardiff University in 2015.18 Greer’s talk, titled “Women & Power: 
The Lessons of the 20th Century,” discussed “the suffragette movement, the 
‘nightmare’ of the corporate world, equal pay, systematic sexual abuse of vul-
nerable girls and abortion” (Morris 2015). She did mention transgender issues, 
but when asked about the matter during Question and Answer she replied 
“They [trans people] are not my issue. It should be perfectly clear why not. 
I think 51% of the world’s population is enough for me to be going on with” 
(in Morris 2015). When pressed on the fact that transgender people are being 
killed in the United States because of their status, she pointed to domestic vio-
lence that women experience: “We have two women a week being murdered 
in England by their partners” (Morris 2015).
The debate has been especially fierce in the UK because of efforts to broaden 
the terms of the Gender Recognition Act of 2004. As noted last chapter, under that 
law, transgender persons can obtain a “Gender Recognition Certificate” (GRC) if 
they are 18 or over, have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, have lived in an 
“acquired” gender for at least two years, and intend to live in that gender for the 
rest of their life (Gov.UK 2020). The law was groundbreaking as a nation-wide 
effort to provide transgender people legal recognition. Nonetheless, the law was 
criticized by transgender activists as making it too difficult and costly to get a GRC, 
and by the government’s own estimates fewer than 3% of transgender people in 
the UK have obtained a GRC (Mordaunt 2018).19 The government provided an 
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opportunity for citizens to comment on proposed changes that would rely on self-
identification and received over 108,000 responses. This period of consultation 
spurred at least some gender critical feminists to weigh in against self-identification 
being codified into law (see, e.g., Stock 2018). In September  2020, the Boris 
Johnson administration announced it had taken steps to make GRCs less expen-
sive and easier to obtain, but set aside the self-identification measure that Theresa 
May’s administration had favored (Truss 2020). The decision was condemned by 
transgender rights advocates and welcomed by “gender critical” women’s groups 
(Anonymous [The Economist] 2020).
In September 2020 the Manchester Centre for Political Theory held their 17th 
annual Workshops of Political Theory, and it included a program titled “What is 
gender and what do we want it to be?” The program included a number of papers 
that revisit the question of defining “woman” and the implications for transgender 
women. It is safe to assume that feminist theorists and philosophers will continue 
to explore the question of how to define “women.”
Conclusion
It would be an act of extreme hubris to pretend I have anything approaching a solu-
tion to the debate within feminism about how to define “woman.” I agree with 
those, such as Mari Mikkola, who advocate giving up “the quest” as it has gener-
ated “an analytical impasse that looks unsurpassable” (2019). Philosopher Richard 
Robinson describes the “What is X?” form of question as “the vaguest of all forms 
of questions” and rejects the impulse to generate a single, correct, “real” definition 
in response to “What is X?” questions (1950, 190).20 His stance resonates with 
Richard Rorty’s pragmatism, which rejects the notion of a “final” philosophical 
vocabulary with which to describe the world and argues that we have no choice 
but “to face up to the contingency of the language we use” (1989, 9). Our linguistic 
categories are made, not found, and how they are made is driven by our needs and 
interests (Schiappa 2003).
In a retrospective essay about her “Queering the Center” essay, Scheman sug-
gests that the continuing debate has “too often been waged as though one or 
another side needs to win, with an insistence that what should emerge is a single, 
unitary, clear, and precise definition of what it is to be a woman,” which she argues 
is both impossible and undesirable (2016, 215). She concludes with a call for mutu-
ally respectful coalitions:
rather than trans women’s arguing that there is some core meaning 
of woman that as a matter of fact includes them, or defiantly claiming the 
right to self-identify as women freed from any shared social understanding of 
what that means, there is more political hope in arguing against the currently 
normative understandings of gender (understandings that—of course for dif-
ferent reasons—cis-female feminists deplore) and struggling to find plural but 
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interrelated coalitional understandings that do justice to the wide range of 
gender’s discontents.
(2016, 218)
Scheman’s call for respectful coalitions resonates with Butler’s call for contingent 
coalition building: “Certain political practices institute identities on a contingent 
basis in order to accomplish whatever aims are in view. Coalitional politics requires 
neither an expanded category of ‘women’ nor an internally multiplicitous self that 
offers its complexity at once” (Butler 1999, 22).
There may be no way to broker peace with those who treat transgender peo-
ple as irredeemable, such as Raymond (1979), Jeffreys (2014), and, in the case of 
transgender men, Lothstein (1983).21 Setting that sort of extremism aside, I agree 
with Judith Butler’s recent “wager” that “most feminists support trans rights and 
oppose all forms of transphobia” (Ferber 2020). Relatedly, I  am confident that 
most feminists recognize that solidarity is a stronger political strategy than divi-
sion. I began this chapter with a summary of how women have been discrimi-
nated against, continue to be oppressed, and are too frequently victimized by 
violence. As described in Chapter 3, transgender people—especially transwomen 
of color—are also victims of discrimination and violence. It is that commonality 
that provides the basis for coalition building and solidarity. As Butler puts it, “we 
have to renew the feminist commitment to gender equality and gender freedom 
in order to affirm the complexity of gendered lives as they are currently being 
lived” (Ferber 2020).
In reporting the UK government’s decision not to implement self-identification 
for Gender Recognition Certificates, The Economist quotes professor of law Rosa 
Freedman as saying “we need a legal definition of four things: woman, female, 
sex and gender identity” (Anonymous 2020). As argued throughout this book, 
however, such a uniform legal definitional approach fails to recognize the com-
peting needs and interests served in different definitional contexts, let alone the 
history that informs such contexts. As discussed in more detail in the final chapter 
of this book, the considerations involved in deciding who gets to attend a single-
sex school, or which bathroom we use, or where one is housed in jail, or who 
competes with whom in sports, are all quite different. That is why those feminists 
who advocate a more pragmatic and contextual approach to definition have, in 
my opinion, the best chance of articulating definitional criteria that recognize our 
mutual humanity while also respecting the differences that mark us as historical, 
social creatures.
Notes
 1 t philosopher (2019).
 2 Serano (2007, 347).
 3 Chappell (2019).
 4 In Fischel (2019, 89).
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 5 I pluralize feminism to respect the fact that there are a number of feminist theories and 
movements, so diverse that it is “impossible to talk about feminism in terms other than 
the plural”; thus, “We can say that all feminists agree that women suffer social and/
or material inequities simply because of their biological identity and are committed to 
challenging this, but the means by which such challenges might be made are many and 
various” (Pilcher & Whelehan 2004, 48–49).
 6 The preceding paragraphs focus on the U.S. since that is the focus of the book. While 
in the U.S. women have freedoms not enjoyed by women in some countries that deny 
women the right to vote, work, or even drive, overall the U.S. does not compare world-
wide as favorably as the typical American might think. For a brief comparison, see 
Ravitz (2015).
 7 Translation suggested by my colleague Bruno Perreau. The sentence is translated by 
Borde and Malovany-Chevallier as “One is not born, but rather becomes, woman” 
(Beauvoir 2011, 283) and by Parshley as “One is not born, but rather becomes, a 
woman” (Beauvoir 1979, 259).
 8 “Aucun destin biologique, psychique, économique ne définit la figure que revêt au sein de la société 
la femelle humaine; c’est l’ensemble de la civilisation qui élabore ce produit intermédiaire entre le 
mâle et le castrat qu’on qualifie de féminin” (Beauvoir 1949, vol. 2, 13). NB: There are a 
number of early printings of the book and in some versions this famous passage appears 
near the end of volume 1; in others, near the start of volume 2. For some scholars, such 
as noted feminist theorist Judith Butler, Beauvoir here is introducing the distinction 
between sex and gender in a manner consistent with later authors (Butler 1986). But in 
other comments Beauvoir seems to tie her definition of “woman” to anatomy (Byrne 
2020, fn 11) and the matter is complicated by the fact that the French word sexe can be 
translated either as “sex” or “gender.”
 9 I discuss the problems with the idea of “real definitions” in my earlier book on defini-
tions (Schiappa 2003, Chapter 3).
 10 My summaries in this chapter are abridged to the point they run the risk of reproducing 
what historian Leslie Butler calls “glib assumptions of continuity or genealogy” (2012, 
169). I can only plead “no contest” to the charge and hope that my narrative is helpful 
even if it is the proverbial tip of a fascinating and complex historical iceberg.
 11 It is often overlooked that some cultural feminists saw gay men as part of the enemy 
rather than as allies, as they are more typically depicted in contemporary feminist schol-
arship. Adrienne Rich, for example, decried the culture of homosexual men as “patriar-
chal” and “tainted by profound hatred for women” (1979, 225). On the complex history 
of gay men and feminist women, see Scott (2020).
 12 Arguably, Haslanger’s later formulation is compatible with her earlier definition because 
there she was defining “woman” for the purposes of feminist activism.
 13 For a response to Saul’s and Díaz-León’s contextualism that describes “polysemy ambi-
guity theory,” see Laskowski (2020). Zeman (2020) also engages Díaz-León’s to identify 
areas that may be usefully explored further.
 14 For an account of the ways in which—especially in the UK—the scholarly debate has 
become public, see the special issue of The Sociological Review titled “TERF Wars: Femi-
nism and the fight for transgender futures” edited by Ben Vincent, Sonja Erikainen, and 
Ruth Pearce (2020).
 15 Dyess wrote an oft-cited essay titled “TERF Is Hate Speech and It’s Time to Condemn 
It” in 2018 but has since come to regret the post and describes gender critical feminists 
as homophobic, transphobic extremists (Parsons 2020).
 16 Byrne’s paper, “Are women adult human females?” (2020) has been responded to by 
Dembroff (2021); see also Byrne’s reply (2021).
 17 For critiques of Gender Hurts see Bresser (2016), Bucur (2017), and Johnston (2014).
 18 A counter-petition was also created on Change.org in support of Cardiff’s hosting of 
Greer that obtained over 3,000 signatures. On the topic of deplatforming or censuring 
critical gender authors, see also 12 Leading Scholars (2019) and Lance (2019).
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 19 In September 2020, the Minister for Women and Equalities claimed that “of those who 
had completed their transition, around 2 in 5 said that they had a Gender Recognition 
Certificate, a higher proportion than is often believed” (Truss 2020). It is unclear how 
many people that proportion represents, since those who have completed transition 
represents an unspecified fraction of those who consider themselves transgender.
 20 Not all contemporary philosophers would agree. See, for example, Rosen (2015).
 21 Lothstein pathologizes female-to-male “transsexuals” and opposes sex-reassignment sur-
gery: “No matter how entrenched the child’s cross-gender identity and role, every effort 
should be made to treat the problem psychologically, identify the current stressors (and 
removing them) and prescribing long-term intensive psychotherapy” (1983, 306).

PART III
What now?    
Transgender voices
“Although I think the Utopian ideal of a genderless society is perhaps interesting, I don’t 
think it sounds like a society I’d like to live in. I like gender, I just don’t like the amount 
of meaning we attach to it. What if gender carried no more meaning than color. What if 
I wore masculinity today in the same way I wore the color green?”
Anonymous1
“During the late 1990s shortly after my transition I had called up a male dean at Harvard 
and asked him if Harvard could change my degree to the women’s college, Radcliffe. ‘Oh, 
I don’t think we can do that.’ ‘But the U. S. State Department,’ I whined, ‘had no trouble 
changing my passport from male to female.’ Pause. Then with a smile in his voice, ‘Yes. 
But Harvard is older than the U.S. Department of State.’
Goodness. Some things never change.”
Deirdre Nansen McCloskey2
“It is dangerously naïve to assume that men would never self-declare as women with 
nefarious motives. Most men probably wouldn’t, but those who might are the ones that 
cause concern. Women’s boundaries are hardly secure if they have to rely on the assumption 
that men wouldn’t do that, would they?”
Debbie Hayton, teacher and author3
“As a matter of public policy, it is important to recognize that there are some single-sex 
contexts where we need to set some bar to assess eligibility beyond self-identification. The 
question is where the line is going to be drawn. We also need to be careful to proceed in a 
manner that does not erase gender self-identification altogether—without which it is hard 
for the concept of transgender to exist.”
Jami K. Taylor4  
DOI: 10.4324/9781003250494-14
Ask yourself how you would define the category “human.” Aristotle was the first 
in Western philosophy for whom there is extensive evidence documenting efforts 
to answer such a question and, like many who followed, he focused on how to 
distinguish humans from other animals based on our linguistic and rational facul-
ties. In Joanna Bourke’s important historical survey, she describes many efforts to 
define what it means to be human, noting at the outset that “It turns out that the 
concept ‘human’ is very volatile. In every period of history and every culture, com-
monsensical constructions of ‘the human’ and ‘the animal’ exist, but the distinction 
is constantly undermined and re-constructed” (2011, 13). Reaching a consensus 
on how to define “human” is quite difficult: “conventional distinctions between 
human and nonhuman animals are applied inconsistently, or are simply wrong. Is 
intellectual ability the crucial criterion? Or self-consciousness? Or the possession of 
a soul? Or toolmaking? Or private property? Or genetic inheritance?” (15).
In Defining Reality, I argue that new definitions should be thought of as pre-
scriptive and theory-bound (2003, 49–68). That is, a new definition is a proposal 
for how we ought to use a term in the future. And definitions depend on a set of 
beliefs about the world that can be described as a theory. Paul T. Sagal suggests 
that asking “what is [x] questions” is tantamount to asking for a “rigorous, con-
sistent, complete theory” that would include “an implicit definition of x” (1973, 
446–447). For those reasons, efforts to define “human” are competing theories that 
are informed by specific beliefs about the world, including biological, psychologi-
cal, economic, political, legal, and religious beliefs. The beliefs considered most 
important or valuable to a thinker will be the ones that influence which traits of 
human beings are deemed most “essential” or definitive. As needs, interests, and 
values change over time, so do theories of what is human. And those theories have 
proven to have important implications for answering such crucial questions as: Are 
women persons? Are the enslaved human? Do animals have rights? (Bourke 2011).
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Given how difficult it is to define “human,” it should come as no surprise that 
it is equally challenging to define “woman” and “man.”5 That is, if it seems impos-
sible or at least implausible to determine a “final” definition of “human” that 
meets all potential stakeholders’ needs and interests, then it seems straightforward 
to accept Rebecca Solnit’s claim that “There is no one-size-fits-all definition of 
what a woman [or man] is” (2020). On one hand, a too-narrowly tailored bio-
logical definition erases transgender, nonbinary, gender-fluid, and DSD people and 
perpetuates biological essentialism—a key source of sexist prejudice throughout 
much of history. On the other hand, pure autonomous nominalism—gender-fluid 
self-identification unfettered by time or place—denies the possibility of legitimate 
concerns in specific sex-segregated contexts, as described in Part II of this book. 
Once we set aside the need for a one-size-fits-all set of definitions, then we are able 
to look at issues such as who should have the power to define, whose interests are 
being served, and above all the purpose a given definition is serving in a specific 
context.
In my earlier book on definitions, I argued that when we are faced with a defi-
nitional rupture the “What is X?” question needs to be replaced with questions 
such as, “How ought we use the word X given our needs and interests?” “What is 
the purpose of defining X?,” and “What should count as X in context C?” I advo-
cated a pragmatic approach that sees definitions as made not found, and treats the 
definitional process as one involving important ethical questions of values, interests, 
and power. This book has been an effort to apply such an approach to compet-
ing definitions of sex and gender emerging in the 21st century amid what I have 
described as the Transgender Exigency.
Defining with purpose
The first theme of this conclusion is that we need to define with purpose. The 
purpose in defining sex/gender can vary significantly in different contexts. When 
I asked college-aged Anastazy, who identifies as a nonbinary transgender man, how 
they fill out paperwork that asks about gender, they replied that it depended on 
the context:
If it’s for something that isn’t medical related, I put male. For medical stuff 
I put female since it’s what my body is, and it makes sure that I can get the 
most care I need. If things were my way, there would be a section where you 
could fill in the blank. That way it is easier for each person to explain their 
gender, and it takes some of the stigma away of being trans.
(Anastazy 2020)
The challenge of defining sex/gender for transgender patients in medical 
contexts is underscored by a tragic case recounted in the New England Journal 
of Medicine when a transgender man was admitted into the emergency depart-
ment with lower abdominal pain (Stroumsa et  al. 2019). “Sam” (a pseudonym) 
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had not transitioned surgically, though he had previously been taking testosterone 
and presented as a man. Sam was, in fact, pregnant. He had had a positive result 
with a home pregnancy test that morning, and despite the fact that the triage nurse 
ordered a pregnancy test (a serum hCG test), she “did not incorporate that possibil-
ity [of pregnancy] into the differential diagnosis in a way that would affect ensuing 
classifications and triage decision making”; as a result, he was not treated with the 
urgency that his and the baby’s health required. A team of doctors analyzing the 
case after the fact concluded that “the triage nurse did not fully absorb the fact that 
he did not fit clearly into a binary classification system with mutually exclusive 
male and female categories”: A cisgender woman with the same symptoms would 
have been “directed to urgent obstetric evaluation” (Stroumsa et al. 2019). Sam was 
not treated immediately and lost the baby due to undiagnosed umbilical cord pro-
lapse. Doctors concluded that “earlier evaluation might have resulted in detection 
of the cord prolapse in time to prevent fetal death” (Stroumsa et al. 2019).
The challenge is not solely a matter of definition, but also to advance supportive 
and understanding attitudes and behaviors toward transgender people in all con-
texts, especially when it relates to issues of health and safety. A more flexible and 
pragmatic approach to understanding sex/gender would encourage us to think 
about our identities as multifaceted, such that no tension is felt between saying I am 
a man and (not “but”) medically you need to check me for pregnancy.
Such flexibility is not easy to put into practice. Aside from proper names, lan-
guage cannot function without categories. For those categories to “work,” they 
have to be shared and there has to be some level of what I have described as “deno-
tative conformity.” Categories succeed by excluding; that is, one’s understanding 
of X typically requires one to understand what is not-X. Much early language 
acquisition depends on learning prototypical exemplars of what “counts” as an X, 
and being corrected by more experienced language users when we “overextend” a 
category—by counting an orange as a ball, say—or “underextend” a category—by 
not counting a football or wiffle ball as a ball (Schiappa 2003, 11–29).
However, once a category gains wide acceptance, people adopt the “natural 
attitude” toward it; that is, we take the category as “given” (rather than socially 
constructed) and that is when all sorts of problems can emerge, including essen-
tialism, reductionism, and—in the case of categories of people—stereotypes and 
prejudice. Think of this cycle as the category paradox. That is, we benefit from 
categories as necessary tools to make sense of reality, but the same cognitive func-
tions that make shared categories socially useful (learning to recognize attributes of 
category X and to exclude not-X attributes) often carry the price of forgetting that 
categories are made not found, revisable and contingent social constructions rather 
than fixed realities. Ron Mallon calls this “the reification problem”: the “mistaken 
belief in the naturalness of a category can be one of the mechanisms by which the 
category is sustained” (2016, 216).
In the past 50 years, there has been growing recognition that the categories of 
“woman” and “man” are socially constructed, but what do we do with that recog-
nition? Ian Hacking in his useful book The Social Construction of What? describes 
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six gradations of social constructionist commitment: Historical, Ironic, Reformist, 
Unmasking, Rebellious, and Revolutionary. These gradations begin with the mod-
est acknowledgment that a particular category X is a product of history: “Someone 
presents a history of X and argues that X has been constructed in the course of 
social processes. Far from being inevitable, X is the contingent upshot of historical 
events” (1999, 19). At the other end of the spectrum are activists: “An activist who 
moves beyond the world of ideas and tries to change the world in respect of X is 
revolutionary” (1999, 20). Hacking correctly observes that with respect to “gender,” 
one finds the whole range of responses evident:
As our consciousness about gender is raised, some of us find our attitudes 
moving along from historical to ironic to reformist, and then to unmasking 
the function of gender relations. With the mask removed, we become rebel-
lious; a few become revolutionary.
(1999, 20–21)
The ongoing social and political conflicts surrounding transgender issues sug-
gest that, as a society, we are far from all being on the same page as far as how 
much of the world we are willing to change when it comes to sex/gender. At a 
minimum, I argue it is crucial that we collectively gather at the ironist/reformist 
stage. Hacking acknowledges that his label “irony” is informed by Richard Rorty’s 
description in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989). Hacking notes: “Irony about 
X is the recognition that X is highly contingent, the product of social history and 
forces, and yet something we cannot, in our present lives, avoid treating as part of 
the universe in which we interact with other people, the material world, and our-
selves” (1999, 20). Having acknowledged the historicity of sex/gender categories, 
we can do our best to improve those categories—a stance described by Hacking as 
Reformist: We may
have no idea at present how to live our lives without X, but having seen that 
X was not inevitable, in the present state of things, we can at least modify 
some aspects of X, in order to make X less of a bad thing. This is reformist 
constructionism.
(1999, 20)
For example, a strong reformist element can be seen in recent decades in the 
scholarship concerning the category of masculinity. We have come a long way from 
treating masculinity as an essential part of being a man. Instead, today masculinity 
is more likely to be seen as a historically and culturally contingent set of beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviors, or even an ideology. Indeed, since 2000, an academic 
journal has been dedicated entirely to the Psychology of Men & Masculinity. Schol-
ars have moved from treating masculinity as unidimensional to multi-dimensional 
(see Chapter 2), with a variety of measures of masculine norms in use. Moreover, 
important work by psychologists has investigated the harms of certain forms of 
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masculine role socialization, generally studied under the rubric of Gender Role 
Conflict (GRC).6 As of 2015, there have been 350 studies of GRC (O’Neil 2015, 
4). Masculine norms are changing in the United States, a fact that underscores the 
historical and cultural contingency of gender norms: “More than ever before, men 
are being allowed to be vulnerable, emotional human beings. This transition is 
hopeful and important, but painfully slow” (O’Neil 2015, 10).
Attitudes and beliefs about gender can now be thought of as ideology—that is, a 
set of culturally specific political beliefs. “Traditional Masculinity Ideology” (TMI) 
describes masculine norms that harken back to the time before the questioning of 
gender roles in the 1970s, including toughness, avoidance of femininity, negativity 
toward sexual minorities, dominance, and restrictive emotionality. TMI is rooted 
in “patriarchal, Western, heteronormative, and traditional perspectives of men” 
(Levant & Richmond 2016). Of course, one does not need to be born and raised 
male to embrace Traditional Masculinity Ideology, or to act on such ideology.7
To summarize the argument thus far: We are past the point where it is possible 
to stipulate a one-size-fits-all definition for male/female or woman/man. There 
is simply no good alternative to recognizing that sex/gender categories must be 
treated pragmatically. That is, in specific contexts we need to decide whether sex/
gender is even necessary to reference. When there are good reasons to do so, we 
need to define with purpose. Just as our contexts vary (for example, from a dating 
site to a doctor’s office), so too will the purpose of defining.
As I noted at the beginning of this book, I believe that self-identification, or 
first-person authority, should be presumptive. “Presumptive” does not mean abso-
lute and unfettered, however. As feminist philosopher Naomi Scheman, cited in 
the last chapter notes:
while it may often be just fine for me—as it ought to be just fine for a trans 
woman—to identify simply as a woman, it’s not solely up to me to determine 
when and why it might not be just fine: judgments of importance or appro-
priateness are not solely mine to make
(2018, 188)
So how do we make decisions about which contexts require something more—in 
particular, a regulatory definition? That is the question pursued in the next section.
When might self-identification not be enough?  
The imperfect analogy with race
Before I turn specifically to the issue of regulatory definitions impacting transgen-
der people, I want to discuss another definitional challenge that may serve as a 
useful though imperfect analogy.8 In particular, I want to consider what has been 
described as transracialism, hereafter referred to as trans-r.9 Trans-r people claim a 
racial identity for themselves that differs from what can be called their “birth race.” 
The most infamous recent example is Rachel Dolezal, a woman of white ancestry 
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and who identified as black and “passed” as black, at one point leading the Spo-
kane, Washington, branch of the NAACP before she was “outed” as white in 2015.
Dolezal is not the only self-identified trans-r person in recent history. German 
model/actress Martina Adam (or “Martina Big”), who now goes by the name 
Malaika Kubwa, was born white but underwent dermatological treatment to 
darken her skin and now claims an African identity (Big 2020). Jessica A. Krug was 
a professor of history and Africana Studies at George Washington University who 
revealed on September 3, 2020 that she was born to white parents but had been 
passing as a black woman throughout her professional life (Lumpkin & Svrluga 
2020). I  shall return to Krug’s case below, but since her revelation, at least one 
other white person has confessed to similar efforts to pass as non-white (Vee 2020).
In 2017, prompted by sympathetic media coverage of Caitlyn Jenner and 
negative coverage of Rachel Dolezal, philosopher Rebecca Tuvel published “In 
Defense of Transracialism,” in which she suggests that “similar arguments that sup-
port transgenderism support transracialism” (2017, 275n). Tuvel’s essay was not 
the first philosophical paper to explore such a thesis (see Heyes 2006; Overall 
2004), but the publication of her essay in the leading journal of feminist philosophy 
ignited an academic firestorm. It is not necessary for the purposes of this project to 
review (let alone resolve) the various issues of contention involved.10 The threads 
from the academic discussion of Dolezal’s case that I want to draw attention to are 
those that reflect the need to triangulate among three issues: Who has the right to 
define, the purpose of defining, and specific contexts.
Prior to Tuvel’s intervention, a group of philosophers informally tackled the 
question of how to react to Dolezal’s claim to be black. The conundrum facing 
philosophers was and remains to reconcile the widely shared belief that “race” is 
a social construct and a “biological fiction” with the fact that race often has been 
used as a tool of prejudice and oppression. As columnist Courtland Milloy put 
it, “Race is a biological fiction, a concept with no basis in anatomy. It is a myth, 
pseudoscience, a fraud, a social con job” (2018). Nevertheless, racism persists. As 
philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah puts it,
Much of the elaborate scientific superstructure that grew up around race was 
dismantled in the past century. . . . But the world outside the sciences hasn’t 
taken much notice. Too many of us remain captive to a perilous cartography 
of color.
(2018, xv)11
Thus, Dozenal’s case compels theorists to specify how race can be invoked, by 
whom, and to what purpose. Philosopher Esa Díaz-León acknowledges that race 
is a social construction, but suggests that two important definitional attributes—
social position within a social hierarchy, and shared historical properties—serve 
“crucial” explanatory roles, “such as explaining a history of racial discrimination 
and revealing different social structures of oppression.” Based on those two sets of 
attributes, Díaz-León concludes that “it’s not clear at the moment that a concept 
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of race based (solely) on self-identification is politically useful to a similar extent” 
(in Weinberg 2015). In a similar vein, Meena Krishnamurthy suggests that the key 
definitive attribute should be ancestry, which again would challenge the ability to 
self-identify one’s race:
Ancestry is the appropriate basis for referring to people as “black” because it 
tracks politically relevant considerations such as oppression and slavery (his-
torical political injustices), which are considerations that ought to be given 
weight to and taken into consideration when we interact with others in the 
public sphere. This is what self-respect and a just society require.
(in Weinberg 2015)
Note that these philosophers are not making a metaphysical argument about 
what race “really is,” but rather are identifying attributes that they consider “essen-
tial” for the pragmatic purposes of social justice. Such an approach resonates with 
William James’s claim (quoted earlier) that “The essence of a thing is that one of 
its properties which is so important for my interests that in comparison with it I may 
neglect the rest” (1981, 961). Thus, for the purposes of defining race with an eye 
toward recognizing the historical injustices associated with racism, historical prac-
tices and status (including enslavement) are vitally important, and thus should take 
priority over claims of self-identification.12
Similarly, analytic philosopher Quayshawn Spencer notes that the category of 
race has practical implications in various institutional policies and regulations, and 
thus a shared definition of race and honesty about ancestry advances goals of social 
justice:
So, why does any of this matter? Well, one reason is because linguistic com-
petence and honesty about one’s racial membership(s) is presupposed in the 
execution of many social programs designed to promote social justice. For 
instance, the preferential treatment of Blacks in college admissions and faculty 
hiring, the federally-mandated racial tracking of mortgage loan borrowers, 
the [FBI’s] racial tracking of hate crimes, and the Department of Health and 
Human Services’ racial tracking of health disparities all rely on Americans 
being linguistically competent and honest about their racial membership(s) 
in census racial discourse.
(Spencer, in Weinberg 2015)13
Thus, the situation with race and self-identification, as these philosophers see 
it, is not unlike the approach described in this book with respect to sex/gender. 
Yes, in most contexts, people can and should be able to identify themselves as 
they wish. Once that identity is declared in practical or institutional contexts that 
involve the cooperation of others, however, we are dealing with a social identity 
that requires social recognition, sometimes negotiation, and if the stakes are high, 
definitional regulation. In the cases where white academics passing as non-white 
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were discovered, the individuals were criticized because they had received mate-
rial resources to support their work that could have otherwise gone to Black or 
Latino scholars. In Jessica Krug’s case, she lost a tenured faculty position at George 
Washington University after she was revealed as white and it was learned that she 
had misrepresented her upbringing as stereotypically non-white and impoverished, 
such as falsely claiming her parents were addicts and her mother was a sex worker 
(Wamsley 2020).
On March  22, 2021, the city of Evanston, Illinois, approved a program for 
local reparations for Black residents, initially focusing on housing. The program 
“acknowledges the harm caused to Black/African-American Evanston residents 
due to discriminatory housing policies and practices and inaction on the City’s 
part,” and offers financial compensation. Consistent with what the philosophers 
cited earlier advocate, the program’s definitions focus on ancestry, and define 
“Black or African-American” as “A person having origins in any of Africa’s black 
racial and ethnic groups” (City of Evanston 2021). Similarly, William A. Darity, Jr. 
and A. Kirsten Mullen, authors of From Here to Equality: Reparations for Black 
Americans in the Twenty-First Century (2020), argue that two conditions are “criti-
cal” for determining eligibility for reparations: “[R]ecipients must have at least 
one ancestor who was enslaved in the United States”—a requirement consistent 
with other definitional approaches—and, interestingly, “recipients also must show 
that they self-identified as Black, Negro or an equivalent designation on an official 
document for at least 12 years before a reparations program was set in motion” 
(Mullen & Darity 2021).
When might regulatory definitions be desirable?
Returning to the issue of definition with respect to gender, what might be gleaned 
from the previous discussion of self-identification and race? Put most simply, there 
need to be compelling reasons to impose a regulatory definition. Activist-scholar 
Heath Fogg Davis argues in his book, Beyond Trans: Does Gender Matter?, that “all 
of us would be better off in a society with dramatically fewer sex-classification 
policies” (2017, 17). I agree with the thesis that we do not need regulatory defi-
nitions for sex/gender unless a legitimate purpose is being advanced in specific 
contexts. Davis describes in an appendix and a companion Workbook how to 
perform a “gender audit exercise” that is intended to encourage gender-inclusive 
design strategies (2017, 151–157, 2018a).14 For example, the dominant practice 
of sex-segregated restrooms has the stated purpose of ensuring privacy and safety, 
but properly designed all-gender restrooms could advance such purposes without 
discriminating based on sex/gender and avoiding the consequences of people being 
“policed” based on their appearances and gender-based assumptions.
I wish to take Davis’s idea of a gender audit a step further to think about a 
framework for thinking about how and when regulatory definitions of sex/gender 
are appropriate. Such an approach is consistent with that taken in the UK, where 
the Equality Act of 2010 permits actions involving sex segregation, including with 
Pragmatic approach to defining sex/gender 181
respect to gender reassignment if such acts are “a proportionate means of achiev-
ing a legitimate aim” (2010, 150). This notion of proportionate means achieving 
legitimate aims is pursued in the next section operationalized as “levels of scrutiny.”
The United States does not have an Equality Act akin to the UK’s Equality 
Act of 2010, though one has passed in the U.S. House of Representatives (H.R.5 
Equality Act). H.R.5 is an act “To prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, 
gender identity, and sexual orientation.” The bill defines gender identity as follows: 
Sec. 1101(a) “(2) GENDER IDENTITY.—The term ‘gender identity’ means the 
gender-related identity, appearance, mannerisms, or other gender-related charac-
teristics of an individual, regardless of the individual’s designated sex at birth.” The 
bill as currently drafted has been criticized in part because of the obvious circularity 
of the definition of gender identity—“ ‘gender identity’ means the gender-related 
identity”—and the absence of any sort of framework or regulatory definitions for 
adjudicating claims for contexts in which sex/gender based segregation may be 
relevant (as explored in Part II of this book).15 In its current form, the Equality Act 
is unlikely to be approved by the U.S. Senate (AP 2021b; Burns 2021). It is likely 
that passage will require some sort of pragmatic framework or wording similar to 
the UK’s Equality Act (allowing sex segregation if such acts are “a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim”).
It may be recalled from the previous chapters that a number of regulatory defi-
nitions for sex/gender have been used or proposed. The simplest way to describe 
self-identification as a regulatory definition would be: Anyone who self-identifies at 
the moment as a woman/man (X) counts as a woman/man (Y) in this context (C). 
Note that there is no temporal requirement of duration stipulated. Most contexts 
that still prefer sex segregation (for specific contextual reasons) add the requirement 
of duration, either past or future, such as some of the single-sex schools discussed 
in Chapter 4: Anyone who consistently lives and identifies as a man/woman (X) 
counts as a man/woman (Y) in the context of applying to this institution (C). 
“Lives as” is somewhat open-ended, but in the context of a single-sex school, one’s 
future intentions are salient, and presumably one must transition socially, including 
using gender-specific pronouns and names.
Some contexts, such as bathrooms in states without the so-called bathroom bills, 
function with an implicit regulatory definition: People perceived as a male/female 
(X) counts as a man/woman (Y) in the context of public bathrooms and changing 
facilities (C). In many non-institutional settings, the only social “requirement” is 
that one passes. While there may not be “official” sanctions for not-passing, there is 
a threat of violence that all too many transgender people must contend with. Note 
that with the single-sex school example, the student has the presumptive power to 
define herself or himself. As we move to more restrictive regulatory definitions, 
that power shifts as decisions are a negotiated outcome with others.
Some regulatory definitions attempt to recognize transgender individuals but 
require more than self-identification, such as the military’s requirement for an 
“official” diagnosis of gender dysphoria. Some institutions defer the authority to 
define to “official” (i.e., medical or governmental) agencies, such as Anyone who is 
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legally recognized as a woman/man (X) counts as a woman/man (Y) in this context 
(C). Such approaches sometime stipulate the birth certificate as the controlling 
official document, which is why the ability to amend one’s birth certificate is so 
important to transgender people.
Some regulatory definitions require one either to be receiving hormone ther-
apy and/or undergo surgical reassignment to pass the requirements of a specific 
definition, such as in elite sports, prisons, or to obtain legal identification in some 
jurisdictions. Some biology-based regulatory definitions, including that previously 
advanced by the Trump administration, are intended to ignore the possibility of 
transgender and DSD people, such as Only those assigned the sex female/male at 
birth (X) counts as women/men (Y) in this context, or Only those with male/
female chromosomes count as male/female (Y) in this context.
The point is that regulatory definitions range from easy to extremely difficult 
to satisfy. The argument I am advancing with different levels of scrutiny is a simple 
one: The more onerous the regulatory definitional requirements, the stronger the 
justification must be.
Levels of scrutiny
I advocate an approach analogous to that found in U.S. constitutional law known 
as different “levels of scrutiny” applied to laws and regulations that restrict indi-
vidual freedom.16 Deference here is to individual freedom, and it is the institution 
involved that must meet increasingly higher levels of scrutiny as more restrictive 
regulatory definitions are proffered. It may be useful here to describe the levels of 
scrutiny recognized in U.S. constitutional law before explaining how I adapt them 
as levels of scrutiny specific to the regulatory definitions of sex/gender.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the University of California, Berkeley, School of 
Law, notes in his influential textbook on constitutional law that “In a sense, the 
level of scrutiny provides instructions for balancing. It informs courts as to how to 
arrange the weights on the constitutional scale in evaluating particular laws” (2015, 
789). The lowest level of scrutiny is known as the Rational Basis Test. This test 
holds that government action is permissible as long as it is “rationally related” to 
a legitimate government purpose. So, for example, state laws that set a minimum 
age to obtain a driver’s license in fact “discriminate” against those younger than 
the minimum age, but have been supported by the courts because such laws serve 
a legitimate purpose of public safety. This level of scrutiny sets a very low bar for 
government regulation as it is presumed that laws have a rational basis; as a result, it 
has been invoked very rarely by the Supreme Court to invalidate a law or regula-
tion.17 I  include the Rational Basis Test only in the interest of contrasting it to 
the other two levels of scrutiny, which will be far more relevant to the framework 
I advocate concerning regulatory definitions of sex/gender.
The next level of scrutiny is known as Intermediate Scrutiny. As Chemerinsky 
states, “Under intermediate scrutiny, a law will be upheld if it is substantially related 
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to an important government purpose” (2015, 790, emphasis in original). The wording 
may seem only subtly different than what I  just described as the Rational Basis 
Test, but note the substitution of two key words—substantially for rationally, and 
important for legitimate. The idea is that when Intermediate Scrutiny is applied, 
the stakes are acknowledged as higher, so the burden of proof is increased on the 
government and justification must be correspondingly stronger. For example, the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall make no law 
abridging freedom of speech, but over the years a number of government restric-
tions have been permitted by the Supreme Court, such as regulation of commercial 
advertising, when the justification is substantially related to an important purpose.
A more relevant set of Intermediate Scrutiny cases are those in which the 
Supreme Court has reviewed regulations based on sex. It was not until 1971 that 
the Supreme Court first struck down a classification based on sex (Chemerinsky 
2015, 1086). Before that time, laws that prohibited women from becoming attor-
neys, from voting, or that restricted women’s ability to work as bartenders, were 
upheld with the logic of what we now call the Rational Basis Test. In a series of 
cases in the 1970s, the Court wrestled with what the appropriate level of scrutiny 
should be with respect to sex classifications, vacillating between Rational Basis and 
Strict Scrutiny. Finally, in the 1976 case of Craig v. Boren (429 U.S. 190), the Court 
described what is now labeled Intermediate Scrutiny when it struck down an Okla-
homa law that set different ages at which men and women could purchase alcohol, 
proclaiming that to survive constitutional challenge, “classifications by gender must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to those 
objectives” (197, quoted in Chemerinsky 2015, 1092). In the important case of 
United States v. Virginia (518 U.S. 515 [1996]) the Court declared the exclusion 
of women by the Virginia Military Institute unconstitutional. Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg applied Intermediate Scrutiny and declared that parties “who seek to 
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an exceedingly persua-
sive justification for that action. . . . The burden of justification is demanding and it 
rests entirely on the State” (515, quoted in Chemerinsky 2015, 1093).
It should be noted that the Court looks closely at the purpose of sex/gender 
classifications. Restrictions based on gender role stereotypes are not allowed, but 
classifications “benefitting women designed to remedy past discrimination and dif-
ferences in opportunity generally are permitted” (Chemerinsky 2015, 1097).
The final and highest level is Strict Scrutiny, under which “a law will be upheld 
if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose” (Chemerinsky 2015, 791, 
emphasis in original). Again, the stakes are raised with the terms necessary and 
compelling. The government action under scrutiny must be shown to be the only 
way to achieve a crucial and vital purpose. The first case applying Strict Scrutiny 
was the 1944 decision of Korematsu v. United States (323 U.S. 214), challenging the 
constitutionality of segregation and internment of all persons of Japanese ancestry 
from certain parts of the U.S. The decision was the first to apply Strict Scrutiny to 
government actions based upon racial classifications. Though the Court ruled that 
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the need to protect against espionage (the case took place during World War II) 
outweighed the rights of Americans of Japanese descent, the application of Strict 
Scrutiny would become an important legal tool in the future against laws discrimi-
nating based on race.
To be clear, I am not trying to map my framework for thinking about levels of 
scrutiny concerning regulatory definitions of sex/gender exactly onto the levels of 
scrutiny found in U.S. constitutional law. My hope by describing these levels is to 
facilitate thought and discussion that promotes greater nuance than an either/or 
choice of autonomous nominalism and biological essentialism.
Given the values and interests explicated in the chapters in Part II, a brief 
description of the levels can be described as follows:
Level Zero:
Self-Identification is definitive. No need for documentation as self-decla-
ration is sufficient. No temporal constraints; that is, ephemeral status or 
nonbinary status always acceptable. Examples: Non-institutional social 
settings, including bathrooms.
Level One:
There is a rational basis, grounded in history, served by sex segregation in this 
context. Self-identification is sufficient, but may require commitment to 
live as a gender not necessarily assigned at birth. Social transition required 
but not medical transition. Example: Single-sex schools.
Level Two:
Intermediate scrutiny: There is an important value or set of values served 
by sex segregation in this context that requires a documented condition 
of gender dysphoria and/or a durational criterion to “count” as a gender 
other than that assigned at birth. Examples: Interscholastic sports, Mili-
tary, Prisons.
Level Three:
Strict scrutiny: Sex segregation advances an important interest that can only 
met through meeting specific durational and medical transitional criteria. 
Example: Elite Competitive Sports.
My placement of different contexts within specific levels is intended to reflect 
the current rationale (values and interests) for sex/gender segregation as identified 
in Part II. They are not necessarily a reflection of my personal preferences, nor are 
they intended to be definitive. Rather, this account is offered as a heuristic frame-
work to stimulate thinking and discussion about regulatory definitions concerning 
sex/gender in a manner that acknowledges the proposition that as the institutional 
context changes, so do the stakes.
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Personal identification
The various forms of identification we routinely use that carry a designation of 
sex/gender is an example of implicit regulatory definitions at work. As Heath Fogg 
Davis notes, “[t]he government agencies that issue and administer our sex-marked 
birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and passports never define the terms ‘sex’ or 
‘gender’,” thus how the terms are defined and applied imply rather than spell out 
specific definitional criteria (2017, 29). Formally defined or not, having a name or 
sex/gender designation on one’s ID that is at odds with one’s transgender identity 
can lead to serious difficulties, thus obtaining a name change on documents—
not only government-issued documents but items like bank accounts, academic 
record, leases, paychecks, etc.—is an important step for many transgender people 
(National Center for Transgender Equality 2016a). Thus, the Department of State’s 
announcement on June 30, 2021 that it plans to permit self-identification of gen-
der on passports is significant and noteworthy (Blinken 2021).
The sheer complexity of the matter—the many different jurisdictions and myr-
iad types of IDs and documents involved—prevent more than cursory treatment 
here. As noted transgender activist and political theorist Paisley Currah observes, 
“The state is not a singular entity, defined by structure or function, but an array of 
agencies, legislatures, and courts relying on practices, laws, and norms that oper-
ate—often at cross-purposes—at every level of government” (in Fischel 2019, 89). 
The result is a variety of different regulations and policies to determine, for exam-
ple, when an individual may change their designated sex on official records:
[F]or these various apparatuses of governing, sex was malleable, dependent 
on the particular remit of the agency. Sex was not a property to be classified 
according to some ideal, but rather something to be defined based on what 
it accomplished for a particular governing rationality.
(in Fischel 2019, 90)
Davis argues that such designations are not necessary for the purpose of gov-
ernment-issued IDs, and he questions whether there is a legitimate government 
interest “in collecting and recording sex-identity information about us” (2017, 48). 
The pragmatic approach advocated here suggests that sex-identity information on 
IDs should be limited to contexts where a legitimate purpose is served. If there is 
no such legitimate purpose, then self-identification should be presumptive, ceteris 
paribus. If all else is not equal and there is some pressing reason to impose a regula-
tory definition, then the levels of scrutiny described here would obtain.
An example of such pragmatic reasoning is a recent Federal District Court deci-
sion in Corbitt v. Taylor that struck down policy order 63 of the Department of Pub-
lic Safety in Alabama that specifies people’s genitalia must be used to determine the 
sex indicated on their driver’s license. Only transgender people who can document 
that they have undergone gender reassignment surgery were allowed to change the 
sex indicated on their driver’s license. This requirement functions as a regulatory 
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definition since it defines “sex” based on the physical attribute of genitalia. The 
requirement imposed substantial burdens on transgender people who could not 
afford or did not desire such surgery, since it required them to “bear a driver license 
with a sex designation that does not match the plaintiffs’ identity or appearance” 
(Thompson 2021, 7). The court noted, “carrying licenses with sex designations 
that do not match plaintiffs’ physical appearance exposes them to a serious risk of 
violence and hostility whenever they show their licenses” (8).
As the framework of levels of scrutiny I have described indicates, the more oner-
ous the definitional criteria, the more compelling the institution’s rationale must 
be. And indeed, requiring surgical reassignment is the most onerous requirement 
possible. In this case, the court explicitly applied “heightened scrutiny” since sex-
based classifications were involved. The court ruled that Alabama’s rule failed to 
meet such a standard, because their “interests are insubstantial or were formulated 
post hoc, and because the policy is inadequately tailored to advancing them” (10). 
Such state interests as administrative convenience and consistency between proce-
dures to change birth certificates and driver licenses were considered inadequate.
Another justification offered by the state for policy order 63 was to facilitate 
identification by law enforcement, specifically for booking and search purposes. 
The court rejected this rationale for two reasons. First, the reason was offered post 
hoc, after the fact, and there was no evidence that such a purpose was considered 
when policy order 63 was first created (34–36). Such post hoc rationalizations are 
not sufficient to pass heightened levels of scrutiny. Second, no evidence was offered 
“showing how a license with a sex designation that differs from the license-holder’s 
appearance could help officers confirm that the license matches the driver” (40). 
Indeed, the court noted that the “record suggests that licenses denoting the license-
holder’s genital status are wholly unhelpful for this purpose” (40).
The court’s reasoning in Corbitt v. Taylor nicely illustrates the pragmatic approach 
to regulatory definitions advocated in this book. The definitional rule imposed by 
policy order 63 was “People with male (or female) genitals (X) count as male (or 
female) (Y) in the context of applying for an Alabama driver’s license (C).” Requir-
ing evidence of surgical reassignment to “count” as female or male falls under what 
I have described as Level Three strict scrutiny, and I see no reason to disagree with 
the court’s assessment that it fails even a lesser, intermediate level of scrutiny. The 
harms caused by such a requirement outweigh the stated benefits and thus fail on 
pragmatic grounds. One can take the argument one step further, as Fogg does, to 
question whether or not state driver licenses need a sex classification marker at all 
(2017), since other information on the license, including the photo, can serve the 
pragmatic purposes of identification.
The future of defining sex/gender
It should be clear by now that the definitions of the words “sex” and “gender,” 
“female” and “male,” “man” and woman,” are in varying degrees of flux. Obvi-
ously, context matters. Most of the time and in most places, people use the words 
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“sex” and “gender,” “female” and “male,” “man” and woman” without confusion 
or fear of contradiction. Usage of such terms typically displays a high degree of 
denotative conformity. With increasing frequency, however, what would appear to 
be a straightforward question can turn into a definitional rupture that requires us 
to consider the purposes and processes of definition itself: Is this person a man or 
a woman in this particular context? It depends on how we define the words man 
and woman, which in turn depends on our purposes and interests. When defini-
tions are deployed by institutions with the power to enforce them, they become 
regulatory definitions that deserve critical examination as policy proposals. Once 
we set aside the impossible myth of a “one size fits all” definition, then it is pos-
sible to appreciate the importance of considering the specific values and interests 
advanced by competing definitions in specific contexts. The same can be said about 
methods of definition. That is, self-identification is one method of determining 
whether an individual is male, female, or gender nonconformist, requiring the use 
of chromosome analysis is another. Each approach advances different values and 
interests that can—and should—be evaluated according to the context in which 
definition occurs.
“Nothing About Us Without Us” is a phrase that can be traced back centuries. 
Nihil novi literally means “nothing new” but as early as 1505 was associated with 
the Polish political doctrine Nihil novi nisi commune consensus—nothing new with-
out common consent (Rzegocki 2019). In vernacular Polish this became Nic o nas 
bez nas, “nothing about us without us.” “No taxation without representation” is, 
of course, an early U.S. version of the sentiment. “Nothing About Us Without 
Us” became known in the U.S. initially as a key theme of the disability rights 
movement. In fact, Nothing About Us Without Us was the title of two important 
books on disability rights published in 1998 (Charlton; Werner); both of which 
advocated for self-representation and control over the objectives of the disability 
rights movement.
The principle has been put to good use in a variety of other social movements, 
including by transgender activists and scholars.18 Sasha Constanza-Chock’s Design 
Justice (2020) identifies “Nothing About Us Without Us” as a core commitment 
for design practices aimed at social change. The point is straightforward: Regula-
tory definitions can be thought of as tools we create to advance values and interests 
in specific institutional contexts. An important part of the pragmatic approach to 
definition I advocate is to consider such questions as who has the right to define 
and whose interests are served by competing definitions. Given the complexity of 
the issues described in the preceding chapters, the construction of regulatory defi-
nitions necessarily requires both trans and cis people to be at the table.19
The U.S. legal process—by which I include legislative and judicial actions—has 
and will continue to wrestle with these issues. I recognize that some supporters of 
full gender freedom will take a dim view of the sort of legal incrementalism this 
book describes (see, for example, Spade 2015), but I concur with Isaac West’s argu-
ment that our best chance for social progress is not to withdraw from institutions 
of power and authority but to engage in “impure” politics, for “they are the only 
188 What now?
politics available for those who want to engage strangers in the quest for recogni-
tion and justice” (2014, 191). Writing in a similar key, Paisley Currah advocates 
efforts toward incremental reform as well as pursuing long-range efforts to decon-
struct regulatory roles based on sex/gender classifications.20 In his words:
The short-term objective of recognition in order to alleviate the material 
problems of misclassified individuals in the here and now, and a long-term 
project that is necessarily less identitarian and more universalist, that looks 
at how sex classification figures into the reproduction of capital, race, and 
nation.
(in Fischel 2019, 95)
Though the Supreme Court majority decision in Bostock v. Clayton County in 
2020 claimed to be using a conventional understanding of the word “sex” to decide 
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or sexual identity violated 
Title VII’s proscriptions against employment discrimination based on sex, it is 
almost certain that the question of defining “sex” is an issue the Court will need to 
reckon with again, and at greater depth (see Eskridge, Slocum, & Th. Gries 2021). 
The historical situation facing the Court is, of course, symptomatic of the larger 
cultural pattern of needing to adapt our language use to evolving circumstances. 
As critical rhetoric scholar John Sloop notes, referencing Judith Butler, we find 
ourselves as part of a long struggle “in which our commonsense understandings 
about gender, sex, and sexuality are disarticulated and rearticulated in more con-
tingent arrangements—arrangements that help increase those ‘possibilities for a 
livable life’ for everyone” (2004, 148). Consistent with the sort of pragmatic ironist 
approach to language advocated here, Sloop concludes: “Literalization and de-
literalization, freedom and constraint, each must, in different ways and in different 
critical moments, continue to be a part of the overall critical project” (149).
As the famed philosopher W. V. O. Quine noted, “Our patterns of thought or 
language have been evolving, under pressure of inherent inadequacies and chang-
ing needs, since the dawn of language; and, whether we help guide it or not, we 
may confidently look forward to more of the same” (1969, 24). The Transgender 
Exigency is just such a moment when our changing needs require an evolution of 
our patterns of thought and language. Beginning at an ironist/reformist stage of 
analysis with something like the tiered scrutiny I have advocated strikes me as a 
prudent step toward that evolution.
Notes
 1 Quoted in McCreide (2012, 127).
 2 McCloskey (2019, 277).
 3 Hayton (2018). Hayton is a controversial figure and was criticized for wearing a t-shirt 
that said “Trans Women Are Men. Get over it!” (Hellen 2019). My inclusion of her 
quotation is not an endorsement of her views, but simply an effort to illustrate the range 
of transgender voices addressing the issues discussed in this book.
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 4 Taylor (2021).
 5 In the process of describing the “instability of definitions of who is truly human,” Bourke 
notes that “the human” is “most commonly marked as male” (Bourke 2011, 13–14). 
Androcentrism has a long, long history that, combined with biological essentialism and 
gender polarization, has defined women’s place as subordinate to men’s (Bem 1994). See 
also Grimshaw (1986, 104–138).
 6 GRC is defined as “a psychological state in which socialized gender roles have negative 
consequences for oneself or others” (O’Neil 2015, 10). An example of a harm to one-
self would be the socialized resistance to asking for help or care when one needs it; an 
example of harm to others is when masculine socialization includes anti-gay beliefs and 
attitudes.
 7 Multiple studies affirm that both men’s and women’s endorsement of traditional (or 
“hegemonic”) masculinity was a strong predictor of support for Donald Trump for 
president both in the 2016 and 2020 elections (Vescio & Schermerhorn 2021).
 8 Brubaker (2016) notes that analogical reasoning in the case of transracial and transgen-
der issues has been criticized, but I agree with him that race and gender are “systems of 
social classification with distinctive yet in some ways converging logics that can fruitfully 
be compared” (11).
 9 I use the construction trans-r because the term “transracial” has been used primarily 
by those in the adoption community to refer to describe parents who adopt a child of 
a different race. As Kevin H. Vollmers, Executive Director of Gazillion Strong, notes: 
“Many members of the White press have appropriated and co-opted a deeply meaning-
ful, historical term—transracial—from the adoptee community” (Wang 2015).
 10 For a modest sampling of the discussion Tuvel’s article sparked, see Botts (2018), Gordon 
(2018), Mc Manus (2019), Russell (2019), Sealey (2018), and Tuvel’s response to her 
critics (2018). For an update on her position, see Tuvel (2021).
 11 Not all scientists agree that race is a fiction, and some argue for the continued utility of 
racial categories. See Morning (2011, 2014), Torres (2020), and Yudell (2014).
 12 Joshua Glascow, Sally Haslanger, Chike Jeffers, and Quayshawn Spencer collaborated 
to produce the book What is Race? Four Philosophical Views (2019). The authors nicely 
illustrate the point that one cannot ask “what is x?” questions in a vacuum. The question 
of “what is race?” is coherent only once there is at least some agreement as to what the 
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